Kosovo’s Declaration Of Independence: What’s Next?

“[The Serbs look upon the present conflict over Kosovo as]
a kind of final battle for their national identity...

The Serbs are likely to let the country be destroyed before they give it up.”

Raschke, cited in Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance, 2007

I. Introduction

A. The End of the Cold War

The end of the cold war led to the break up of several states into independent republics, for example the split of the Soviet Union or the partition of Czechoslovakia. In 2006, The Republic of Montenegro voted for independence from the remainder of the Yugoslav Federation, the so-called Union of Serbia and Montenegro. With that, Yugoslavia was formally resolved into its six former member republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. Yet, the struggle over independence in several European regions is not over. Examples of unsolved regional disputes include the Basque region in Spain, the Komarno region in Slovakia (populated by ethnic Hungarians) and – as discussed in this paper - Kosovo.

B. The Right to Secede

Issues associated with these regional conflicts are complex. While international law recognizes the right of self-determination for all peoples, it also states, “outside of the colonial context, there is no right to secede from an existing independent state (Wilson 2009, 465).” Only if a government were to fail in its duty to represent all groups equally, the argument could be made that such a group should have the right to secede from that state. Unfortunately, international law does not give a clear answer to the question:

“When should a group be allowed to secede from a state?”
C. The Conflict over Kosovo

Kosovo has been a part of Serbia since World War I, but Kosovo has never received the status of a standalone Yugoslav republic, nor was Kosovo ever an independent state. Nevertheless, Kosovo is demanding statehood. In fact, on February 18, 2008, Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia. The United States and many powerful European nations were quick in recognizing Kosovo’s statehood; other nations refused to do so. Some argue that Kosovo is a special case. To understand the underlying issues associated with the conflict over Kosovo, we must look back in history.

On June 28, 1389 - according to Serbian history - the Serbs fought in the battle at the Fields of Blackbirds in Kosovo against the Ottoman Turks and lost. In turn, the Turks occupied Serbia for several centuries and continued to rule Kosovo until the early twentieth century. As a consequence, Serbs began to leave Kosovo and migrate northwards while ethnic Albanians, followers of Islam, moved into Kosovo. The Serbian defeat against the Turks is deeply engrained in the Serbian national consciousness. As a Serbian Orthodox priest states: “We cannot give up Kosovo because it is the Serbian Jerusalem (cited in Lakhani 2006, 29).” On the other hand, Albanians - belonging to the Illyrian tribes - lived in the Balkans long before the arrival of the Slaves.

In 1817, Serbia won independence from the Ottoman Turk empire, but the Turks were able to control Kosovo until World War I. After World War I, Kosovo became part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Finally, at the end of World War II, Marshall Tito incorporated Kosovo into the Serbian Republic. In 1974, Kosovo gained autonomy within Serbia. But in 1980, the death of Marshall Tito brought the end of stability in Yugoslavia. In 1989, Slobodan Milosevic took control over Serbian Communist party. As a result, Kosovo lost its autonomy. Milosevic
ordered the firing of ethnic Albanian government employees and limited the use of the Albanian language. Ethnic Albanians initially reacted with peaceful protest and civil disobedience. In 1996, some ethnic Albanians grew frustrated with peaceful protest; consequently, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) conducted attacks against Serbian institutions. Milosevic reacted with a massive crackdown on Kosovo that escalated into the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of Kosovo with “the death or expulsion of over one million Albanian Kosovars (Lakhani 2006, 30).”

D. Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence

Ultimately, a NATO air strike campaign against Serbia forced Milosevic to stop all hostilities against ethnic Albanians. U.N. Security Council resolution 1244 established a U.N. administration in Kosovo with the goal of substantial autonomy for Kosovo. The U.N. slowly transferred the administration of Kosovo to Kosovar authorities while U.N. peacekeepers protected the Serbian minorities in Kosovo from ethnic Albanian reprisals. Nevertheless, during the unrest of 2004, rioting ethnic Albanians attacked Serbian communities and churches. NATO peacekeepers had to step in. After that, Albanian Kosovars grew frustrated over the uncertainty of Kosovo’s future, until the Kosovar parliament declared the independence of Kosovo in 2008.

E. The United Nation’s Appeal to the International Court of Justice

On October 8, 2008, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed a resolution asking the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to render an advisory opinion to the question whether the declaration of independence of Kosovo is in accordance with international law (International Court of Justice, 2008). It is important to understand that the ICJ will only voice an advisory opinion. The consequences of that recommendation remain uncertain.
F. The Importance of the Opinion Rendered by the International Court of Justice

Armed conflict between Albanian Kosovars and Serbs can easily re-ignite and draw in outside actors: the United States, NATO, Russia, and even Muslim fighters and radical Islamic terrorists. Atrocities and the flow of refugees could further de-stabilize the region, spread conflict to Albania, Macedonia, Greece and other countries, and possibly cause hostilities between NATO and Russia. Even tough the opinion delivered by the International Court of Justice will only have an advisory role, it could embolden any of the players and encourage hostilities. The consequences that the court’s opinion will have are not clear, and they are not discussed in the literature. But the effects are worth further consideration. The situation in Kosovo is a major concern for U.S. strategy, as armed conflict could involve U.S. combat troops.

II. Literature Review

A. Background

Most media reports and scholarly articles regarding Kosovo focus on the status quo but don’t offer any suggestions or predictions regarding Kosovo’s future. Nevertheless, the issue deserves attention. Sure, newspaper articles raise the question of where Kosovo’s independence is going. But commentators usually avoid predictive analysis and simply take a side for or against Kosovo’s independence.

B. Gaps

The literature should examine the likelihood of different scenario and identify measures that could lead to the desirable scenarios. Articles point to the International Court of Justice but don’t make any predictions on how the court may rule and what the consequences of the ruling may be. Nor does the literature mention any indicators that could point to significant future
events. Most authors seem to take a stand on the sideline and wait for future events to comment on them.

C. Overview

First, the literature review presents the official U.S. Department of State view of Kosovo. Then, a BBC News article focuses on the gridlock regarding Kosovo’s independence. The BBC News website presents many insightful articles and is not afraid of discussing inconvenient topics, for instance Russia’s role in the Kosovo conflict. Next, a scholarly article promotes the use of non-traditional diplomacy to solve the Kosovo conflict. This article is somewhat unique as it suggests an actual solution to the problem. Then, a journal article serves as an example of the many articles that discuss the problem without providing any solutions, suggestions or predictions. Finally, a Russian newspaper article presents the Russian point of view.

D. Literature Samples

1. Background Note: Kosovo

   The Department of State website features a document with the official United States Government’s view of Kosovo. Information includes geography, demographics, government and economy. A significant part of the document presents Kosovo’s history, with focus on events from Kosovo’s loss of autonomy in 1989 to Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008. The document portrays a steady path from Kosovo’s peaceful resistance in the early 1990s to the recognition of Kosovo’s independence by the United States in 2008. Basis of the U.S. support for the independence of Kosovo is the so-called Ahtissari Plan addressing many issues regarding Kosovo’s future, including “decentralization of local government, protecting Kosovo’s cultural and religious heritage in Kosovo, economic issues and safeguarding the rights of minorities (Department of State, 2010).” However, as the document acknowledges, Serbia rejects the plan
and the U.N. Security Council cannot agree on a resolution because of Russian resistance. The document avoids any suggestions or predictions regarding Kosovo’s future.

The text uses the quantitative approach when it comes to demographics and the historical perspective when it mentions recent events. The text mainly focuses on events within the last twenty years and examines Kosovo’s status from the viewpoint of international law and order. However, to truly explore the origins of the conflict in Kosovo, the text would need to take a deeper look at Kosovo’s historic relationship with both Serbia and the Turkish Ottoman Empire.

A picture on top of the document features a teacher holding Kosovo’s national flag in front of school children. This demonstrates that Kosovo’s independence and future are important to the United States. Still, the document does not acknowledge Kosovo’s role as a strategic partner to the U.S. Overall, the text provides facts about Kosovo without risking offending any foreign state.

2. Kosovo: To Recognize or not to Recognize?

This BBC News article was written on 18 February 2008, the day after Kosovo declared independence. It raises many questions regarding the impact of the steps taken by the Kosovar government. The question of global importance is whether the Kosovo declaration will serve as a precedent for other regions with aspirations of independence (Reynolds 2008).

The BBC News article groups countries into two factions. Nations like the United States, Great Britain, France and Germany see Kosovo’s independence as “the last piece of the old Yugoslav jigsaw being slotted in place (Reynolds 2008).” Others like Russia, China and Spain have problems with their own breakaway movements and are refusing to recognize Kosovo’s independence “on the grounds that there was no agreement between Serbia and Kosovo and no clear U.N. Security Council mandate (Reynolds 2008).”
The text also lists several separatist movements welcoming Kosovo’s declaration of independence, for instance the Turkish Cypriots, the Basque regional government in Spain, and the Transdniester region of Moldova. The European Union is split, as it does not have an official foreign policy. Several EU nations do not recognize Kosovo. Spain’s foreign minister sees Kosovo’s declaration of independence as an act against international law. Although the article was written the day after Kosovo’s declaration, it still portrays a valid assessment of the controversy over Kosovo. Lines between opponents and supporters of an independent Kosovo have been drawn a long time ago.

The article points out that the number of nations choosing to recognize Kosovo as an independent state will ultimately determine whether Kosovo can develop and prosper (Reynolds 2008). This implies that unless a significant number of nations decide to support Kosovo, the issue will remain indefinitely unresolved. The article recognizes that the conflict over Kosovo is far from over.

3. Finding a Peaceful Path for Kosovo: A Track Two Approach

In the journal article Finding a Peaceful Path for Kosovo: A Track Two Approach, Lakhani (2006) argues that so-called Track One Diplomacy – the traditional approach to conflict resolution that engages state actors – has failed to provide for peace in Kosovo. Instead, Lakhani proposes so-called Track Two Diplomacy, or ‘citizen diplomacy’, involving non-government organizations as an alternate approach to conflict resolution in Kosovo. More specifically, Lakhani proposes faith-based diplomacy solutions (2006, 35). Lakhani looks at the issue from a historic perspective and shows “how the conflict is rooted in unresolved cultural, ethnic, and religious differences (2006, 28).”
The author states that the key issue is to find a way to transform Kosovo into a society where cultural and religious differences between Serbs and ethnic Albanians are a sign of strength, not cause for conflict. To solve the problem, Lakhani suggests four measures: First, faith-based diplomats can promote education to help Kosovars recognize their ethnic similarities, the common root in the Abrahamic family and the connection between Christian and Muslim traditions (2006, 36). Second, non-government organizations can promote dialog between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians to establish a National Park or museum in honor of the battle at the Field of Blackbirds, thus recognizing the importance of Kosovo as a landmark and special place in history. Third, in contrast to the ‘forced peace’ implemented by the U.N. and NATO, faith-based diplomats should implement a truth commission - not with the goal of assigning guilt - but with the aim at reconciliation and restoration. Finally, the status of Kosovo must be solved based on dialog and the current reality. Only a resolution of the political status of Kosovo will open the way for foreign investments, support and respect (Lakhani 2006, 38).

The author uses the qualitative research design to explain the problem and his proposed solution. However, the author does not provide an example of a conflict where the faith-based approach played a role in conflict resolution. Lakhani mentions Kashmir and Rwanda as similar conflicts but does not provide examples of faith-based attempts to solve the conflict there. In conclusion, Lakhani states that the conflict over Kosovo will not be solved through U.N. Council resolutions or pressure from NATO. In contrast, faith-based initiatives could foster the healing of deep historical and psychological wounds and create a climate for a future peaceful resolution (Lakhani 2006, 35). While traditional diplomacy engages the political leaders, Lakhani’s approach focuses on bringing the societies together. This approach could help Kosovo
past the current gridlock. However, whether Serbs and Albanian Kosovars groups are willing to engage in dialog remains to be seen.

4. Self-determination, Recognition and the Problem of Kosovo

Wilson uses international law to discuss Kosovo’s claim for statehood. The Montevideo Convention of 1933 describes criteria for statehood as “possession of a permanent population, defined territory, government and the capability to enter into relations with other states (2009, 459).” Of significance is also the U.N. Friendly Relations Declaration in which the U.N. General Assembly reasserts the right for self-determination. However, the Friendly Relations Declaration appears to apply only to a colonial context (Wilson 2009, 464). Finally, U.N. Resolution 2625 “provides a right for secession to a group whose right have been consistently and severely abused by the state (Wilson 2009, 468).” Wilson acknowledges that international law does not provide clear-cut guidance regarding Kosovo’s demand for statehood.

In the text, Wilson explores three main arguments (2009, 456). First, that international law affords Kosovo the right for succession. Second, that if international law denies Kosovo the right for succession, then there should be a broader right established. Third, that Kosovo is a unique case where independence can be tolerated without creating a precedent for other breakaway regions.

Wilson uses the qualitative research design along with case studies, for example Bangladesh. While the study discusses Kosovo’s right for succession, it does not explore Serbia’s right to defend the integrity of its territory. If Kosovo cannot establish the legality of its independence, can Serbia then suppress Kosovo’s institutions by any means? In the study, Wilson explores many examples. However, he acknowledges that none fits the case of Kosovo. Slovenia, Bosnia and Croatia came about when the Yugoslav Federation dissolved into its
individual republics. Similarly, the Baltic republic of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania broke away from the Soviet Union, but they had been independent and democratic states before. On the other hand, Kosovo was never a separate Yugoslav republic.

In summary, Wilson states that Kosovo may be a special case as it is already recognized by a third of the U.N. member states (2009, 481). Thus, it may have achieved independence despite the lack of provision in international law. At least, it is unlikely Kosovo will ever be a mere province within Serbia. Unfortunately, Wilson doesn’t explore Serbia’s options in the conflict.

5. Kosovo – A Serbian Question

In a commentary article, published in the former official Soviet government newspaper Pravda, Bancroft-Hinchey presents the Russian point of view. He does so without mentioning Russia’s own troubles with separatist movements. Nevertheless, he voices his opposition to the independence of Kosovo (and thus to separatist movements within the Russian Federation) by saying, “[Kosovo’s independence] is like Marseilles being occupied by North Africans, who push out the French and declare it as an Algerian enclave (2007).” Bancroft-Hinchey then states that giving Kosovo to ethnic Albanians would reinforce Fascist actions during world War II: “Mussolini and Hitler must be laughing in their graves, for it was they who in 1941 integrated Kosovo into Greater Albania as tens of thousands of Serbs were forced out of their homes (2007).” He also points out that the EU, NATO and UN have no business in drawing borders in the Balkans and that the Russian Federation is the only power that stands for the rule of law.

Bancroft-Hinchey presents facts skillfully to make his case without reference to Russia’s objective of suppressing separatist movements within the Russian Federation.
III. Actors & Perceptions

A. The Predictive Issue

Typically, the United Nations acknowledges statehood through the process of admission and recognition (Wilson 2009, 461). The case of Kosovo is unique as approximately one third of U.N. members have recognized the statehood of Kosovo, but the U.N. as a whole has not. Neither has the U.N. opted for non-recognition. States perceive the issue of Kosovo based on their own specific circumstances. To the Kosovars, it’s a matter of self-determination; to the Serbs, Kosovo is sacred ground, the birthplace of the Serbian Orthodox Church; to the United States, Kosovo is a strategic partner; to the Russians, it’s a Pandora’s box that when opened will fuel breakaway movements within the Russian Federation; to concerned Europeans, Kosovo is a breeding ground for criminal organizations, corruption and human trafficking; for the Basque region, it’s hope for their own independence. To predict the outcome of the conflict over Kosovo and its impact on the world, we must answer the question:

“What will be the consequences of the International Court of Justice’s recommendation regarding the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence?”

B. Actors Bearing on the Problem

This study will focus on future actions taken by actors previously engaged in the Kosovo conflict: Serbia, Russia and NATO. Although NATO is an organization of individual member states, for the purpose of this study, NATO is considered a single entity.

C. Perceptions and Intentions of Each Actor

1. Serbia

Serbs are a tribe of the Southern Slavs; in fact, Yugoslavia means Southern Slavia. Serbian tribes moved to the Balkans sometime in the sixth century. Almost all Serbs are
members of the Serbian Orthodox Church. When Slobodan Milosevic took power in 1987, he did so by skillfully manipulating Serbian nationalist and religious sentiments and by enlisting the help of the official Serbian Orthodox Church.

In 2006, Serbia became the legal successor of the Union of Serbia and Montenegro, a state formed by the only two remaining republics left in the former Yugoslav Federation. With that, the split of Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, created by Marshall Tito in 1945, was complete. The six successor republics are Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. With the separation, Serbia gave up direct access to the Adriatic Sea.

Moreover, with the forced U.N. administration of Kosovo and Kosovo’s subsequent declaration of independence, Serbia has de facto not only lost another territory, but also the origins of the Serbian state. Until the battle at the Field of Blackbirds, Kosovo was the center of the Serbian Empire. The Serbian Orthodox Church came to life in Kosovo. Even today, Kosovo plays an important role in Serbian nationalism and is part of the envisioned ‘Greater Serbia’. Kosovo represents the Serbian ‘Golden Age’, embodied in epic poetry (BBC News 2009). About 120,000 ethnic Serbs live in Kosovo, mostly north of the Ibar River, adjoining Serbia proper and south of the Ibar River under NATO protection. Ethnic Serb policemen in the Kosovo’s North still refuse to take orders from the Pristina, the Kosovar capital (BBC News 2008).

It is important to understand that Serbs see themselves as victims in the conflict and feel misunderstood by their European neighbors. A painful Serbian Diaspora from Kosovo and the migration of ethnic Albanians into Kosovo followed the loss of the Serbian army at the Field of Blackbirds. As a consequence, numerous old historic Serbian Orthodox churches remained un-accessible and abandoned in Kosovo. Finally in 1913, Serbs and other Balkan states drove the
Turks out of the Balkans and out of Europe. Today, the Serbs feel that the rest of Europe is not recognizing this historic accomplishment. Similarly, the Serbs mounted significant resistance against Hitler’s Third Reich, but later ended up being punished by NATO air strikes. Serbs have also been victims of atrocities committed by ethnic Albanians, first by members of the KLA in 1996 and then by rioting Albanian Kosovars in 2004. In fact, one purpose of NATO presence is the protection of the Serbian minority in Kosovo’s northern districts. Also, ethnic Serbian communities along the border of Serbia and Kosovo challenge the final drawing of the border (Central Intelligence Agency 2010).

As of 2010, President Boris Tadic and Prime Minister Mirko Cvetkovic lead Serbia. The government takes a pro-European Union stance; however, the Serbian government opposes the independence of Kosovo.

2. Russia

Serbia and Russia do not have a common border, but both share the traditions of the Orthodox Church and a mutual Slavic heritage (BBC News, July 2008). Russia itself is fighting separatist movements in several republics within the Russian Federation. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said, “[Kosovo independence] would undermine the basics of security in Europe… It would inevitably result in a chain reaction in many parts of the world, including Europe and elsewhere (cited in Reynolds 2008).” Russia is mostly concerned about its own territory. Twenty autonomous ethnic republics are part of the Russian Federation. One of the republics, Chechnya, is in ruins after Moscow brutally suppressed the independence movement there. Russia claims that most of the recent breakups took place through internal agreement, for example split up of the Soviet Union or Czechoslovakia. Even the disintegration of Yugoslavia
respected the borders of the individual republics, and further breakaway tendencies were
discouraged, for instance breakaway attempts by the Bosnian Serbs (Weir 2008).

At the same time, Russia is supporting separatist movements in Georgia. The Georgian
regions of Ossetia and Abkhazia both have Russian majorities demanding independence from
Georgia. After Kosovo declared independence and since many European nations recognize
Kosovo’s statehood, Russia now faces internal pressure to formally recognize breakaway
movements in other former Soviet states (Weir 2008). But such an act could backfire and fuel
separatist movements within the Russian Federation.

Moreover, Russia feels betrayed by the West. Russian experts claim that during the 78-
day NATO bombardment of Serbia, “Moscow’s envoy, Viktor Chernomyrdin, convinced Serbian
leader Slobodan Milosevic to surrender by conveying Western pledges that a NATO occupation
of Kosovo would never lead to its separation from Serbia (cited in Weir, 2008).”

Russian will not hesitate to engage in military operations in Serbia. In June 1999, in a move that
captured NATO by surprise, Russian troops - serving alongside NATO as peacekeepers in Bosnia -
send a convoy on a parade through the Serbian capital Belgrade and into Kosovo. The Russian
contingent then reached the Kosovar capital Pristina. Ethnic Serbs welcomed the Russian
convoy. Eventually, a group of ethnic Serbian Kosovars climbed onto a Russian vehicle and flew
a Yugoslav flag, joyfully waving its blue, white and red stripes (CNN 1999). The Russian
government later claimed that the whole operation was a mistake. Nevertheless, the stunning
move allowed Russia to claim part of the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo.

3. NATO

NATO continues to keep peace between ethnic Albanians and the Serb communities in
Kosovo under the authority of the U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).
The number of NATO troops in Kosovo is down to about 10,000 soldiers. In 1999, about 50,000 NATO soldiers entered Kosovo after the 78-day NATO air strike campaign forced the Serbian army to withdraw from Kosovo. The initial mandate for the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) was to deter renewed hostilities against Kosovo by Yugoslav and Serb forces, to ensure public safety and order, to demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army, to support humanitarian efforts and to support the international civil presence (NATO 2010). In 2009, NATO organized the Kosovo Security Force, a lightly armed force without offensive capabilities. As of February 16, NATO has not committed to further troop reductions: “Future decisions on further reducing KFOR’s footprint in Kosovo will continue to need the approval of the North Atlantic Council in the light of both military and political considerations, with no automaticity in the move to a deterrent presence (NATO 2010).” NATO wants to keep its options open.

Twenty out of 27 NATO members recognize Kosovo as an independent state, including influential nations like the United States, Turkey, United Kingdom, Germany and Italy. Other NATO members oppose the statehood of Kosovo. One of them is Spain who has an own domestic problem with an independence movement in the Basque region. Many European Union members are also part of NATO; however, the EU does not have a common foreign policy, and the EU has left the recognition of Kosovo’s independence up to its 27 member states.

IV. Research Design

A. Analytical Techniques

Several methodologies are suitable for predictive analysis, for example the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP), Delphi Technique, Hypothesized Futures and Scenarios, and the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP). When selecting a technique, the researcher should ask himself the following questions: How many actors are included in the
analysis? What is the purpose of the study - prediction or decision-making? How complete is the data available? How many experts will take part in the study?

AHP assigns probabilities to scenarios and looks at desirability of alternate futures for the purpose of decision-making. Delphi Technique is a process aimed at “systematically eliciting a set of informed judgments from a group of experts about the timing, probability, and implications of a designated trends and events (Lockwood & Lockwood, 1993). The Hypothesized Futures and Scenarios technique does not produce actual “forecasts” but examines alternate futures and scenarios with focus on certain assumption and as a starting point for further discussion and research. LAMP technique is based on the assumption that the future “is the sum total of the interaction of free will of the national actors involved (Lockwood & Lockwood, 1993).” LAMP does not assign quantified probabilities to scenarios; rather it produced a rank-order of alternate futures based on relative probability.

B. The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP)

I have chosen the LAMP technique to analyze the implications of the International Court of Justice’s recommendation regarding Kosovo’s declaration of independence. LAMP is well suited for analysis where several national actors are involved. In addition, LAMP identifies “focal events” that can act as indicators for the intelligence and warning process. ‘Focal events’ aid in recognizing the change of a future’s relative probability. This feature makes LAMP “flexible” and a preferred method where continued study of a problem is necessary. Dr. Jonathan Lockwood developed LAMP in the early 1990s by borrowing from elements of other quantitative methods and by incorporating these elements into a new structured and reliable method for prediction.
C. The Twelve Steps of LAMP

LAMP is a well-defined 12-step process:

1. Define the issue for which you are trying to determine the most likely future.

   The researcher states a specific issue question, not too broad and not too vague. See paragraph III A. The Predictive Issue.

2. Specify the national "actors" involved.

   The number of actors should not exceed five or six, or the number of alternate futures becomes unmanageable. See paragraph III B. Actors Bearing on the Problem.

3. Perform an in-depth study of how each national actor perceives the issue in question.

   In-dept study of a nation’s history and culture allows the researcher to examine an actor’s point of view. See paragraph III C. Perceptions and Intentions of Each Actor.

4. Specify all possible courses of action for each actor.

   All possible courses of action must be included, regardless of how unlikely they seem. See V A. Courses of Action for Each Actor.

5. Determine the major scenarios within which you compare the alternate futures.

   Each scenario is based on a significant assumption that will influence the behavior of the national actors. See paragraph V B. Major Scenarios.

6. Calculate the total number of permutations of possible "alternate futures" for each scenario.

   \[ Z = X^Y \]

   where Z is the total number of alternate futures to be compared, X is the number of courses of action open to each actor, and Y is the number of national actors involved. See paragraph V C. Number of Alternate Futures.
7. Perform a "pairwise comparison" of all alternate futures within the scenario to determine their relative probability.

   Number of comparisons: \[ X = \frac{n(n-1)}{2} \]

where \( X \) is the total number of pairwise comparisons, and \( n \) is the total number of alternate futures to be analyzed. See paragraph V D. Pairwise Comparison of Alternate Futures.

8. Rank the alternate futures for each scenario from highest relative probability to the lowest based on the number of "votes" received.

   The rank-order represents relative probability from "most likely" to "least likely". See paragraph V E. Rank Order of the Alternate Futures.

9. Assuming each future occurs, analyze each alternate future in terms of its consequences for the issue in question.

   In this step, the researcher develops a situation where the actors take the actions of a particular alternate future. See paragraph V F. Consequences of Alternate Futures.

10. Determine the "focal events" that must occur in our present in order to bring about a given alternate future.

   This step identifies “focal events” that may change the relative probability of the alternate futures. See paragraph V G. Focal Events for Alternate Futures.

11. Develop indicators for the focal events.

   This step produces a list of indicators suggesting that a particular future has occurred or is about to occur. See paragraph V H. Indicators for Each Focal Event.
12. **State the potential of a given alternate future to "transpose" into another alternate future.**

   During this step, the researcher examines alternate futures for consequences, as the occurrence of one alternate future may change the relative probability of other futures. See paragraph V I. Transposition Between Alternate Futures.

### V. Case Study/Analysis/Findings

#### A. Courses of Action for Each Actor

   The actor decides to take the following course of action:

1. **Recognition of Kosovo’s Independence (RI)**

   The actor will support the statehood of Kosovo with diplomatic means but will not engage in any military action to achieve that objective.

2. **Refusal to recognize Kosovo’s Independence (NR)**

   The actor will not support the statehood of Kosovo and continue to oppose Kosovo’s independence with diplomatic means, but the actor will not engage in any military action to achieve that objective.

3. **Military action (MA)**

   The actor will take military action to achieve the his objective. Serbia and/or Russia will use military means in an attempt to install a Serbian-controlled territorial government in Kosovo. NATO will order its troops in Kosovo to uphold an independent government in Kosovo.

#### B. Major Scenarios

   On 8 November 2008, the Unites Nations adopted a resolution requesting the International Court of Justice to “render an advisory opinion on the following question: Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of
Kosovo in accordance with international law?” The International Court of Justice will only make a recommendation.

1. Scenario 1

The International Court of Justice affirms Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia as legal.

2. Scenario 2

The International Court of Justice states that Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia is illegal.

C. Number of Alternate Futures

\[ 3^3 = 27 \]

Based on the general formula, the total number of alternate futures to be compared is 27.
D. Pairwise Comparison of Alternate Futures

1. Scenario 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternative Future</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>NATO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>RI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>NR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>MA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>RI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>MA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>RI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>NR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>MA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>RI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>NR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>MA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>RI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>MA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>RI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>NR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>MA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>RI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>NR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>MA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>RI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>MA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>RI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>NR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>MA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Scenario 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternative Future</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>NATO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>RI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>NR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>MA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>RI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>MA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>RI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>NR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>MA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>RI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>NR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>MA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>RI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>MA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>RI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>NR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>MA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>RI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>NR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>MA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>RI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>MA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>RI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>NR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>MA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
E. Rank Order of the Alternate Futures

1. Scenario 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternative Future</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>NATO</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## 2. Scenario 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternative Future</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>NATO</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
F. Consequences of Alternate Futures

1. Scenario 1

The International Court of Justice affirms Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia as legal.

*Future 27: All three actors, Serbia, Russia and NATO, take military action to attain their objectives.*

This is the worst-case future as it represents open hostilities between NATO and Russia. It is also the most likely future.

The International Court of Justice proclaims the declaration of independence by Kosovo as being lawful. The pro-EU Serbian government under Prime Minister Mirko Cvetkovic faces pressure from the Serbian opposition and media, as well as demonstrations in the streets and calls to not give in to international demands. The Serbian government thus will attempt to secure at least part of Kosovo as Serbian territory. The Serbian government will use violence between Kosovo-Albanians and ethnic Serbs in the Mitrovica district in Kosovo’s North to intervene militarily. As a result, NATO troops tasked with maintaining peace in the Mitrovica district will not be prepared to stop the move of Serbian troops into Kosovo and will withdraw to an area controlled by the Kosovo’s security Forces. The Russian government, fearing the rise of separatist movements within the Russian Federation, will offer military aid to Serbia. In turn, Serbia, fearing retribution from NATO, will allow Russian troops to take positions in the Mitrovica district. Russian commanders will provoke NATO troops into hostilities. As a result, NATO will attempt to cut off Russian supply lines. Eventually, this future will lead to limited war between Russia and NATO.
This future will be even more likely if the Serbian-nationalist movement - led by Tomislav Nikolic of the Serbian Radical Party or one of his successors – will gain control over the Serbian government.

**Future 24: Serbia and NATO take military action to attain their objectives, whereas Russia continues to oppose the independence of Kosovo diplomatically.**

This Future is similar to Future 27, except that Russia is not involved in the hostilities. Therefore, this future is not as dangerous as Future 27. However, Russia could be drawn into the conflict at a later time.

After the International Court of Justice proclaims the declaration of independence by Kosovo as lawful, Serbia will deploy troops to Northern Kosovo under the pretext of preventing violence against ethnic Serbs. NATO will withdraw initially, but then will issue a new mandate to NATO troops in order to ascertain the authority of the Kosovo government over all of Kosovo. During the advance of NATO troops, both Serbian and Kosovo-Albanian groups will commit crimes of ethnic cleansing. NATO will threaten Serbia with a bombing campaign. Russia will choose not to engage in the conflict militarily but support Serbia diplomatically.

**Future 13: Serbia and Russia both do not recognize the independence of Kosovo but refrain from military action. All NATO members recognize Kosovo as an independent state.**

This is the most desirable outcome. The Serbian government will voice its disappointment over the decision by the International Court of Justice but will decide not to take any hostile action towards Kosovo. The Serbian government will avoid endangering the integration of Serbia into the European Union. Opposition to the Serbian government under Prime Minister Mirko Cvetkovic will be minimal as Serbia will be enjoying an economic
recovery. Although Russia will oppose the independence of Serbia, Russia will be unable to convince Serbia to take on military action against Kosovo’s independence.

*Future 18: Serbia does not recognize the independence of Kosovo. Both Russia and NATO take military action.*

This is also a dangerous future as Russia and NATO will engage in hostilities. The pro-EU government in Serbia will oppose the independence of Kosovo by diplomatic means only. The Serbian government will jeopardize the integration of Serbia into the European Union and the prospect of economic incentives. Russia on the other hand, driven by domestic problems, will decide to engage in the conflict over Kosovo to prevent further rise of independence movements in the Russian Federation. To justify an engagement in Kosovo, Russia will answer calls for help from radical ethnic-Serbian groups in Kosovo and airlift troops to Kosovo in order to protect the Serbian minority from hostile Kosovo-Albanian groups.

*Future 21: Serbia and NATO take military action, while Russia recognizes the independence of Kosovo.*

This scenario is similar to Future 24 as Russia will stay out of the armed conflict over Kosovo. Although this scenario assumes armed conflict between Serbia and NATO, it is not as dangerous as Future 27 and Future 18 since Russia will not engage in hostilities with NATO. As in Future 24, the International Court of Justice proclaims the declaration independence by Kosovo as lawful. Serbia will then deploy troops to Northern Kosovo under the pretext of preventing violence against the ethnic Serbs. NATO troops, under a new mandate, will advance against Serbian troops to reinstate the authority of the government of Kosovo in all of Kosovo. Russia will elicit a deal with NATO. As a result, Russia will recognize the independence of the
Kosovo conflict, and NATO will pronounce to stay out of disagreements between Russia and Georgia.

2. Scenario 2

The International Court of Justice states that Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia is illegal.

*Future 24: Serbia and NATO take military action to attain their objectives, whereas Russia continues to oppose the independence of Kosovo diplomatically.*

This scenario is similar to Scenario 1/Future 24, except that the International Court of Justice does not recognize the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence. Again, Russia could be drawn into the conflict at a later time.

After the International Court of Justice proclaims the declaration of independence by Kosovo as unlawful, Serbia will deploy troops to Northern Kosovo to take control over the territory. NATO troops will withdraw initially, but as new violence and ethnic cleansing erupt, NATO will renew its pledge to maintain peace in Kosovo. During the advance of NATO troops, Serbian commanders will provoke NATO troops into numerous firefights; finally, open armed conflict will break out between NATO and the Serbian army. Russia – still opposing Kosovo’s independence diplomatically – will choose not to engage in the conflict militarily.

*Future 23: Serbia deploys troops to Kosovo in order to take control over the territory. Russia opposes Kosovo’s independence diplomatically while NATO does not recognize the independence of Kosovo and does not commit to military action.*

This future will end the hopes of Kosovo’s government for independence from Serbia due to the inability to oppose the Serbian army.
After the International Court of Justice states that Kosovo’s declaration of independence is illegal, Serbia will send troops to Kosovo to take control over the territory. NATO will be divided, unable to agree on a course of action and will withdraw from Kosovo. This will be an outcome that will please Russia, as Kosovo’s statehood will be avoided without an armed conflict with NATO. The ruling by the International Court of Justice will also encourage Russia to suppress movements for independence on Russian territory.

*Future 27: All three actors, Serbia, Russia and NATO take military action to attain their objectives.*

This is the worst-case future as it represents open hostilities between NATO and Russia. The International Court of Justice proclaims the declaration independence by Kosovo as illegal. The government of Serbia will feel emboldened and will deploy troops to Kosovo in order to take control over the territory. As a result, NATO troops tasked with maintaining peace in the Mitrovica district will withdraw to areas still controlled by the Kosovo government. The Russian government, fearing the rise of separatist movements on his own territory, will offer military aid to Serbia. In turn, Serbia, fearing retribution from NATO, will allow Russian troops to take positions in the Mitrovica district. NATO, in expectation of new ethnic violence and forced displacements, maintains its presence in Kosovo. Russian commanders will provoke NATO troops into hostilities. As a result, NATO will attempt to cut off Russian supply lines. Again, this future is even more likely if the Serbian-nationalist movement - led by Tomislav Nikolic of the Serbian Radical Party or one of his successors - gains control over the Serbian government. Also, disagreements within NATO will encourage the Serbian government to engage NATO in armed conflict.
**Future 22: Serbia takes military action, Russia does not recognize Kosovo’s independence,** whereas **NATO recognizes Kosovo as an independent state.**

This future will end the hopes of Kosovo’s government for independence due to the inability to oppose the Serbian army.

After the International Court of Justice states that Kosovo’s declaration of independence was illegal, Serbia will deploy troops to Kosovo to take control over the territory. NATO, fearing new ethnic violence and a stream of refugees reaching Western Europe, decides to disregard the advise of the International Court of Justice. All NATO members will thus support the independence of Kosovo diplomatically, but NATO as a whole will not be able to agree on a military plan of action. NATO will order the NATO troops in Kosovo to give way to the advancing Serbian Army. This will be an outcome that will please Russia, as Kosovo’s statehood will be avoided without an armed conflict with NATO. The ruling by the International Court of Justice will also encourage Russia to suppress movements for independence on Russian territory.

**Future 25: Serbia and Russia will take military action while NATO recognizes the independence of Kosovo.**

This future will end the hopes of Kosovo’s government for independence due to the inability to oppose the Serbian army.

After the International Court of Justice states that Kosovo’s declaration of independence was illegal, Serbia will deploy troops to Kosovo to take control over the territory. NATO, fearing new ethnic violence and a stream of refugees reaching Western Europe, will decide to disregard the advise of the International Court of Justice. All NATO members will thus support the independence of Kosovo and discuss a plan of action. Russia, emboldened by the decision of the International Court of Justice will deploy troops to Serbia and Kosovo in order to support the
Serbian government. NATO in turn will decide not to take military action in Kosovo and avoid an armed conflict with Russia.

**G. Focal events for alternate futures**

**1. Scenario 1**

The International Court of Justice affirms Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia as legal.

*Future 27: All three actors, Serbia, Russia and NATO, take military action to attain their objectives.*

a. The pro-EU Serbian government is under pressure from nationalist movements.

b. Nationalist and communist parties gain control over the Russian government.

c. Ethnic violence in Kosovo is cause for concern among the actors.

*Future 24: Serbia and NATO take military action to attain their objectives, whereas Russia continues to oppose the independence of Kosovo diplomatically.*

a. A nationalist Serbian party has achieved victory in national elections and is willing to retake Kosovo by force and without military assistance from Russia.

b. Russia is interested in good relations with the West.

c. Ethnic Albanians commit atrocities against the Serb minority in Kosovo.

*Future 13: Serbia and Russia both do not recognize the independence of Kosovo but refrain from military action. All NATO members recognize Kosovo as an independent state.*

a. Serbia is interested in good relations with its neighbors and a membership in the European Union.

b. The Russian government is interested in economic stability and refrains from deploying troops to the Balkans.
c. Kosovo makes progress in economic development, political stability, and security for all citizens. Corruption and crime rates decline.

**Future 18: Serbia does not recognize the independence of Kosovo. Both Russia and NATO take military action.**

a. The government of Serbia seeks membership in the European Union.

b. The Russian government deploys troops to the Balkans to distract its population from domestic problems.

c. The Serbian minority of Serbia conducts an uprising.

**Future 21: Serbia and NATO take military action, while Russia recognizes the independence of Kosovo.**

a. A nationalist party wins the Serbian national elections.

b. Russia is interested in good relations with the West.

c. Ethnic Serbs attack NATO peacekeepers in Kosovo.

2. Scenario 2

The International Court of Justice states that Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia is illegal.

**Future 24: Serbia and NATO take military action to attain their objectives, whereas Russia continues to oppose the independence of Kosovo diplomatically.**

a. Popular opinion in Serbia demands that Serbia re-takes control over Kosovo.

b. Russia seeks friendly relations with the West.

c. NATO is determined to prohibit Serbian troops from entering Kosovo.
Future 23: Serbia deploys troops to Kosovo in order to take control over the territory. Russia opposes Kosovo's independence diplomatically while NATO does not recognize the independence of Kosovo and does not commit to military action.

a. The government of Serbia declares that it will retake control over Serbia, if necessary by force.

b. Russia continues to support Serbia diplomatically.

c. NATO members cannot agree on a strategy in Kosovo.

Future 27: All three actors, Serbia, Russia and NATO take military action to attain their objectives.

a. Serbia is emboldened by the decision of the International Court of Justice and declares that it will re-take Kosovo by all means.

b. Russia is under pressure from nationalist movements and faces economic challenges.

c. All NATO members recognize Kosovo as an independent state and commit troops to defend the independence of Kosovo.

Future 22: Serbia takes military action, Russia does not recognize Kosovo’s independence, whereas NATO recognizes Kosovo as an independent state.

a. The government of Serbia declares that Kosovo is a part of Serbia and demands by ultimatum that the provincial government of Kosovo dissolves.

b. Russia supports the government of Serbia diplomatically.

c. NATO members cannot agree on a course of action to guarantee the independence of Kosovo.

Future 25: Serbia and Russia will take military action while NATO recognizes the independence of Kosovo.
a. Serbia is emboldened by the decision of the International Court of Justice and declares that it will re-take Kosovo regardless of the cost.

b. The Russian government sides with Serbia and deploys troops to the Balkans in order to deflect from domestic issues.

c. NATO members recognize the independence of Kosovo but are unable to commit combat troops to defend the independence of Kosovo.

**H. Indicators for Each Focal Event**

1. Scenario 1

   The International Court of Justice affirms Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia as legal.

   *Future 27: All three actors, Serbia, Russia and NATO, take military action to attain their objectives.*

   a. Serbia suffers from unemployment, economic decline and a drop in the living standard.

   b. The Russian government is unable to suppress separatist movements within the Russian Federation. Russia deploys troops to the Balkans.

   c. Kosovo faces a decline in the living standard.

   d. The government of Kosovo is unable to provide security and to control crime and corruption.

   e. NATO sends additional troops to Kosovo.

   *Future 24: Serbia and NATO take military action to attain their objectives, whereas Russia continues to oppose the independence of Kosovo diplomatically.*
a. Ethnic Albanians commit atrocities against the Serbian minority in Kosovo. As a result, demonstrations in Serbian cities demand that the government of Serbia takes action to protect the Serbian minority in Kosovo.

b. Russian troops are engaged in a major military conflict to suppress the separatist movement in Chechnya.

c. NATO deploys troops around the Kosovar capital Pristina to prevent Serbian troops from entering the city.

_Future 13: Serbia and Russia both do not recognize the independence of Kosovo but refrain from military action. All NATO members recognize Kosovo as an independent state._

a. Progress in negotiations between the European Union and Serbia give Serbia hope of a timely EU membership.

b. The Russian government openly supporting separatist movements in the Georgian regions of Ossetia and Abkhazia.

c. Kosovo’s economy is improving and attracting foreign investors.

_Future 18: Serbia does not recognize the independence of Kosovo. Both Russia and NATO take military action._

a. A majority of Serbian newspapers supports Serbia’s membership in the European Union.

b. Demonstrations in Russian cities demand economic and political reforms.

c. Serbian leaders in Kosovo call for an uprising against the Kosovar government.

_Future 21: Serbia and NATO take military action, while Russia recognizes the independence of Kosovo._

a. The majority of Serbian media outlets support the nationalist Serbian movement.
b. The Russian industry seeks access to Western markets.

c. The Russian government seeks international support in its struggle with separatists in Chechnya.

d. NATO increases its troop strength in Kosovo.

2. Scenario 2

The International Court of Justice states that Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia is illegal.

*Future 24: Serbia and NATO take military action to attain their objectives, whereas Russia continues to oppose the independence of Kosovo diplomatically.*

   a. Mass demonstrations in Serbian cities call for the Serbian army to take control over Kosovo.

   b. Serbia mobilizes its army.

   c. Russia seeks trade agreements with the West.

   d. NATO deploys additional troops to Kosovo and puts them on alert.

*Future 23: Serbia deploys troops to Kosovo in order to take control over the territory. Russia opposes Kosovo’s independence diplomatically while NATO does not recognize the independence of Kosovo and does not commit to military action.*

   a. Serbia mobilizes its army and stages troops at the border with Kosovo.

   b. Russia seeks trade agreements with the West.

   c. Several NATO members refuse to recognize the independence of Kosovo.

*Future 27: All three actors, Serbia, Russia and NATO take military action to attain their objectives.*
a. Mass demonstrations in Serbian cities call for the Serbian army to take control over Kosovo.

b. Serbia mobilizes its army.

c. The Russian government is under pressure from nationalist and communist groups.

d. Russia deploys troops to the Balkans.

e. NATO deploys additional troops to Kosovo and puts them on alert.

*Future 22: Serbia takes military action, Russia does not recognize Kosovo’s independence, whereas NATO recognizes Kosovo as an independent state.*

a. Serbia mobilizes its army and sends troops to its border with Kosovo.

b. Russia declares that the recommendation of the International Court of Justice must be respected.

c. Kosovo makes great progress in combating crime and corruption.

d. International organizations invest in the Kosovar economy.

*Future 25: Serbia and Russia will take military action while NATO recognizes the independence of Kosovo.*

a. Serbia mobilizes its army.

b. Serbia allows Russia to deploy troops to Serbia.

c. Kosovo makes great progress in combating crime and corruption.

d. International organizations invest in the Kosovar economy.

**I. Transposition Between Alternate Futures**

1. Scenario 1

The International Court of Justice affirms Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia as legal.
Future 27: All three actors, Serbia, Russia and NATO, take military action to attain their objectives.

This future could transpose into Future 24 if Russia withdraws from the conflict due to international or domestic pressures.

Future 24: Serbia and NATO take military action to attain their objectives, whereas Russia continues to oppose the independence of Kosovo diplomatically.

This scenario could transpose into Future 27 if Russia decides to enter the conflict due to domestic pressures and problems.

Future 13: Serbia and Russia both do not recognize the independence of Kosovo but refrain from military action. All NATO members recognize Kosovo as an independent state.

If Serbia decides to deploy troops to Kosovo due to domestic pressure or atrocities committed against ethnic Serbs in Kosovo, this future could transpose into several other futures depending on whether Russia and NATO are also drawn into armed conflict.

Future 18: Serbia does not recognize the independence of Kosovo. Both Russia and NATO take military action.

If Serbia enters the armed conflict, this future will transpose into Future 27.

Future 21: Serbia and NATO take military action, while Russia recognizes the independence of Kosovo.

This future could transpose into Future 27 if Russia enters the armed conflict or Future 23 if NATO withdraws from the conflict.

2. Scenario 2

The International Court of Justice states that Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia is illegal.
Future 24: Serbia and NATO take military action to attain their objectives, whereas Russia continues to oppose the independence of Kosovo diplomatically.

If Russia enters the war, this future will transpose into Future 27 or Future 23 if NATO withdraws from the conflict.

Future 23: Serbia deploys troops to Kosovo in order to take control over the territory. Russia opposes Kosovo’s independence diplomatically while NATO does not recognize the independence of Kosovo and does not commit to military action.

This future could transpose in a number of alternate futures depending whether Russia or NATO enter the conflict.

Future 27: All three actors, Serbia, Russia and NATO take military action to attain their objectives.

This future could transpose into Future 24 if Russia withdraws from the conflict due to international or domestic pressures.

Future 22: Serbia takes military action, Russia does not recognize Kosovo’s independence, whereas NATO recognizes Kosovo as an independent state.

This future could transpose in a number of alternate futures depending whether Russia or NATO enter the conflict.

Future 25: Serbia and Russia will take military action while NATO recognizes the independence of Kosovo.

In this scenario, atrocities against ethnic Albanians could draw NATO into the armed conflict (Future 27).
VI. Conclusion

Regardless of the recommendation that the International Court of Justice will render, the situation in Kosovo seems to be un-reconcilable. Serbia is not willing to give up its beloved province. Kosovars have enjoyed self-government and will not be willing to surrender to Serbian authorities. NATO peacekeepers are still maintaining relative peace between ethnic Serbs and ethnic Albanians within Kosovo’s borders. Separatist movements around the globe look for Kosovo as a precedent, while the Russian Federation fears the consequences of an independent Kosovo. Several European nations also strongly oppose the independence of Kosovo. Russia and China - both members of the United Nations with veto-power – can easily block Kosovo’s admission to the UN. Still today, Kosovo carries the image of a save heaven for organized crime, corruption and human trafficking. The conflict over Kosovo will be decided by armed conflict or not at all, at least not until a new generation of Serbs and Kosovars takes charge.

The administration under President George W. Bush was quick in recognizing the independence of Kosovo. By showing respect for the aspiration of the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo, the U.S. gained an ally in the region. But the U.S. government is now committed to guarantee Kosovo’s independence. A withdraw of U.S. support for Kosovo’s statehood could irritate allies worldwide and compromise the credibility of the United States.
VII. References


Appendix A: Maps

A. Serbia

![Map of Serbia]

Source: CIA World Factbook, 2001

B. Kosovo

![Map of Kosovo]

Source: CIA World Factbook, 2010
C. South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Break-away Regions in Georgia, supported by Russia)

Source: BBC News, 2009

D. Separatist Regions in Russia

Source: War News Updates, 2008
Appendix B: Outline

I. Introduction
   A. The End of the Cold War
   B. The Right to Secede
   C. The Conflict over Kosovo
   D. Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence
   E. The United Nation’s Appeal to the International Court of Justice
   F. The Importance of the Opinion Rendered by the International Court of Justice

II. Literature Review
   A. Background
   B. Gaps
   C. Overview
   D. Literature Samples
      1. Background Note: Kosovo
      2. Kosovo: To Recognize or not to Recognize?
      3. Finding a Peaceful Path for Kosovo: A Track Two Approach
      4. Self-determination, Recognition and the Problem of Kosovo
      5. Kosovo – A Serbian Question

III. Actors & Perceptions
   A. The Predictive Issue
   B. Actors Bearing on the Problem
   C. Perceptions and Intentions of Each Actor
      1. Serbia
2. Russia

3. NATO

IV. Research Design

A. Analytical Techniques

B. The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP)

C. The Twelve Steps of LAMP

V. Case Study/Analysis/Findings

A. Courses of Action for Each Actor

B. Major Scenarios

C. Number of Alternate Futures

D. Pairwise Comparison of Alternate Futures

E. Rank Order of the Alternate Futures

F. Consequences of Alternate Futures

G. Focal events for alternate futures

H. Indicators for Each Focal Event

I. Transposition Between Alternate Futures

VI. Conclusion

Appendix A: Maps

A. Serbia

B. Kosovo

C. South Ossetia and Abkhazia

D. Separatist Regions in Russia

Appendix B: Outline