Coping with Bounds in the Debate over Japanese Defense: Analytical Eclecticism, Nonlinearity, and the Lockwood Method: An Extended Literature Review and Methodological Review

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Working Draft

Abstract:

The following essay is an extended discussion of my methodological approach to my dissertation research on the future of Japanese security policy. My proposed dissertation will examine the issue of Japanese defense transformation through the perspective of three overlooked methods: analytical eclecticism, the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP), and nonlinear analysis. While these three research tools differ in their origins, each privileges the creation of a "big picture" gestalt of complex problems over the creation of parsimonious predictions. Given the complexity involved in understanding how external stimuli (nuclear missile tests, defense build-ups, rhetorical aggression) are processed through the filters of domestic policy, this essay argues that methods that contribute to a coarse graining of political analysis can augment conclusions from parsimonious approaches. I will show how my research will "capture" the complexity of the issue through a modified version of LAMP that takes into account the theoretical concerns of the discipline of International Relations. Though current Japanese defense transformation purposely hedges between two different (but not mutually exclusive) policies of military engagement based on US alliance maintenance and maintaining its role as a "unique" humanitarian power, forecasters of Japan's defense policy need to keep in mind the potential impact of focal events ranging from a financial meltdown, to US abandonment, to continued nuclear bullying by North Korea.

I. Introduction

Currently, Japan is at an impasse regarding future defense transformation. On the one hand, the rising threats of a nuclear North Korea, an assertive China, and the fear of abandonment from the US creates a pull toward so-called military "normalization," often defined in terms of conventional rearmament and a more autonomous defense posture; as several authors note, the idea that Japan must increase military spending, reform its pacifist constitution, and rely less on the US bilateral security treaty has gained an increasingly ardent following, especially among policy elites in the right wing of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (Envall 2008; Middlebrook 2008). On the other hand, the very current and reoccurring regional and domestic politics of Japan's militarist past tend to push Japanese foreign policy toward a middle power path that emphasizes the country's role as a civilian humanitarian power (framed as a continuation of its UN-centered diplomacy), regional order-building, and economic leadership through its official development assistance (ODA) (Soeya 2004, 2005). The domestic debate over the course of future defense policy takes place in the context of a domestic Japanese politics that privileges informal bargaining, consensus, and incremental change over decisive change. Thus, any attempt to understand the domestic foundations of future defense policy must take into account both the perceptions of the actors involved in the debates, as well as the various processes, what Curtis (1999) calls "opportunity structures," in which political actors seek change.

This essay will discuss my methodological approach to the issue of Japanese defense transformation through the perspective of three overlooked research perspectives: analytical eclecticism, the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP), and nonlinear analysis. While these three research tools differ in their origins, each privileges the creation of a "big picture" gestalt of complex problems over the creation of parsimonious answers. Though analytical eclecticism has been criticized for being permissive, offering few defenses against bias, proponents of eclectic approaches (Katzenstein and Sil 2004; Katzenstein and Okawara 2004; Carson and Suh 2004; Sil and Katzenstein 2005) have demonstrated the usefulness of analytically eclectic approaches for denaturalizing assumptions and opening up new paths for inquiry. As Katzenstein and Sil (2004) argue, analytical eclecticism serves to bridge the gap between the social sciences and other sciences' progress in the study of complexity (17). As the proponents of analytical eclecticism argue, detaching, comparing, and synthesizing competing explanatory sketches is a pragmatic way of negotiating competing analytical claims in what are otherwise discreet research programs. LAMP, on the other hand, is a method largely used in the field of defense intelligence; the method asks the analyst to consider all possible future choices from the perspective of the relevant actors (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993; Tanner 1996). Though LAMP retains some commitment to "parsimony" in that its process guides the analyst toward a conclusion about which scenario is the most likely to occur (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993), it also shares the "crude look at the whole" (Czerwinski 1998; Kerbel 2004) aspect that nonlinear and analytically eclectic perspectives share. As Lockwood and Lockwood (1993) write, LAMP--with its emphasis on the autonomy of actors, free will, and the impact of nonlinearities, or focal events--is "probability theory's answer to "chaos theory"" (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993: 91-92). Even though the analyst chooses a mostly likely future, this conclusion never amounts to an instance of analytical closure; the analyst must come back to his conclusion to account for new data and forecast indicators that point to possible focal events that would change the likelihood of all possible futures. In this way, the LAMP method opens up a crucial space for examining areas of ripeness, reinforcement, and resistance (Czerwinski 1998; Beyerchen 1992; Kerbel 2004) that may lead to unexpected results.

As I will demonstrate, each of these three methodologies provides crucial inputs for

understanding the complexity of Japanese security politics. While LAMP provides the basic methodological structure for inquiry, the in-depth qualitative research that this method requires into the relevant security actors will be informed by a nuanced analytically eclectic approach. This approach will emphasize how the basic concerns of power, efficiency, and identity (Katzenstein and Sil 2004) are operative within the Japanese "refractive state" (Curtis 1999: 9); thus, I will examine how domestic political parties, bureaucracies, and influential industry groups use realist concerns with relative international power, liberal concerns over international and regional cooperation to create efficiency, and understandings of their identity in the creation of their security interests. In addition, I will explore how these actors use the logics of power, efficiency, and identity to help securitize and de-securitize issues within the security policy apparatus.

My research questions are:

What is the current trajectory of Japanese defense policy?

Sub-questions: How can LAMP, Analytical Eclecticism, and nonlinear approaches help to elucidate this current trajectory?

Sub-question: How can these three approaches help to uncover areas of ripeness, resistance, and reinforcement that lead to unlikely defense policy futures?

Sub-question: How do interactions between international capabilities and social structure and domestic capabilities and social structure help to create defense policy within Japan?

II. Why a new approach: the dangers of linearity and parsimony

The issue of complexity in international affairs is a problem that spans both the academic field of International Relations and the discipline of defense intelligence. Should/can complex systems like states or security complexes be simplified to help analysts distinguish the important details from background "noise"? How can scholars and analysts draw meaningful distinctions between data that should be collected and analyzed and data that should not? What analytical structures should be used to guide analysts and scholars in their investigations? As I will argue, the traditions of parsimony and linearity greatly inhibit how analysts relate to their object of study**.** As Kerbel (2004) writes, the commitment to linearity and parsimony in defense intelligence is "unrecognized, deeply ingrained, and enduring" (paragraph 2). In terms of academic literature, commitments to parsimony and theoretical fidelity have entrenched explanations in isolated conceptual paradigms, which hinders comparison with other explanations in other traditions; as Sato and Hirata (2008) write, current dialogue on Japanese foreign policy is driven by "paradigm competition" and thus "many scholars talk past each other and engage only in mutually exclusive paradigm-based monologues" (3). For this reason, the academic literature on Japanese foreign policy often fractures along thematic lines, with different theoretical perspectives often over-emphasizing the issues of either power (in the case of realism), efficiency (in the case of liberalism), or identity (in the case of constructivism and some forms of liberalism) (Katzenstein and Sil 2004). The result for both academic scholarship and defense intelligence literature has been a woeful lack of reflection on the limits of established methods of inquiry. By combining relatively recent movements in both the field of academic International Relations and defense intelligence to encourage engagements with complexity, this essay will create a framework for creating a big picture gestalt of the trajectory of Japanese defense policy.

a. Problems in "linear" Defense Intelligence

Since the devastating attacks of 9/11 and the analytical failure of the Iraqi weapons estimate, the US Intelligence Community has put more effort into developing "alternative" methods of analysis. Part of the soul-searching on the part of the confederated Intelligence Community and its constituent bureaucracies has been effort to take seriously the problems of complexity in predictive analysis. As several recent studies of defense intelligence have argued, the issue is as much about changing policy-makers' attitudes about what kinds of analytical products "count" as it is about improving analysis per se. As this literature argues, the focus on numerical percentages and "making the call" in predictive intelligence can be dangerous, prescribing a certainty that is arbitrary, misleading, and in a fundamental sense meaningless (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993). In the aftermath of the infamous National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, open source articles in the defense intelligence literature have pointed to the folly of closed, bottom line judgments (Cooper 2005; Kerbel 2004; Fishbein and Treverton 2004). In the case of the 2003 Iraq estimate, the non-classified version of the estimate conveyed a certainty over the Community's estimate that was not representative across bureaucratic line (Cirincione, Mathews, Perkovich, Orton 2004; Matthews and Miller 2004). In the wake of the invasion of Iraq, it is now clear that inter and intra-agency disputes and doubt expressed in the classified version was one of the most productive features of the original estimate (significant dissents came from both the State Department and the Air Force on key issues). In a larger sense, the focus on "making the call" (i.e. parsimony) obscures the need for more useful exercises in "sense-making" and the need to build more flexible analytical structures that can accommodate unlikely scenarios that are nevertheless important for policy-making (Cooper 2005: 42; Kerbel 2004; Fishbein and Treverton 2004: 13-23). Typically, the debate over alternative methods in intelligence analyst has often been reduced to the well-worn terms of the "intuition versus structured methodologies" debate. This need not be the case. As Fishbein and Treverton (2004), Kerbel (2004), and Czerwinski (1998) each demonstrate, dealing with complexity is best accomplished by a combination of overlapping approaches. In addition, there are a number of ways to "structure" non-traditional approaches in ways that direct analysts to rigorously interrogate complex systems and unlikely future outcomes. These methods include: brainstorming sessions to create divergent opinions; out-loud discussion and "red team" sessions to unearth faulty logic; greater degrees of modeling and audio-visual stimulation; investigating unlikely scenarios by working backwards and creating indicators; and interrogating multiple hypotheses through an examination of falsifying evidence (Fishbein and Treverton 2004: 23; Kerbel 2004; Heuer 1999: 69-78, 95-110)

b. The Limits of the Major Research Paradigms: realism, liberalism, and constructivism.

Proponents of analytical eclecticism (Katzenstein and Okawara 2004; Katzenstein and Sil 2004; Carson and Suh 2004; Sil and Katzenstein 2005) in the academic literature build their case by emphasizing that none of the major theoretical paradigms (realism, liberalism, or constructivism) can capture the complex interplay between material power, concerns over efficiency in international politics, or the effects of identity. Though each of these theoretical paradigms often construct their explanations in ways that are coherent and identifiable within their own research traditions, theoretical coherence often takes place through a process of highlighting one aspect of international political reality while relegating other issues to second order priorities. Thus, while realism emphasizes relative state capabilities and their impact on the security dilemma, it proves less useful

in examining the basis for cooperation or ideational influences. As Kawasaki (2001) demonstrates, neorealist predictions that countries will prepare for the worst case scenario in defense planning have often failed to materialize. Liberalism, for its part, is often productive in demonstrating the role of institutions in producing efficiencies that benefit multiple parties in positive sum relationships; however, liberal approaches often fail to address issues of relative capability, the security dilemma, and the strong effects of identity. Constructivism, meanwhile, tends to highlight issues of identity and normative influences, while neglecting issues of relative power and the material efficiencies produced through cooperation (Katzenstein and Okawara 2004: 98; Dobson 2003: 7-25); in this way, constructivist approaches often ignore the "facilitating [material] conditions" that underpin the construction of security concerns by actors (Buzan et al 1998: 17). In short, while realist and liberal approaches, rooted in rational-materialist foundations, tell us much about basic motivations and material restraints, they tell use very little about how states exercise agency in environments characterized by risk and uncertainty. For an explanation of this, we need liberal and constructionist approaches that consider ideational and historical socialization processes.

In terms of the analytical sketches each of these perspectives has generated for East Asian security issues, each theoretical paradigm has demonstrated limitations. Though realist theories predict competition and balancing behavior based on a regional security dilemma, current theories are indeterminate as to whether Japan will balance with China against the US, or vice versa; by focusing merely on capabilities, realism misses just how important issues such as the history Japanese militancy have been in undermining cooperation or the incipient multilateralism that is developing in the East Asian region. In terms of liberalism, its focus on institutional efficiencies, information sharing, and converging identities, misses the role domestic identity politics play against greater cooperation in the region; in the case of Japan, the problem of history has been a continuous barrier against greater cooperation with South Korea and China. Constructivist approaches to Japanese defense policy, meanwhile, often overlook just how young institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) are and the limited impact they have had in helping to shape common understandings in the region over defense issues; in addition, constructivist approaches tend to minimize just how effective international structure is in conditioning some aspects of foreign policy-making (Katzenstein and Okawara 2004: 110-116).

For these reasons, proponents of analytical eclecticism espouse the use multiple approaches to undercover the rich structures of causality that underlie foreign policy-making. Rather than conclusions nested firmly in the ontological, epistemological, and methodological approaches of a research paradigm, what analysts should focus on are the "analytical sketches" that these research programs generate. These detached analytical sketches can then be compared and contrasted with each other to demonstrate lingering problems in the subject matter. In this way, the analytically eclectic approach espoused by Katzenstein and Sil (2004) works within the larger tradition of "coping with complexity" that is occurring not only in defense analysis, but also in other sciences. As this essay will later demonstrate, detached from their theoretical paradigms, broad thematic concerns over power, efficiency, and identity can be used to interrogate the complex motivations of domestic actors and the securitizing/ de-securitizing moves of these actors within the domestic security policy structure.

c. From "Flabby" Pluralism to Nuanced Approach to Complexity

As Katzenstein and Sil (2004) state, "theoretical multilingualism" may "tax an individual researcher's stock of knowledge and array of skills while introducing more "noise" into the established channels of [scholarly] communication" (Katzenstein and Sil 2004: 30). In addition, an

analyst's attempt to write on a subject across theoretical boundaries may lead to inconsistency, or worse, incoherence. For these reasons, some eclectic approaches have been dismissed as undisciplined, "flabby" appeals for pluralism that ignore the deep conceptual inconsistencies that are important between research paradigms (Johnson 2002: 245). As a response to these critics, proponents of analytical eclecticism have demonstrated, quite effectively, that in the case of the analysis of security dynamics, theoretical parsimony can produce costly silences. Thus, proponents note that the commitment to analytical eclecticism is founded on a deep pragmatism: analytical eclecticism is a more efficient analytical tool for finding persistent problems and guarding against premature analytical closure (Carson and Suh 2004; Katzenstein and Okawara 2005; Sil and Katzenstein 2005). A commitment to analytical eclecticism—the use of explanatory methods in different theoretical traditions without their paradigmatic baggage—means being able to speak the language of power, efficiency, and identity in ways that open up new spaces for inquiry. As I will demonstrate with my examination of the LAMP method, however, in terms of predictive analysis, this also means that the analyst must actively seek out instances of potential rupture between past and present. These *commitments to seeing nonlinearity* work from an open theoretical framework that privileges interchange between theories and a willingness to speculate about what lies outside the normal purview of discussion on the topic. However, these commitments also impose rigor: they demand a vigilant eye for areas of ripeness, reinforcement, resistance, and non-additivity that help to complicate linear models that link past with future.

III. LAMP: Chaos Theory's Answer to Predictive Analysis

a. Nonlinearity and Parsimony

Much of western science is based on the premises of linearity. Linear analysis assumes that systems are characterized by proportionality, additivity, replication, and demonstrable cause and effect. Systems are proportional when small inputs produce small outputs, and large inputs produce large outputs; systems are additive when they can be broken up into smaller pieces, analyzed, and then reconstructed to make up a larger whole. In the sciences, progress is measured when cause and effect relationships are independently verifiable and can be replicated. Thus, linear analysis—or reductive linear analysis—works under the assumption that phenomena can be broken, their parts analyzed, and then added to construct an understanding of the whole. Nonlinear modes of analysis, on the other hand, work from the premise that many phenomena are not amenable to reductive analysis, and thus, must be supplemented with methods that help to develop a "crude look at the whole." Systems that are not amenable to linear analysis are often characterized as unstable, irregular, and inconsistent; they have "synergistic" relationships, feedback loops, trigger effects, delays, or are subject to abrupt qualitative shifts. Nonlinear approaches, then, take into consideration the possibility that small changes can have large effects or even qualitatively change the system altogether (Beyerchen 1993: 61-63; Czerwinski 1998; Kerbel 2004).

In most forecasts, the future is often considered a continuation of the past, and thus the analyst is blinded to data points that indicate potentials for acceleration, resistance to change, or even system shift (Doran 1999). Frequently, subjects of study demonstrate the characteristics of both linear and nonlinear systems. Even as analysts go about mapping in detail the important characteristics of the phenomena under study, no matter how great the detail or how well the parts seem to fit, there is always the possibility, hidden within the data, that something important has been missed or that the relationships between data points are not as straight-forward as would first

appear. For these reasons, analysts must find ways to "cope" with the unknown. Nonlinear methods of coarse graining (or taking a "crude look at the whole") and actively searching for areas of ripeness, resistance, and reinforcement serve as important supplements to linear reductionist techniques. These methods help to guide analysts away from the pitfalls of idealized approximations that are superficially well-behaved. In many ways, the "culture" of parsimony demands these well-behaved systems, and for good reasons the ability to make nuances "behave well" is equated with progress in the discipline. But in terms of predictive analysis, these simplifications can have disastrous results for policymakers. In International Relations, much can be gained by finding ways to allow more noise into our analysis, and to develop coping mechanisms that supplement parsimonious explanations. As I will shortly demonstrate, LAMP combines a rigorous method for linear forecasting with opportunities for the analyst to use creative speculative exercises to find areas of rupture between present and future. The final intellectual product of a LAMP analysis, then, is a combination of both parsimony and creative speculation that adds up to the "crudeness" that nonlinear approaches demand.

b. LAMP

The Lockwood Analytic Method for Prediction (LAMP) is based on the idea that the future is "nothing more than the sum total of all possible interactions of "free will"" (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993: 24-25). Thus, in order to predict the future, an analyst must know who the relevant actors are and understand how those actors view their options. For this reason, qualitative research into each actor's perspective is the main requirement of the analyst's time and expertise. Unlike quantitatively based methods of forecasting that ask the analyst to assign percentages to various outcomes, LAMP asks the analyst through a series of pair-wise comparisons only to distinguish between relative probabilities. In addition, by asking the analyst to engage in creative exercises of brain-storming on possible focal events that would change the likelihood of relative probabilities, and by thinking of how the most likely futures can transition into unlikely futures, the method provides countermeasures against satisficing and provides a platform for developing a more nuanced gestalt of the problem. For this reason, Lockwood and Lockwood (1993) characterize their method as probability theory's answer to chaos theory (91-92).

The steps to LAMP are as follows:

Step 1: Determine the issue for which you are trying to predict the most likely future.
Step 2: Identify the national actors involved
Step 3: Perform an in-depth study of how each actor perceives the issue in question.
Step 4: Specify all possible courses of action for each actor.
Step 5: Determine the major scenarios within which you will compare the alternative futures.
Step 6: Calculate the total number of permutations of possible "alternative futures" for each scenario.
Step 7: Perform Pairwise comparisons with each one receiving a vote or a nonvote.
Step 8: Rank the system by the number of votes received.
Step 9: Pick the future that is most likely to occur and examine it for it consequence on the issue at hand.
Step 10: State the possibility of a future event to transition into another future event.
Step 11: Determine the "focal events" that must occur in our present in order to bring about a given alternative
Step12: Develop Indicators for the focal events

The LAMP method is not without its problems. The most conspicuous problem (and one that Lockwood and Lockwood (1993) make explicit) is that any question of inquiry must be defined in such a way as to limit the number of relevant actors and choices available to these actors. Since in LAMP the number of all alternative futures is the sum of all possible interactions of "free will" among actors, the analyst must limit both the number of actors considered and the number of choices each actor has in order to keep the number of perspectives to be examined and the total number of possible futures to be compared manageable. This encourages the analyst to: one, limit the actors in any given scenario to what seems reasonable to that scenario; two, aggregate actors into large units at one scale of analysis; and thus, three, to regard other so-called marginal actors and actors at different scales as exogenous to the system that it considers.

In scenarios at the regional-interstate level of analysis, then, the analyst is encouraged to analyze each state as a unitary actor rather than as a composite state or dispersed groupings of self-interested parties each with their own perspective. When the LAMP method is adapted for use within the state (as I will do), the analyst is likely to examine the future as the net outcome of the freewill of organizations at the political party and bureaucracy level, rather than as a composite of smaller sublevel units or individuals, such as interest groups, civic organizations, or powerful personalities. Thus, the analyst is blinded to the potential impact of these smaller groupings and powerful individuals. In other words, an analyst might choose to look at units that seem structurally similar while ignoring unlike units that may nevertheless have similar or even greater capabilities to enact change. One defense against this bias is to take the effects of these smaller units into account when doing qualitative research on the similar aggregated units. Another defense that LAMP provides against these blind spots is in Steps 10 and 11, where these smaller groupings can be imagined as exogenous shocks to what are otherwise stable interactions of freewill on the part of organizations at the same level. An even more ambitious approach by the analyst would be to push beyond the bias for examining structurally like units, and instead, to look (creatively) for units that have roughly similar capabilities, even if these units are radically different in organization.

As my examination of the domestic politics of Japan will demonstrate, the LAMP method must be adapted for use in considering how domestic political actors interact to create state policy. As my analysis will demonstrate, because of the great deal of informal bargaining that takes place across parties and among groups in the bureaucracies, trade groups, and in even in civil society, the issue of identifying discreet organizational actors in some ways obfuscates more than it illuminates. The net sum of interactions between larger groupings (bureaucracies and political parties) may be made irrelevant by the great deal of bargaining that takes place among members of these groups within the settings of policy *zokus* (specialized policy tribes), *kokutai* politics (informal bargaining structures), or through the renegotiation of party lines by self-interested political actors (Curtis 1999; Stockwin 2008). In addition, powerful personalities may be able to override organizational objectives in ways that make the analysis of discreet domestic units irrelevant—thus, an analyst must be sensitive to issues of overlay and penetration by supra-group structures. Nor can one discount the impact of different situations on actors' agency; different scenarios (interactions of both the external and domestic environment) may give some organizations or parties more agency to decide policy while sidelining other organizations. Thus, the interaction between units and the extent to which actors are enabled by their contexts is at least as important as their perspectives on an issue.

There is a third problem with the LAMP method, no less significant than the two addressed above. As a method, LAMP allows the analyst a great deal of freedom to determine which data are important in assessing the perspective of the actors in Step 3. The only guidelines Lockwood and Lockwood (1993) provide for the analyst is a warning not to give into the temptations of "mirror-imaging" (substituting one's own logic for that of the actor) when examining perspectives

(30-31). Though LAMP as a defense intelligence methodology is evolutionarily discreet from theoretical debates in International Relations, the method does not escape the issues these theories address. For example, in order to determine which actors matter in any given scenario of inquiry (Step 2) the analyst must first examine the international structure and the capabilities of the actors involved—both key issues of concern for neorealism. However, when the analyst goes about the task of analyzing the perspective of each actor there is a sense in which aspects of liberalism and constructivism take over (though realism never disappears, as actors' perceptions often reflect realist concerns). Rather than an examination of nations as functionally similar (as neorealist analysis suggests), the analyst must reach beyond rational-actor perspectives and assume that actors have unique forms of agency in deciding how to view the problem (lest the analyst fall into the trap of "mirror-imaging"). In doing so, the analyst (it is assumed) will most likely take into consideration how actors' perspectives form within their individual histories and contexts, including the interactions between agents or through commonalities in politics and cultural (again forms of liberal and constructivist analysis).

As I will demonstrate in the next section, it is not enough to consider the perspective of actors from one theoretical perspective. Instead, an analyst must examine how the issues of power, efficiency, and identity permeate the perspectives of all actors in dynamic ways if one is to understand how issues are securitized or de-securitized by actors.

b. Adjusting LAMP to fit the Problem of Japanese Security Policy

In the area of defense policy, several actors stand out as discreet, interested, and efficacious in deciding the nature of the policy debate. These actors can be aggregated into both bureaucracies and political parties. The relevant political parties would be: The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the once dominant party now minority party; and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the recently elected majority party of Japan; and perhaps some analysis of the role other parties such as the Komeito, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), or the Social Democratic Party (SDP) could play in future alliances with either party. In terms of the relevant bureaucracies, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has long been the most influential bureau in foreign policy; in addition, since the Koizumi administration the former Japanese Defense Agency, now the Ministry of Defense (MOD), has risen to the level of a full policy ministry; the super-bureaucracy the Ministry of Finance (MOF) would also need to be taken into account since this bureaucracy exerts such strong influence over each of the other bureaucracies through its power over budgets. Finally, the Japanese economic confederacy the Keidanren (along with the role of the defense industry) warrants some attention specifically for its interest in easing the ban on arms exports and expanding the Japanese defense budget over the one percent of GDP restriction.

As discussed above, drawing boundaries around which actors count in Japanese politics can be a dangerous proposition because of the possibilities of overlay and penetration by groups and individuals at smaller scales. Often bureaucracies and ministries will make decisions with the inputs from other bureaucracies and even subgroups like interest groups and industry committees. In addition, powerful personalities such as the Prime Minister, party heads, or even industry leaders can play a substantial role in shaping policy that overrides functional organizational flow charts. If we frame the premise of discreet actors as problematic, then the focus of our qualitative research takes on a much different character. Because LAMP does not readily accommodate or structure analysis across multiple scales or across actor boundaries, adjustments need to be made to accommodate the particular characteristics of Japanese domestic politics. In addition to the discreet actors listed above, an analyst must simultaneously study informal deal making at the level of policy *zokus* and *kokutai* forms of politics that overlay and interpenetrate relevant organizations.

Also, one needs to be sensitive to how individual personalities may shape agendas across organizational lines.

The other issue to contend with is what to make of the larger voting public. The LAMP method encourages the analyst either to regard constituencies among voters either as part of the political party or to lump the voting public into one category as an "actor" for analysis. Because a majority of Japanese voters are currently unaffiliated, it is difficult conflate their influence with that of the political parties. However, considering the voting public as a homogenous group could lead to some dangerous simplifications. For this reason, the large number of unaffiliated voters is one potential source of either ripeness or resistance in Japanese politics that will need to be accounted for. Though the general public will be investigated as a discreet actor, through an investigation of domestic political theories I will also examine how the general public helps to empower other actors.

For all of these reasons, I suggest that the LAMP process be used at two scales: at the domestic level and at the national level. At one level, I will perform an in-depth analysis of each of the relevant actors, articulate their options, and do a pairwise comparison of which policy each actor will prefer. The LAMP process at this level will then inform my LAMP investigation of Japan's security policy preference at the national level. At this level, inputs from the LAMP process at the domestic level will be combined with an understanding of each actor's relative position within the security policy apparatus and the influence of overlaying and interpenetrating actors and individual personalities. Though domestic theories of political power will be helpful in understanding the relationship of actors to one another, these relationships will also be highly context driven. Thus in some scenarios, such as in the context of large degrees of public support, I predict that political parties or the prime minister will have more agency than the bureaucracies; however, in situations where domestic support for the ruling party wanes, or where weak coalition governments or intra-party rivalries persist, the initiative may pass to the bureaucracies. In addition, by emphasizing different structures of agency in domestic politics, I will also demonstrate how defense policy exhibits the characteristics of a composite policy, demonstrating aspects of an actors' favored policy to different degrees in different issue areas. Thus, a continuation of the status quo means that MOFA will continue to be influential in "civilian" aspects of security policy such as ODA spending, multilateral diplomacy, and norm-pioneering exercises in human and climate security, while MOD will have an increasingly strong role in "national" defense through increased inter-operability with US forces. Both of these actors, however, will find their roles constrained by the sensitivity of political parties and MOF (activated by public concern) over the cost of defense.

After I have conducted my predictions of policy preferences for each "actor" at the domestic level, I will then perform comparisons of options at the national level. The idea is that by extrapolating this analysis to the national level, I can then create big picture, or gestalt, of Japan's defense policy trajectory that has both the benefit of greater clarity, but also, allows for some coarse graining to "account for the unaccountable." The following section will provide a preliminary examination of Japan as a national actor and attempt to delineate what security policy choices are at the country's disposal.

IV. Japan as a National Actor and the Problem of Security Policy

Japanese politics has often been characterized as a veil of consensus that masks larger processes of conflicting interests and informal bargaining. Studies that examine Japanese foreign policy note multiple and conflicting layers of strategic thinking. Japan has been characterized as having an Asia-oriented policy, a UN-centered policy, a US-dominated policy, as relying on bilateralism with an incipient multilateralism, but also as taking a "low stance" on foreign policy so

as to assure a financial and political focus on domestic issues (Kazenstein and Okawara 2004; Samuels 2007, 2007a; Curtis 1999; Mochizuki 1995). Each of these characterizations is in its own way accurate. Though each of these themes form a composite part of Japanese foreign policy, which of these parts prevails depends greatly on the available opportunity structure and what organization or politician is able to most effectively use their opportunity to promote their foreign policy agenda. Prime Minister Koizumi, for example, was able to capitalize on his own popularity and the external problems of the North Korean abduction issue and nuclear threat, as well as the fraying of the bilateral relationship with China, to develop closer ties with the US and to promote an expanded role for the JSDF (Stockwin 2008; Samuels 2007a); the greater power of the Prime Minister's office and the cabinet during Koizumi's tenure contrasts sharply with the dominance of the bureaucracies during Japan's rapid economic growth, and the relative power of the Japanese bureaucracy during the politically tumultuous period of the 1990s (Mochizuki 1995). In addition, while MOFA has traditionally been the lead agency on issues of defense, a result of the historically low popular support for the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) during the Cold War; during the Koizumi administration, the policy influence of the JDA (later the MOD) expanded greatly, empowered by greater operational planning with US forces, a threatening external environment, and greater public support (Samuels 2007a).

Though a "low stance" on defense policy (defined as a combination of low defense expenditures and a reliance on the US protection) has been a basic characteristic of Japanese foreign policy since the foundation of the Yoshida Doctrine, the trauma of the first Gulf War (when Japan was labeled a pay check ally) has spurred Japanese politicians to rethink basic issues of foreign policy. This activism has resulted in a host of new legislation allowing for a greater use of the JSDF overseas, stronger central control in the Prime Minister's office during times of emergency, and *de facto* collective defense arrangements with US forces. In addition, Japan has dispatched forces with regularity for peacekeeping missions, has shown greater interoperability with US forces, and has embraced a military modernization program that includes Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). This increased activism, however, has yet to overturn some of the most important aspects of Yoshida consensus: the limit on defense spending (pegged at one percent of GDP), the US bilateral security treaty, the three non-nuclear principles (not to posses, manufacture, or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons onto Japanese territory), and Article 9 of the constitution which denies Japan its sovereign right to wage war.

Among the political parties, policy orientation is divided: the LDP is united in its support for the US, but divided on how to deal with Asia, while the DPJ is united on its multilateralist agenda for Asia, but divided on the US alliance (Samuels 2007, 2007a). On another level, there is a fundamental disagreement about how much the US alliance should cost and whether it should consist of Japan becoming a "normal" nation (Samuels 2007: 127). In addition, several authors have noted resurgent and aggressive nationalist tendencies in the LDP—a tendency that could lead to a nascent Gaullist security policy (Enval 2008; Rapp 2004; Samuels 2007, 2007a). Given the right opportunity structure—a heightened threat from North Korea, a belligerent China, a sense of abandonment by the US—this nascent Gaulism might become very potent.

a. The Postwar History: Article 9, the US Bilateral Treaty, and Policy Change

Following Japan's defeat in the Pacific War, Japan found itself an occupied power with a devastated economy and a shattered political system. In the years following Japan's defeat, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida was able to use a bilateral defense treaty with the United States as well as Article 9 of Japan's peace constitution to forge a consensus for economic development over military rearmament. Despite being an invention of the American occupying forces, a large element of the

Japanese public would eventually embrace the constitution and its pacifist overtones. Moderates like Prime Minister Yoshida were able to effectively neutralize opposition on the right by establishing a bilateral security arrangement with the US that would ensure Japan's safety, while at the same time neutralizing left wing opponents by embracing Article 9. Thus, under what would be called The Yoshida Doctrine, or Yoshida Consensus, Japanese politics would be driven by concerns over domestic social harmony, raising living conditions, and economic development, what would be called the politics of GNP-ism.

From early on the JSDF was seen as a semi-illegitimate organization. The Japanese Defense Agency was established as a mere agency (not a ministry) with top tiers of the agency filled by bureaucrats forwarded from other ministries. Thus, the role the MOF and MOFA played in establishing defense policy was supplemented by their role in directing the operations of the JDA. The role of the MOF played in determining JDA budgeting and procurement was especially emasculating for those in the JSDF. Because JDA procurement was often based on the lobbying of powerful domestic constituencies, the JSDF soon took on the moniker of a "shopping" army. Eventually, Japan's low defense expenditures were institutionalized, as a cabinet order in 1967 pegged spending at one percent of GDP, allowing for a greater allotment of government revenue to be spent on economic development and domestic projects that rewarded political patrons. Another important aspect of Japan's defense policy developed during this period is the three non-nuclear principles: that Japan would not possess, produce, or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons.

The US would periodically excerpt pressure on the Japanese to raise defense expenditures in order to contribute to a greater share of its defense. Japan, however, has been successful at invoking Article 9 as a constraint on a more active contribution. In addition, and partially as a result of this external pressure by the US, Japan would eventually begin promoting its own conceptions of security--comprehensive security (sogo anzen hosho). As a concept meant to counter external criticism, the concept stressed its foreign aid and contributions to international organizations as part of a comprehensive contribution to international security; as a concept focused on Japan's national security, the concepts has been used to focus attention on Japan's reliance on trade, as well as the importance of food and energy imports (Edstrom 2008: 63-66).

Though postwar Japan has been described as being allergic to defense strategy, this basic characterization of Japanese strategy misses just how much of postwar Japanese prosperity was based on minimalist foreign and defense policies. A minimalist defense force, constructed to deter but not threaten, allowed Japan to pursue mercantilist policies that helped build up its national wealth and construct policies in Official Development Assistance (ODA) that could buy the support of neighboring nations. Samuels (2007, 2007a) has called this a successful case of "cheap riding" on Washington's security strategy. Others, such as Kawasaki (2001) have suggested that this was a self-conscious strategy of minimizing offensive capabilities so as not to aggravate the regional security dilemma and provoke a costly arms race.

b. The Post-Cold War Security Shifts

Since the Cold War, the crisis of the first Gulf War and domestic political changes have created a new dynamic that has opened up the basic tenets of Japanese defense policy. Even though changes to defense policy have fallen short of challenging the main tenets of the Yoshida Doctrine, Japan has made significant changes to its minimum defense policy. These policy changes include: allowing the dispatch of the JSDF overseas, including peacekeeping missions in Cambodia, Mozambique, Rwanda, and East Timor; enacting numerous defense-related legislation that has allowed closer cooperation with US forces, including refueling assistance to coalition forces in the

Indian Ocean, and humanitarian operations in Iraq; in addition, Japan has also embarked on military modernization program that has allowed the procurement of sophisticated weapon systems such as enhanced missile defense systems. All of these changes have taken place in the backdrop of larger shifts in public attitudes toward the JSDF and constitutional reform.

The trauma of the first Gulf War, when Japan failed to send troops only a large financial contribution and was subsequently labeled a paycheck ally, has served as catalyst for much of this change. Criticisms of Japan's contribution during this conflict, helped spark a debate over Japanese "international contribution" (kokusai kouken), which led to, among other things, dispatch of minesweepers to the Persian Gulf and greater contributions to peacekeeping (through the Peacekeeping Law of 1992), and a significant role in peacekeeping and peacemaking in Cambodia in 1992. In addition, the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1994 demonstrated the severe limitation of the US-Japanese alliance. As a result, the revision of the US-Japan Guidelines for Security Cooperation, the passage of the Regional Contingency Law, and other related legislation expanded the scope of US-Japanese cooperation and expanded Japan's support of the US beyond mere territorial defense to areas around Japan. In addition, the late nineties saw an expansion of its comprehensive security concept into new, more ambitious ground. Japan's assertive response during the Asian financial crisis, characterizing the crisis as a problem of "human security" and employing some 30 billion dollars in foreign assistance to economies affected by the crisis (Edström 2008: 98), demonstrated that Japan could be assertive as a "civilian" power. Koizumi's decision to support the Global War on Terror with refueling activities in the Indian Ocean, and the decision to send a token humanitarian force to Iraq, by contrast, demonstrated the primacy of the US Bilateral Security Treaty as the bulwark of Japanese Defense. As Stockwin (2008) argues, it became apparent in the early years of the twentieth-century that right wing politicians saw closer ties with the US as the best way to push back on constitutional limitation on executive power and promote the normalization of the armed forces (253). Joint operational planning on Ballistic Missile Defense and contingency planning for North Korea helped to cement a more symmetrical military relationship, including a greater interoperability between Japan and US forces. Meanwhile, the Marine Self Defense Force and civilian Coast Guard's participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative since 2004 has helped boost the role of the Coast Guard to near the level of a service branch (Samuels 2007a).

In the midst of all of these shifts, the domestic landscape of defense politics has shifted tremendously. The early nineties saw the collapse of the Japan Socialist Party as a major competitor after its historical opposition to the JSDF was dropped from their party platform. Since then, partially in response to generational changes and positive public views of their role in peacekeeping, public support of the JSDF has risen. This allowed LDP politicians to elevate the JDA to a full policy ministry and eventually establish it as a full ministry in 2007. In addition, the once taboo subject of repealing or revising Article 9 has repeatedly been publicly aired by politicians, as has the possibility of nuclear armament. Larger changes in both the public attitude toward the JSDF coupled with the willingness of politicians to continually test the waters of constitutional change have led some authors to conclude that now may be an opportune time push for a normalization agenda; all of these changes occurred in a permissive opportunity environment that included the North Korea abduction issue, North Korean nuclear bullying, and acute instances of Chinese Japan-bashing (punctuated by an incident in April 2005 where China threw stones through the window of Japan's embassy in Beijing). North Korean missile tests in 1998 and 2006, along with continuous missile testing and periodic belligerent statements by government officials, have helped drive efforts toward military modernization, and have motivated policy makers to place greater emphasis on alliance maintenance (Hughes 2009).

Since the first Gulf War constant special legislation has continually tested the viability of

Japan's pacifist constitution (Middlebrook 2008). The question now remains, with the ascension of the DPJ to power: Will these limits continue to be tested or will Japan drift slowly back toward a more minimalist stance on the use of the JSDF for peacekeeping and support for US operations abroad? The victory of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) could signal a potential watershed in Japanese security policy. The DPJ platform promises a more UN and Asia-centered foreign policy. In addition, the DPJ have been openly critical about many aspects of the US security relationship, including the cost of the alliance and the refueling mission in the Indian Ocean; nevertheless, the priority of domestic issues like the economy may compel the DPJ to rely on policy drift on foreign relations (Konishi 2009).

c. Choices: Between "Normalization" and a "Unique Civilian Power"

Given Japan's current position, I suggest that there are four discreet choices for Japan: (1) normalization-Gaulism, defined as: increased defense expenditures, a revision or retraction of Article 9 of the constitution, and a greater de-emphasis or even a break with the US-Japan Bilateral Defense Treaty; (2) normalization-closer US strategic ties, defined as: a revision or repeal of Article 9 with closer military ties with the US, with greater provisions made for collective security; in addition, as a minor provision, in the short term no major changes would be made to Host Nation Support and the US-Japan Status of Forces Agreement (3) radical pacifism; in this option Japan would restrict the JSDF's deployment overseas, including a halt to refueling efforts in the Indian Ocean and perhaps a repeal of the Peacekeeping Law; this option might also call for a radical reduction in the number of US troops stationed in Japan; and (4) an active "unique" civilian power, which maintains Article 9, but increases support for overseas peacekeeping, and demonstrates a more robust approach to the building of regional forums such as ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), APEC, a renewed effort at establishing the East Asian Community (EAC); new measures to improve cooperation on international crime; an increase in ODA budget; and increased activism on issues of human and climate security.

Despite all of the shifts in the domestic environment since the early nineties, scholars of Japanese politics have still characterized Japan's reaction to the watershed events of the collapse of the Cold War as slow. This lethargy has been attributed to the economic stagnation of the 1990s, a lack of power in the executive branch, and a cultural preference among the Japanese for incremental change over bold policy measures (Stockwin 2008; Curtis 1999); thus, as a result of an "immobilist political system" (Stockwin 2008: 263) political decisions often have the substance of half-measures and compromises between approaches. As my discussion of the various theories of Japanese domestic power will demonstrate, there is good reason to analyze Japan as both a unified actor and a composite state. Though informal political bargaining often provides a general consensus on Japanese policy, often within this consensus, actors retain some freedom to pursue divergent policies. From another perspective, these divergent policies on the part of ministries are often part of a deliberate strategy of hedging on the part of the political elite (Samuels 2007a).

Thus, as I expect my qualitative research on the various actors to reveal, clear cut distinctions between the four options outlined above may be misleading. It may be that within a general policy consensus, elements of two or more options may predominate in several of the key actors. As Samuels (2007, 2007a) argues, Japan is currently pursuing an active "middle power" diplomacy (option 4), but with a fuller hedge against a non-democratic China (option 1, 2). Thus, option (5) will be a continuation of the status quo: the pursuit of a limited "civilian" power role through MOFA diplomacy (human security, climate security, a seat on the Security Council),

coupled with closer ties with the US and extensive alliance maintenance, and a "minimal" military modernization program aimed at countering the threats of North Korea and China. One of the key elements of this option will be an acute sensitivity to the costs of defense policy (Kawasaki 2001). Thus, Japan's role as a civilian middle power will be constrained by wariness over increased ODA expenditures, while its military modernization program will continue to suffer from the current one percent of GDP cap on defense expenditures. In addition, I expect that this sensitivity toward the cost of defense will be observable through continued political deliberation over Host Nation Support payments to the United States.

The following is a complete list of measurements for each option, including more minor indicators of movements toward these options.

Options and Measurements:

(1) Normalization-Gaulism,

-increased defense expenditures (above the current 1 percent of GDP cap) -acquisition of offensive weaponry: Including midair refueling capabilities, naval power to project forces overseas, and ship-based offensive missiles
-a revision or retraction of Article 9 of the constitution
-a break with the US bilateral treaty
Minor: De-emphasis of the US bilateral security treaty
Minor: Reinterpretation of Constitution to allow pre-emptive attack on North Korean Missile sites
Minor: Legislative change toward a strengthening of the Prime Minister's office
Minor: Bilateral Security agreements with other countries

(2) Normalization-Closer US Strategic Ties

-increased defense expenditures (above the current 1 percent of GDP cap)
-a revision or retraction of Article 9 of the constitution
-greater inter-operability with the US
-legislation supporting collective self-defense
Minor: No major revision of Host Nation Support and the US-Japan Status of Forces Agreement
Minor: Reinterpretation of Constitution to allow pre-emptive attack on North Korean Missile sites Minor: Legislative change toward a strengthening of the Prime Minister's office

(3) Radical Pacifism

-restrict the JSDF's deployment overseas
-a radical reduction of the number of US troops stationed in Japan
-repeal of the Peacekeeping Law
-a halt to refueling efforts in the Indian Ocean

(4) An Active Civilian Power

-maintain and affirm Article 9
-increased support for overseas peacekeeping
-a robust approach to regional fora: ARF, APEC, regional cooperation on transnational crime

-more action to restart the East Asian Community (EAC)
-increased ODA expenditures
-activism in human security and climate security -establish Free Trade Agreements (FTA) and Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA)

(5) A Continuation of the Status Quo

-a limited civilian role through MOFA diplomacy (human security, climate security, UN diplomacy) (constrained by falling ODA spending)
-closer ties with the US and extensive alliance maintenance
-a minimal military modernization program (constrained by one percent/GDP limit)
-a sensitivity to the cost of military as demonstrated over increased debate over Host Nation Support payments
-a political focus on domestic economic issues

V. Actors, Choices, and Perspectives

As a method, LAMP works to guard against the problems (frequently encountered in defense analysis) of mirror-imaging (Heuer 1999: 70-71; Lockwood and Lockwood 1993). Instead of substituting the analyst's own rationality for that of the actor's, LAMP puts a premium on exploring the logic of the actors under study. Though Lockwood and Lockwood (1993) suggest that analysts use different kinds of qualitative data to unearth this perspective, ranging from survey research, to history, to detailed linguistic analysis, they fail to specify how one can create a comprehensive understanding of a "national perspective." My study will attempt to reach a more nuanced understanding of Japan's "national perspective" by first examining the views of relevant domestic actors. This analysis will be supplemented by an analysis of how these parties interact, and how various "opportunity structures" are created where one or more parties have an advantage over others. After examining the priorities and options of these domestic groups, I will then use this information to analyze what policy choices prevail at the national level. My qualitative data gathering will use the concerns of analytical eclecticism to bring the rich insights of International Relations theory to the ethnographic study of these defense actors.

My study of defense actors in Japan will focus on (1) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), (2) the Ministry of Defense (MOD), (3) the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), (4) the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), (5) the Ministry of Finance (MOF), (6) the Keidanren, and (7) Civil Society. In addition, I will also examine the function of key interlocutors: (8) the defense policy-*zoku*, the Cabinet Legislative Bureau (CLB), and the Security Council. Following my ethnographic sketches of these groups, I will then use the descriptive literature on Japanese domestic politics to distinguish when and to what degree each group's perspective matters in foreign policy.

My study of the relevant domestic actors will look at the rich themes of (1) power, defined

as a concern with the distribution of capabilities in the international system (2) efficiency, defined as the potential for positive-sum cooperation both in economics and security affairs and (3) identity, defined as the specific concerns both at the national and organizational over the values, norms, and concepts that give group structures meaning. I will also look at how these three themes interact with the more parochial concerns of actors: (4) institutional or political survival and power and (5) concerns for the domestic interests that underpin this power.

As Katzenstein and Sil (2004) argue, discreet research traditions often make meta-theoretical choices that obscure comprehensive understandings of phenomena. In the case of Japan's domestic actors, the concerns of power, efficiency, and identity are all operative in different ways and to different degrees. As my cursory examination of the literature suggests, concerns over the security dilemma, economic prosperity, and maintaining a specifically Japanese identity are all operative in ways the blur boundaries between theoretical approaches. In addition, because of the nature of Japanese politics and its concern with an overarching harmony (chowa), institutional and party logics need to be constructed in ways that are acceptable for consumption by other actors. Thus the separate concerns of power, efficiency, and identity may collapse into discourses that are meant to resonate with larger public sentiments while preserving parochial interests and objectives. As Buzan et al (1998) work on securitization has demonstrated, it is important to understand not only the facilitating material conditions that underpin actors' security thinking, but also the underlying cultural logics of enmity and amity that are behind successful speech acts on security. Successful speech acts not only reformulate issues as security problems, but also have the potential to de-securitize issues and create the conditions for negotiations and amity (Buzan et al 1998; Buzan and Waever 2003). Thus security discourses can create areas of ripeness that can lead to unexpected and abrupt shifts in opportunity structures. Thus, while initial efforts to expand Japan's "international contribution" were originally framed within UN-centered constraints and pacifist language, the expanded use of the JSDF overseas created opportunities for Koizumi's administration to venture into activities that were *de facto* collective-defense operations with the US and to expand the influence of the JDA (later MOD). Thus, I believe an ethnographic approach informed by analytical eclecticism can lead to greater understandings of actors' perceptions of how domestic and foreign political landscapes coalesce into opportunities and constraints.

b. Domestic Politics: Theories and Trends

Theories of Japanese domestic power abound. Though most theories of political power in Japan emphasize the "Iron Triangle" metaphor of interactions between bureaucratic elites, politicians, and corporate elites, scholars differ on the relative power of each of these groups within the triangle. On one end of the spectrum are those who look at the unusual influence of the bureaucracies and conclude that unelected bureaucrats play a central role in managing Japan (Johnson 1995: 115-140; Kerbo and McKinstry 1995). Others view power in Japan as shaped like a pyramid with a small number of LDP (now DPJ) faction members at the top, senior bureaucrats, ministry heads, and keiretsu conglomerates at the next level, and a vast "elite at large" as the third level (Rothacher 1993); thus, elites compete with one another to get to the top of the pyramid. Others, noting the common culture among elites, interlocking club memberships, and especially the preponderance of elites who attended the same university (usually Tokyo University), contend that Japan is ruled by a homogenous yet diffuse elite with similar concerns and values (Kerbo and McKinstry 1995). Proponents of this elite culture thesis note that a large number of politicians were former bureaucrats and that the practice of *amakudari*, or "descent from the heavens," provides

retiring bureaucrats with plum jobs in the private sector or in politics. Other scholars note the importance of informal bargaining and consensus-building as a normative feature of elite policy-making (Curtis 1999); informal bargaining is as a way to avoid overt confrontation and to help the opposition "save face" (Kerbo and McKinstry 1995). As the recent electoral battle between the LDP and DPJ in Japan has demonstrated, however, these cultural features do not always constrain policy debates, especially when political survival is at stake.

From the perspective of what I will refer to as "the refractive state" position, politicians, bureaucrats, and business interests pursue their and their constituents' interests through a combination electoral politics, interparty maneuvering, and informal bargaining. As Curtis (1999) writes, in the Japanese refractive state, policy makers absorb and respond "to demands emanating from groups in civil society and from the electorate, but trying in the process to bend those demands into a shape that conforms as much as possible to the interest and the preferences of the managers of the state themselves" (9). Thus, policy makers pursue their policies through the various institutions that are available to them in ways that mix their own preferences with responsibilities to their party, bureaucracy, or electorate, or even the narrow interest of like-minded actors. Unlike the other theories that note a relatively static distribution of power amongst the three sides of the triangle, the refractive state position notes ever-changing opportunity structures available for policy-makers to exploit.

At the heart of the debate over power in Japan is the question of Japanese bureaucracies. Even compared with the Westminster system of Britain, Japanese bureaucracies have a significant amount of control over the day to day running of the government. As Stockwin (2008) explains, the roots of Japan's strong bureaucracy extend even before the Pacific War, when even then Japanese officials maintained a reputation as a highly-educate elite, dedicated to government service; the removal of the military from political influence during the American occupation greatly enhanced the clout of the civilian bureaucracies (137). This level of influence grew with time, as the honesty and efficiency of Japan's bureaucracies were seen as a driving force behind Japan's meteoric economic rise. Kerbo and McKinstry (1995) even note the popularity of novels that have bureaucrats as the protagonist; the authors argue that these novels are as much about Japanese respect for bureaucrats as they are about the heroes themselves (82).

Traditionally, Japanese bureaucracies have been able to recruit the brightest students from Japan's top universities, such as Tokyo and Kyoto University. During Japan's economic rise, bureaucracies enjoyed relatively high public approval, a reputation for honesty and efficiency, and an unusually large amount of autonomy, including the ability to draft legislation. However, since the 1990s, public opinion has turned against the bureaucracies, with MOF especially being held responsible for Japan's mismanagement of the economic bubble and the nation's botched economic recovery. In addition, constant media exposure of corruption scandals has overturned the popular images of bureaucrats as dedicated and honest servants of the state. Current public debates now focus on how to curve the autonomy and power of these bureaucracies, as well as the structural corruption that underpins relations within the iron triangle.

In contrast to the historical position of the bureaucracies, the positions of the prime minister and the cabinet have been relatively weak in Japanese policy-making. Factors contributing to this weakness include cultural inhibitions against aggressive leadership styles, a tradition of consensus building in Japanese politics, and the influence of power brokers within the LDP (Angel 1989; McCargo 2004). There have been some noticeable exceptions, however, including the tenure of Tanaka Kakuei, Sato Eisaku, Nakasone Yasuhiro, and Koizumi Junichiro (McCargo 2004: 94). Even in comparison to other parliamentary democracies, the cabinet tends to be weak. Cabinet power has been limited by constant reshuffles, tenures lasting less than a year, and limited power to appoint deputy ministers (Stockwin 2008; McCargo 2004). The administrative reforms introduced

by Prime Minister Koizumi in January 2001, however, were designed to increase the power of the prime minister and the cabinet. These reforms included the creation of super-ministries (the retraction of 21 ministries and agencies into 13) and the introduction of politically appointed junior ministers into the ranks of the ministries. The introduction of junior ministers was meant to push the bureaucracies further away from the legislative process and to foster greater political control.

Prime Minister Koizumi's tenure was a watershed in terms of consolidating political control in the hands of the prime minister and cabinet. Not only was he effective in reigning in the power of the bureaucracies, but he was also able to get around the complex systems of power-sharing within his own party, successfully taking on anti-economic reformists that stood against his position on privatization of Japan's postal system. Stockwin (2008) suggests that the power of the bureaucracies has actually been in gradual decline since the 1970s when LDP politicians began the practice of creating *zokus*, or policy tribes, around policy issues. These policy *zokus* have their own staff to educate them about their area of specialty. Prior to this, diet members were dependant on the bureaucracies for information on crucial policies. Thus, an important issue in defense policy is to identify the influence of the defense policy *zoku* vis-à-vis the relevant bureaucracies.

With Koizumi's new reforms and public sentiment turning against the bureaucracies, it seems that power has shifted toward a stronger prime minster and cabinet. A major policy plank of the now ruling DPJ is to continue to reign in the power and privileges of the bureaucratic elite by expanding the number of political appointees assigned to ministries, centralizing budgetary authority in the cabinet, and by cracking down on the practice of *amakudari* (Konishi 2009; Green and Szechenyi 2009; DPJ 2009; Chanlett-Avery et al 2009). The fact that 87.5 percent of respondents of a September *Fujisankei* poll supported checks on bureaucratic power, suggests that the new government now has an opportunity to shift power further away from the bureaucracies toward the central government (Green and Szechenyi 2009). However, several crucial and intertwined questions remain: one, can the DPJ limit its own infighting and enforce party discipline; two, will the DPJ be successful in gaining control over the bureaucracies; and three, will a focus on domestic economic problems and the inexperience of DPJ members empower the defense bureaucracies (MOFA, MOD, and MOF) to maintain a larger degree of control on defense issues?

c. Domestic Actors

The following is a brief description of the key actors in Japanese defense policy-making. My in-depth research on these actors will focus not only on their preferences concerning defense policy, but also on what types of opportunity structures will help elevate their policy agendas.

The Prime Minister, the Kantei, and DPJ

The current administration, under the leadership of the DPJ, will demand much more focus and attention than any other key actors. The victory of the DPJ in August of 2009, ended more than half a decade of nearly uninterrupted rule by the LDP. DPJ rule could mark a possible turning point in Japanese politics. Though the newly elected majority party ran on a platform of creating a more independent relationship with the United States, including a reappraisal of Host Nation Support (HNS) payments and the Status of Force Agreement (SOF), initial evidence suggests that the DPJ is toning down its security agenda in order to focus on the more immediate needs of the domestic

economy and reforming the government's relationship with the major government bureaucracies (Konishi 2009). Since its inception in 1998 as a merger of four smaller parties, the DPJ has put up staunch resistance to Koizumi's security policy of close bilateral support for the US, encouraging a more Asianist approach to foreign policy. In its manifesto, the DPJ promised a "close and equal" relationship with the US, including a drastic review of HNS and the SOF, in order to create a more "autonomous" foreign policy (DPJ 2009: 28). Its past legislative record, moreover, shows strong resistance to both JSDF participation in Iraq and MSDF refueling support of coalition forces in the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, given the amalgamation of politicians on the left and right of the party, it remains unclear whether the DPJ policy positions were clear presentations of an ideological position against US-bilateralism, or merely a way of opposing the LDP. As several analysts argue, the party leadership in reality remains divided on foreign policy issues (Konishi 2009; Green and Szechenyi 2009; Chanlett-Avery et al 2009). Nevertheless, Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio summarized the five pillars of his foreign policy agenda in his UN Assembly speech as: global economic recovery; climate change; nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation; peace building, development, and poverty alleviation; and building an East Asian Community (Green and Szechenyi 2009: 3). Thus, early indications are that Hatoyama prefers a civilian power policy oriented toward regional order-building in Asia. Despite these policy preferences the demands of maintaining party unity, addressing Japan's domestic economic problems, and a fear of abandonment by the US may lead the prime minister and the cabinet to moderate these ambitions. In respect to party unity, a key relationship to monitor is that between Prime Minister Hatoyama and independent-minded Party Secretary Ichiro Ozawa; a positive working relationship between these party leaders will help the party remain cohesive, while acrimony would help immobilize their political agenda (Chanlett-Avery et al 2009: 23).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)

For much of the postwar period, MOFA was the key ministry for managing not only Japan's foreign policy, but also, security policy, with the JDA mostly sidelined during this period. As noted earlier, following the postwar structural changes, the top levels of the JDA were frequently filled by officials seconded from other agencies, including MOFA. This arrangement was used to ensure civilian control of the agency, but as one might expect, also privileged MOFA in many areas of policy formation. The Koizumi administration came as a shock to the prestige and policy dominance of MOFA. Not only was the Koizumi administration adamant about promoting the JDA as a policy ministry, but during the 2006 negotiations over force realignments, the JDA not MOFA was placed in charge of negotiations (Samuels 2007a: 75). The greater interoperability between US forces and the JDSF further shifted control away from MOFA toward the new MOD. Another important change during the Koizumi administration was the de-prioritization of civilian foreign policy efforts such as human security and ODA spending and the increased emphasis on alliance maintenance with the US. Despite these changes, MOFA has remained the lead ministry on issues that reside in Japan's "civilian" foreign policy role, including climate security promotion, regional economic cooperation, ODA leadership and human security (along with the Japan International Cooperation Agency [JICA] and MOF), and Japan's bid for a permanent Security Council seat. A key question, then, is whether MOFA under the DPJ will once again be the privileged ministry in terms of defense policy and the management of the US-Japanese alliance or whether the MOD will continue to rise as a policy ministry. Given the DPJ's stated policy preference for a greater civilian power and regional order-building role for Japan, another crucial question is whether MOFA will receive an expanded budget for pursuing human and climate security initiatives. In addition, I will also examine how the internal divisions between

pro-American officials and Asianists within MOFA affect policy orientation (Stockwin 2008: 150).

Ministry of Defense (MOD)

Throughout much of its history, the JDA was considered among the least prestigious agencies to work for. In addition, the top layer of the bureaucracy was often seconded from other ministries like MOFA, MOF, MITI, and the National Policy Agency, among others. For this reason, top military officers rarely had control of procurement and budgeting issues. Throughout most of its history, MOF used its considerable clout to keep the defense budget low in order to promote the Japanese development state and an enormous public works budget. In addition, because much of its procurement was based on the logic of domestic industrial development, the agency took on the pejorative moniker of a being a "shopping ministry" (Samuels 2007a; Stockwin 2008). Since the early 2000s, much has changed. In addition to greater autonomy from the other ministries and active participation in policymaking from Japan's top military officers, the agency took the lead on issues of defense during the Koizumi administration. Increased symmetrical cooperation between the JSDF and the US military helped to bolster the position of the MOD on defense issues. This symmetrical cooperation could help to solidify the US-Japan Bilateral Treaty structure, entrench MOD power on routine but important operational issues, and give MOD bureaucrats a foundation from which to voice their opinions on a greater range of issues. Thus, my initial examination will focus on issues of civilian control, the power of the MOD in relation to MOFA, MOD and JSDF perceptions of the normalization agenda, and the larger policy ambitions of MOD's leadership.

LDP

Currently, the future of Japan's former ruling party is murky. Faced with a new minority status and the trauma of severe electoral defeat, the LDP has yet to decide on a new direction. Much like the DPJ party, the LDP is a patchwork of distinct ideological groups. This patchwork has been framed in many ways, but roughly is divisible between three groups: the conservative hawks (those who lobby for a "normal" Japan); populists who support a kind of welfare state based on public works projects; and conservative economic reformers who prefer a small state, administrative reform, and free-market policies (Chanlett-Avery et al 2009: 24). In the short term, the party will be concerned with possible defection by younger members who feel alienated by the party's policy of rewarding seniority rather than political acuity, and will likely focus on rebuilding party morale and its tattered public image. My Initial research will focus on the new party leader Tanigaki Sadakazu, the party's adjustment to its minority status, and the degree to which party members will successfully retain ties with figures in the bureaucracy and the economic elite.

Ministry of Finance

Among Japanese ministries, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) is typically labeled a "super-ministry" because of its enormous control over budgetary matters across the government. For this reason, the position of Finance Minister is highly coveted and usually goes to a senior ranking official within the ruling party. In addition, MOF has enjoyed a great deal of bureaucratic autonomy and relatively high public support, although this has begun to change since the mishandling of the financial crisis in the 90s (McCargo 2004: 97-100). Though a career at MOF is still considered the most prestigious civil service position, a series of scandals at the agency, as well

as the generally negative public perception of its handling of successive economic crises, has damaged its prestige. A key question for investigation, then, is whether the DPJ will be able to enact reforms that allow greater budgetary control under the cabinet, thus limiting the wide-ranging power of the ministry. In addition, my initial research will also examine what role MOF will continue to have in advocating for Japan's low stance on foreign policy and defense spending, especially for ODA and defense expenditures.

Civil Society

As the August 2009 elections demonstrated, the voting public remains one of the most important, and potentially disruptive, forces in Japanese politics. Gone are the days when entrenched constituencies could guarantee predictable victories for the ruling LDP. Since the 1990s, voting turnout has been in decline and those who have declared no party preference (*mutohaso*) has surpassed those supporting any of the other parties (Stockwin 2008: 145). For this reason, the choices of an increasingly alienated and urban Japanese population have become a source or ripeness for massive shifts, as was seen in the August 2009 election. Though public opinion has shown gradual changes in recent years toward more acceptance of the JSDF, the dispatch of the JSDF overseas, and constitutional reform, these changes have occurred side-by-side with greater discontent over the corruption and perceived incompetence of the LDP. Preliminary research suggests complex interactions of power, efficiency, and identity drive civil society inputs. Miyashita (2008), examining public opinion polls throughout postwar Japan, shows that when defense was perceived as more abundant, Japanese attitudes were more pacifist; whereas when security was more threatened, attitudes were more permissive of rearmament and reform of the constitution (29). Opinion polls show that during the three periods of insecurity, during the 1950s when Japan's security environment was highly volatile, the late 1960s and early 1970s when US-Chinese rapprochement was an issue, and in the late 1970s/ early 1980s when the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan occurred, Japanese public opinion on security issues became significantly less pacifist. Though pacifist norms remained an important component of Japanese identity, these issues of identity were not immune from external perceptions of threat (Miyashita 2008). In addition, throughout the postwar period perceptions of external threat were not powerful enough to overturn concerns over efficiency, specifically the cheap-riding consensus established under the Yoshida consensus. Thus, my preliminary research will examine the changing dynamic of Japan's voting public, specifically the phenomenon of *mutohaso*, public attitudes toward the DPJ, changing public attitudes toward constitutional reform, reform of the US-Japanese alliance, the JSDF and MOD, and towards the threat from China and North Korea.

Keidanren/ The Japanese Defense Industry

The Keidanren is often described as a kind of congress of business executives in Japan. The organization represents around 1,000 members from the biggest corporations and exhibits incredible influence over industrial policy. For my research, the Keidanren will be an important actor insofar as the organization influences regional economic integration, ODA spending, and especially defense spending and arms exports. In addition, I will look into how the Japanese Defense Industry influences defense spending and procurement spending through the Keidanren. As Samuels (2007a) states, the current ban on defense exports has tied the hands of the Japanese defense industry at a time when the trend is for cooperation and mergers across national lines (Samuels 2007a: 163). Though the Japanese defense industries applauded cooperation with the US on theater missile defense, they were disheartened that the 2004 procurement package saw procurement exclusively

from US companies. The situation changed, however, in 2005 with the DOD licensing some technologies to companies such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (Samuels 2007a: 164). This incident demonstrated the degree to which issues of domestic arms production is embedded in deeper narratives of *kokusanka* (roughly translated as indigenization), techno-nationalism, and fears of a loss of technological competitiveness (Samuels 2007a; Green 1995). In addition to cooperation between the US and Japan on theater missile defense, the arms industry is also searching for other avenues of getting around the arms band. Some goods, such as small boats for anti-terrorism patrol have been donated by the Japanese Coast Guard as part of Japanese ODA spending. My initial research will look at how the arms industry will promote its interests, including the lifting of the arms export band and the one percent of GDP limit on defense spending, through the clout of the Keidanren. My initial research (Samuels 2007a) suggests that the arms industry may attempt to promote its industrial interests through a process of linking the arms industry with threat of the techno-economic decline of Japan.

Overlaying and Penetrating Structures: The Defense Zoku, the CLB, and the National Defense Council

This section will examine the impact of three overlaying and/or penetrating structures in Japanese defense policy: the defense-*zoku*, the National Defense Council, and the Cabinet Legislative Bureau (CLB). All three organizations are composite organizations made up of members of either one or more of the main political parties, industry representatives, or the bureaucratic actors surveyed above. Out of the three, the defense-*zoku* will be the hardest to understand and map. Policy *zokus* started as a result of concerted effort by the LDP to wrestle control from the bureaucracies. These small informal groupings of politicians are organized around narrow issue areas. Though LDP politicians made up the defense-*zoku*, bureaucracies and interested civic groups (in the case of defense, arms manufacturers) also found representation in the deliberations of the defense-*zoku*. With the decline of the LDP, one has to wonder what will become of the *zokus*. Will DPJ members use a similar organizational structure? Will this form of organization become outmoded? Or will the organization evolve into something entirely different?

In contrast to the defense-*zoku*, the National Defense Council is a more straight-forward cabinet committee that consists of the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Finance Minister, and the Defense Minister. Because this body consists of the top ministry officials appointed by the majority party, its membership overlays both the bureaucratic and the majority party leadership. Thus, an examination of the personalities of this group will help to supplement my examination of the relevant bureaucratic actors, their relationship to one another, and the key attitudes within the majority party.

The CLB is another crucial organizational body that overlays the bureaucratic structure. Historically, the CLB has played a powerful moderating force in Japanese politics; through its legal interpretations, this body has become an important brake on policy change. In addition, the body has *de facto* supervisory status over other ministries. While all ministries are eager to have representation on the CLB, some ministries have been better represented than others. While the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Justice have been guaranteed three slots each, other ministries have had to compete for positions. Noticeably, the JDA/ MOD have yet to have a representative on the CLB (Stockwin 2008). At times this body has been seen as more powerful than the politicians who officially manage it. However, as discussed earlier, the Koizumi administration was able to effectively exert control over this organization through concerted political effort.

V. Prediction, Monitoring, and Analysis

My in-depth analysis of the actors above will lead to four predictions within the course of a one year period. Predictions will take place on January, April, July, and October in order to coincide with the publication of *Comparative Connection: A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations*. These predictions will then be compared with defense and defense-related foreign policy-decisions as reported in *Comparative Connections* and related news-reporting in LexusNexus in the following quarterly cycle.

For each of the quarterly periods, I will begin by reviewing my research for each of the major actors, delineating which policy preferences each actor has, and then use pairwise comparisons to choose which preference each organization will choose. As I extrapolate this data to the national level, I will then make choices regarding the relative opportunity structures of each of the actors. Though, this phase is purposefully parsimonious, additional research will be conducted that includes a wider range of concerns, including the politics of the overlaying structures and the influence of *kokutai* politics. The aim is to supplement the results of the pairwise comparisons with commitments to coarse graining; however, in the spirit of transparency, I will explain how perceived gaps in the data and areas of uncertainty led to the use of more broad-stroke analytical techniques. Finally, I will speculate about focal events or possibilities for transposition from likely to unlikely policy scenarios. In this last step, I will pay particular attention to areas of ripeness, resistance, or reinforcement that could potentially lead to unexpected transitions to unlikely futures or hamper what would otherwise be likely policy choices.

Each of the four predictions will be evaluated not only for their accuracy within a four month period, but also against each of the following reports by *Comparative Connection.* Thus, the first prediction will be evaluated for its accuracy over a period of three months, six months, nine months, and one year; the second predictions, will be evaluated for its accuracy over three months, six months, and nine months; the third prediction, will be evaluated for its accuracy over three and six month periods; and the fourth prediction, over only three months. By monitoring the validity of my predictions, I hope to uncover the limitations of the modified LAMP method for predicting outcomes in the very short to medium term, as well as evaluate how successful my adjustment strategies were between predictive cycles.

VI. Conclusion: Towards a Rigorous Study of Continuity and Change in Japanese Defense Policy

Thus far, I've attempted to outline a research agenda for the study of the trajectory of Japanese defense policy through a combination of methods that share a commitment to seeing nonlinearity. While the LAMP method provides the "backbone" of the study, inputs from analytical eclecticism and the literature on nonlinear supplement this approach by informing the analyst of the limits of forecasting and the necessity of keeping a "fuzzy" gestalt of the phenomena under study. While my use of an adapted LAMP method can demonstrate this rigor in practice, there is one respect in which my research is bound to fail. As an eventual "finished" product, my final analysis cannot duplicate the continuous and open process that new approaches to seeing complexity so thoughtfully espouse. An additional problematic aspect to my approach is that, to a degree, it is anathema to the *science* aspect of the social sciences. An analytically eclectic approach, for example, to the in-depth research phase of the major actors, while comprehensive, is also self-consciously unreliable. In addition, I have purposely rejected formal modeling of the relative influence the

internal actors will have vis-à-vis one another during the prediction phase. The use of comparative probability, rather than numerical probability, is also a self-conscious espousal of the limits of prediction. The goal is to make a decision on the relative likelihood of an event occurring compared to every other event.

As I move forward with my research design, several issues remain. One is the relative wisdom of a single-analyst approach to the in-depth analysis and pairwise comparison stage of the research. As another scholar has already demonstrated, one can effectively use panel-based expert opinion in conjunction with LAMP (Tanner 1996). Through the Delphi method, geographically dispersed expert opinion can be synthesized and used to supplement or replace a single analyst judgment on likely futures. Thus far, I have provisionally rejected using the Delphi method. I feel that the unique approaches I use—the synthesis of domestic theories of politics, the framework of power, efficiency, and identity, and my own in-depth data collection—will provide a unique contribution to the literature on Japanese defense policy. Another, more immediate issue, is the need to make the final stage in the prediction process—the identification of focal events and areas ripeness for transposition into unlikely futures—more rigorous. In essence, this remains one of the crucial questions of nonlinear approaches: how to see the otherwise unrecognizable. In order to address this issue, I will continue to examine the literature on nonlinear approaches to political forecasting. In addition, I have only begun to think about how securitization studies (Buzan et al 1998; Buzan and Waever 2003) can either supplement or structure my analytically eclectic approach to in-depth research on the major defense actors in Japan. A securitization approach would further blur the discreet actor approach (a positive in this study) by showing how logics of security and de-securitization are formed within and among the actors through successful speech acts. This approach my also help to conceptualize how actors gain influence within the security political apparatus through these speech actors. As I continue to formulate my approach to both the in-depth research stage and to speculation on focal events and transposition stage, I will have to stay aware of these tradeoffs between rigor and reliability on the one hand, and comprehensiveness and flexibility in approaching my forecasts on the other.

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