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Whither Al-Qaeda?

The Future of Extremist Groups in Post-Revolutionary North Africa

A predictive analysis research proposal conducted for

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Dr. Jonathan Lockwood

By

William R. Garvey

Strategic Intelligence Studies Graduate Student

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Introduction

2011 has been a perplexing year for Middle Eastern extremist groups like Al Qaeda. For decades these groups have preached the virtue of waging holy war against secular Arab regimes and their Western supporters. To see several of their intractable enemies swept away in the Arab Spring--a tide of mostly peaceful popular uprisings across the Middle East--must be simultaneously encouraging and galling, perhaps as much as the death of Osama Bin-Laden. Their goal of overthrowing dictatorial regimes has been achieved, but it came about at the hands of a populist revolution whose members seem more interested in freedom of expression and social reform than in reestablishing an Islamic Caliphate.

The overthrow of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak is especially poignant for Al Qaeda. Egypt is the ideological homeland of Islamic extremism. The Islamic Brotherhood traces its roots back to Cairo. Sayeed Qutb, who is frequently cited as the founder of the austere anti-Western ideology that underpins Al Qaeda, was Egyptian. Al Qaeda's recently promoted leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, grew up around Cairo and spent several years in an Egyptian jail following the assassination of Anwar Sadat. Yet in spite of the momentous events in Egypt, the normally vocal Al-Zawahiri was very guarded in his videos addressing the revolts, and he dedicated much of his message to warning Egyptians and Tunisians that democracy is un-Islamic (Al-Zawahiri 2011). Egypt is of particular importance because it is the most populous Arab country and because it is considered the home of Islam's greatest scholars. Cairo's Al-Azhar University, in addition to being the oldest university in the world, is the leading institution in Islamic jurisprudence (Aishima 2005). The opinions and fatwas of its clerics are treated as doctrine by most Muslims around the world, and whoever controls Al-Azhar has a great deal of influence in the Islamic community.

The situation in North Africa is still unwinding. Although Hosni Mubarak has stepped down, the military officers who backed his regime are still largely in power. The government has established some reforms, such as holding a popular vote on the national constitution and opening the Rafah border crossing into the Gaza Strip (Issacharoff 2011). For the most part however, Cairo's policies remain the same. Tunisia seems stable for the time being, but its transitional government faces an uncertain future as it attempts to fulfill its mandate to hold elections this summer. Libya is descending into violence, and may yet become a new center for jihadist struggle. When the United States killed Osama Bin Laden, Al Qaeda lost its founder and longtime leader, but AQ's chain of command is intact. Just as Bin Laden had a keen interest in promoting Jihad in his homeland of Saudi Arabia, Al-Zawahiri may choose to focus attention on his native North Africa. The future of the region lies in the balance. It is crucial that policymakers have an idea of how the Arab Spring will play out and what repercussions it will have for national security. Therefore, this study will attempt to answer the question: What course of action will extremist groups like Al Qaeda pursue in the wake of the popular revolutions in North Africa?

Literature Review

Al-Zawahiri (2011) lays out the position of Al Qaeda's senior leadership towards the revolutions in North Africa. Unsurprisingly, his stance is very anti-regime, with especially harsh words reserved for former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. Al-Zawahiri lays out the corruption and abuses of the secular regimes in Egypt and Tunisia before going on to condemn the very concept of a secular nation-state as an un-Islamic and Western. Several times Al-Zawahiri (who is reportedly a surgeon) refers to the secular state as a cancer that can only be cured by the establishment of Islamic government and law:

Thus, removing the tyrant—even excising the corrupt regime—is not but a step or two steps in the medical treatment. It is like a surgeon who cuts open the stomach of a patient with cancer, as the healing cannot be complete except with removing the cancer, then closes the stomach, then gives care [to the patient] until he heals. As for just removing the tyrant, it is like a surgeon who feels content with cutting open the patient's stomach and then leaving him alone. (Al-Zawahiri, *Message of Hope and Glad Tidings*, 4)

In all of his four messages, there is a hint of worry about the route that the revolutions will take. Al-Zawahiri repeatedly stresses the need for Tunisians and Egyptians to maintain their sense of anger and outrage, and not to settle for reforms that stop short of full Islamic jurisprudence. He also takes the risky step of calling upon Egyptians to challenge the authority of the military. The Egyptian army is well-respected and played a crucial role in enabling the overthrow of Mubarak, so calling for an overthrow of military power is certainly a calculated risk. Al-Zawahiri seems to view the Egyptian armed forces (and the military leadership in particular) as a barrier that will prevent the implementation of an Islamic state. Additionally, Al-Zawahiri views the Egyptian constitution—which establishes Egypt as a secular state—as a barrier. He warns that the constitution is a vestige of colonial times, and that it must be completely scrapped and replaced with Sharia law. This hope was dealt a blow by the recent Egyptian referendum that approved democratic reforms to the constitution without overhauling the entire document (CNN 2011). The long-term goal of Al Qaeda is to establish North Africa as a base to export Jihad. Although Al-Zawahiri focuses most of his message on Egypt, he singles out Tunisia as the leading candidate for heartland of the new Caliphate:

The honorable free people of Tunisia, zealous of their faith and Sharia…must stand…against these tricks, and they must continue their sacrifices and efforts until Tunisia returns to being a castle for Jihad and steadfastness, and until it rids itself of corruption and bribery, and theft and suppression, injustice, vice and dependency. And

for Tunisia to take its suitable role amongst its Muslim Ummah, to defend Al-Aqsa to support the Mujahideen in every region of the Islamic homelands, and support weakened and the oppressed and work on liberating the Muslim homelands from armies of the Crusader campaigns today in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, Somalia and the Islamic Maghreb…the free honorable people of Tunisia must establish governance that would become a model for their brothers in Shura.

Al-Zawahiri also has words of encouragement for protestors in Yemen and Palestine. (Notably absent from his analysis is the bloodshed in Bahrain, where predominantly Shia protestors are revolting against a Sunni regime). Although he voices his worry about how the Arab Revolutions may proceed, the Al Qaeda spokesman does seem to have glimpsed opportunity in the midst of turmoil.

Cole (2011) does not view the people of North Africa as especially receptive to the ideology of Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. He notes that the core complaints of protestors are not about religious freedom or theological issues, but rather about jobs, corruption, and social inequality. He also points out that the austere Wahhabism that is common in the Arab Gulf states is much less prevalent in North Africa. Some commentators are wary of where popular elections will take Egypt and Tunisia, fearing the rise of a government composed of religious radicals, as has occurred in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. Cole writes that such an assumption may be flawed, referencing elections in Pakistan, Albania, Kurdistan, and Indonesia where moderate governments were elected. Although Islam is a major force in the region, and religious leaders have influence in the communities, Cole doubts that Al Qaeda will find North Africa to be fertile ground for their agenda.

Jervis (2010) sounds a cautionary note for analysts attempting to predict the outcome of a revolution. He uses the Iranian Revolution as an example of where analysts failed. The US

Intelligence Community (IC) at first failed to predict the revolution. Analysts proceeded to follow up that failure by mischaracterizing the revolution as secular and middle class in nature. Although the failure to predict the overthrow of the Shah was a hard to understand mistake that Jervis spends much of his time explaining, the confusion over the direction the revolution would take was more reasonable. There were essentially two groups of protestors involved in the revolution—largely secular members of the merchant class, who were well-educated and wanted a more representative system of government; and the larger group of religious protestors, who were predominantly poorer and less-educated members of the working class who wanted reforms along traditional conservative lines. Although these two groups were united by nationalism and revolutionary fervor prior to the overthrow of the Shah, they soon found themselves in conflict. The religious reformers eventually won control of the government and squeezed the secular reformers out of the picture. The example of the Iranian Revolution suggests that revolutionary movements are not monolithic and typically unite different interests behind a common cause. The key question is who shapes the country's agenda after the tyrant is overthrown.

Jervis's analysis of the Iranian Revolution also hints at how the North African revolutions may proceed. Some of these indicators do not point towards Egypt and Tunisia becoming a fundamentalist theocratic state. For example, the revolution in Iran was led by religious leaders, while the uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya have not had prominent religious figures leading the charge. This was because the Shah clamped down on secular sources of opposition, while largely ignoring the voices in the mosques (Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails,* 25). The mosques in Egypt and Tunisia though were predominantly state-controlled, with the regime in Cairo even dictating the Friday sermons. Jervis also suggests that the influence of the imams in Iran was helped by a Shia tradition of religious leaders holding political power. North Africa is a

predominantly Sunni region, with a stronger divide between religious leaders and political

leaders. Although many imams in Egypt and Tunisia supported the uprisings, there was no

Khomeini-esque figure that protestors rallied behind. One should not take assumptions too far

though. Jervis notes that the media tend to form their opinion on the sentiment of "the street" in

any country by interviewing well-educated English speaking citizens who may not be

representative of the general populace. It is possible that the common media image of a middle

class Egyptian with a college degree and a Facebook account protesting in Cairo is not reflective

of the average upset Egyptian. Most importantly, Jervis's research indicated that the secular and

religious camps in Iran—who would seem like natural adversaries—had very similar platforms

in some respects. Both groups wanted a more equitable distribution of wealth, less government

corruption, and modernization in one form or another (Jervis 88). The secular and religious

factions found it easier to unite over common political goals, with the religious camp gradually

overpowering the secular camp to establish Islamic jurisprudence and other reforms.

Hirschman (1970) lays out three broad courses of action available to non-state actors in

response to stimuli from a state actor—Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. These options will be the basis

for the courses of action (COAs) available to Al Qaeda. In response to a new government or

new policy, an actor may choose Loyalty. This means that the actor will accept the change

without protest, and more or less work with the government. This COA will be referred to as

Integrate in this study. Another option is Voice. When an actor exercises Voice, the actor

intends to express its opposition to the change. This can be expressed a number of ways,

including protests, strikes, and elections. Note that Voice is not exercised with the intent of

bringing down the political system; it is usually a matter of seeking a redress of grievances from

the government over a specific policy issue or issues. This course of action will be referred to as

Dissent in this study. The last and more dramatic option is Exit. An actor who Exits is discontented enough to attempt to leave the political system entirely. Sometimes this takes the form of emigration, other times it takes the form of a war or revolution that brings down the government and replaces it with a more agreeable one. This course of action will be referred to as Fight in this study. How Al Qaeda responds to the decisions of the interim governments in Egypt and Tunisia will be critical factors that influence how the revolutions proceed.

This study will utilize the Lockwood Analytical Method of Prediction (LAMP) to predict each actor's likely courses of action. The LAMP technique establishes a 12 step logical framework to generate alternate futures and key indicators for the most likely futures (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993, 27-28). As an analytical technique, it is fairly robust at limiting opportunities for bias. Some of the analytical biases that may have influenced this study include mirror imaging and oversimplification. Mirror imaging is the tendency of an analyst to frame an actor's perception and response to a question in the same way that he himself would. Because this study revolves around Middle East and North African actors, there is the potential for misleading mirror imaging due to cultural, historical, and religious differences, among others. Occurrences of mirror imaging will be mitigated through the use of redundant sources and a high level of scrutiny for key assumptions.

Oversimplification is a necessary evil considering the length and timeframe of this study. There are only three actors under consideration in this LAMP process—Al Qaeda (and its associate organizations in the region), the government of Egypt, and the government of Tunisia. Realistically, the number of actors could be much higher, and include secondary actors like the US, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Iran. It is well known that the more repressive regimes in the region—especialy the Saudis--are deeply concerned about the Arab Spring, and may attempt to

influence the outcome of the revolutions. President Obama has stated his intent to aid Egypt to transition to western style democracy (Obama 2011). There are doubtlessly other actors with a stake in the future of Egypt and Tunisia who cannot be accommodated in the scope of this study. Some necessary oversimplifications include treating Al Qaeda as a representative terrorist organization with similar goals to other terrorist groups in the region. Perhaps the most significant oversimplification is treating the actors as unitary groups, with no conflicting interests or factions within their ranks. Additionally, the courses of action available to Al Qaeda and the governments are limited to three apiece. Each course of action could be broken down into more specific COAs. The reason for this simplification is that the process of generating alternate futures and performing pairwise analysis grows increasingly complex with each actor and COA added. The number of actors and COAs has been simplified for the sake of the timeframe available to conduct this study.

Step 1. Define the issue for which the most likely future will be determined.

How will Al Qaeda respond to the "Arab Spring" revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia?

Step 2. Specify the actors involved.

The primary actors in this issue are the Egyptian government, the Tunisian transitional government, and Al Qaeda (AQ). Al Qaeda is a particularly difficult actor to define. To a large extent "Al Qaeda" is a brand name that is assumed by Islamic radicals across the world, regardless of actual connections to AQ's leadership. In spite of the poorly-drawn line between who is a member of AQ and who isn't, terrorism experts have largely agreed on a few key points. Al Qaeda exists as two organizations. One is the global infrastructure--the "public face" of AQ. This is a small cabal of leaders, financiers, bodyguards, and public affairs personnel.

This global group is primarily devoted to producing and disseminating propaganda, although the recent raid on Bin Laden's compound uncovered material that indicated that Al Qaeda's global leadership is still involved in operational planning, at least in the conceptual stages (Daily Mail 2011).

Figure 1

Al Qaeda Organizational Chart (International Level)

(Global Security: 2011)

The second, larger organization is the local Al Qaeda cells. These local groups recruit, plan, and execute attacks in their regions. Some cells adhere closely to the directives issued by the global AQ organization, while others act on their own initiative.

The pattern in North Africa has been for existing extremist groups to develop at least nominal ties with Al Qaeda and to subsequently claim to be a local affiliate of the organization. This is the case with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) which originated as a terrorist group fighting the Algerian government. Although AQIM is active in Algeria and the Sahel desert countries, it is a minor player in Tunisia and not a significant actor in Egypt. There have

been reports that AQIM is taking advantage of the unrest in Libya to obtain heavy weaponry such as machine guns, rocket propelled grenades, and MANPADS from inside the country (MSNBC 2011). This shift of attention to the northeast of AQIM's traditional territory could lead them to become more involved in Tunisia and Egypt. The most significant AQ presence in Egypt is the affiliated Qaeda al-Jihad, which resulted from the merger of Egyptian Islamic Jihad with Al-Qaeda in 2001. Al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al Zawahiri has been the leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad since 1991, although it is doubtful that he plays much of a role in the day-to-day operations of the group. Much media attention has been paid to the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian protests. However, the Muslim Brotherhood has existed as a primarily political and social organization since the government crackdown on Islamic groups following the assassination of Sadat in 1981. Although there are AQ members who are also members of the Muslim Brotherhood, most experts do not consider the Muslim Brotherhood to have a close relationship with Al Qaeda (Tenety 2011). The bottom line on AQ in North Africa is that it is an amalgamation of several different groups, all inspired by the international leadership of Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri, but operationally directed by local leaders. For the most part, "Al Qaeda" in this analysis will be associated with AQIM and Qaeda al-Jihad, as they are the most significant AQ associates in the region. However, an effort will be made to consider the roles that other AQ associated groups may play in any scenario in this analysis.

The Egyptian government is the most unitary actor in this analysis. Although Mubarack and the civilian leaders that nominally rule the country were overthrown, the military Supreme Council that is the power behind the curtain remains. Although an acting president and prime minister have been appointed, constitutional changes have been approved, and elections scheduled, Egypt is very much still a state run by the same military leaders who backed

Mubarack for decades. Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces Mohamed

Hussein Tantawi is the acting president of Egypt, while Mubarack's former Minister of

Transportation Essam Sharaf fills the less powerful prime minister position. (Although the prime

minister of Egypt is the head of government and the president is head of state, the president

typically wields more power than the PM, especially regarding security and stability issues.)

While this state of affairs may not be a boon for democracy, it does make the Egyptian

government a simpler actor to analyze. Although there may be members of the government who

have interests and views that differ from the party line, the Egyptian government can be assumed

to be a more or less unitary and rational actor.

Figure 2

Government of Egypt Executive Branch Organizational Chart

| | Council of Ministers |
| Prime Minister | Ministers' Working |

Ministers' Working
- The Production Group
- The Big Projects Group
- The Human Development Group
- The National Security Policies coordination Group
- The Services and Facilities Group
- The Economic Affairs Group
- The Intellectual Development Group

Supreme Council for Motherhood and Childhood

Supreme Council for Population

Supreme Council for Local Government

The Social Development Fund

Information and Decision Support Center

The National Council for Combating and Curing Substance Abuse

The Fund for Combating and Curing Substance Abuse

Al-Azhar

The Authority for Administrative Supervision

The Suez Canal Authority

(Sayed: 2004)

Note that the positions in the chart are based upon the Egyptian constitution. The chart does not represent the flow of power under the emergency laws, where the vast majority of power was reserved to the president and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Currently the power structure in Egypt resembles that of Mubarack's regime, but popular pressure to end the emergency laws may cause the balance of power to more closely resemble the structure specified in the constitution.

The Tunisian government is a less unitary actor than Egypt's government. Unlike the Egyptian government, which has been a long-lived military-backed institution with several different presidents, the Tunisian government prior to the revolution was essentially a personality cult focused on President Ben Ali. Therefore the government was left in a state of confusion when Ben Ali fled the country. A hastily formed coalition dominated by members of Ben Ali's Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party dissolved in the face of continuing protests, with the RCD itself dissolving soon after. Tunisia is currently being governed under emergency power laws by acting Prime Minister Beji Caid el Sebsi and acting President Fouad Mebazaa. An election to select members of a constitutional assembly is scheduled, although there is a heated disagreement within the government over whether the election will be held July 24th or

13

October 16th (Amara 2011). A general election will take place sometime after the constitutional assembly. Although the small acting government makes analysis somewhat simpler, the weak and ad hoc nature of Tunisia's transitional government may complicate matters.

Figure 3

Tunisian Executive Branch Organizational Chart

(Tunisian Ministry of the National Defence)

Note that the Prime Minister is the head of government and controls the cabinet, but the President is head of state and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. The Minister of National Defence reports to both the Prime Minister and the President (Ministry of the National Defence 2011). This dual-control arrangement could potentially cause confusion during times of national unrest.

Step 3. Perform an in-depth study of how each actor perceives the issue in question.

Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda (and their associates in the region) have a fairly straightforward stance on the question of what to do in the post-revolutionary environments of Egypt and Tunisia. Their stated

goal is to establish Islamic governments that institute Sharia, with the eventual goal of uniting the region--and eventually all of the Islamic world--in a second Caliphate. The short-term goals that AQ leaders will set toward those ends —and the means that they will employ to pursue them—are crucial questions. It is safe to say that AQ will not be forming a political party and fielding candidates in the elections—Al-Zawahiri himself has repeatedly bashed the concept of democracy and popular elections. AQ leaders realize that they do not have large enough numbers of members and sympathizers to be able to influence significant numbers of people or governments into supporting their aims. It is likely that AQ will resort to classic insurgency tactics—stirring up discontent and undermining confidence in the government—to gain influence. AQ leaders may take a page from political Islamic groups in Algeria and use social "wedge issues" revolving around public morality and religion in order to raise popular discontent and gain influence. Based on the historical actions of AQ and the statements of its leaders in relation to the revolutions, AQ is clearly willing to resort to violence to achieve their goals. Historically, a lot of these violent acts (in Iraq and Jordan in particular) have backfired on AQ and hardened popular opinion against them. Whether the local leaders of AQ are savvy enough to judge the wisdom of resorting to violence versus relying on non-violent agitation is unknown.

Egypt

The Egyptian government is likely willing to make minor reforms that do not threaten its hold on power in any meaningful way. The constitutional referendum held in March weakened the power of the presidency, but did not substantially change the influence of the military. The fall of Mubarak and the promise of reform seemed to mollify a large number of protestors. The approach of the government towards protestors who continue to agitate for change has been markedly different from the hands-off approach that the military adopted towards the mass

demonstrations against Mubarak. Days after Mubarak fell, the Egyptian military forcibly cleared the remaining protestors out of Tahrir Square, and has cracked down on subsequent protests, without much of a popular outcry. Despite the show of unity over Mubarak, Egyptian society is divided, with many different groups with different interests. The Egyptian government is likely willing to suppress or ignore a moderate amount of discontent without giving in to pressure for reform. Only when the level of discontent is high enough to threaten the government's power will substantial changes be made.

Concerned commentators have been alarmed by the recent decision to reopen the Rafah border crossing between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, allowing the movement of people and materiel in and out of the Hamas-controlled territory, and point to it as a sign that the new Egyptian government is willing to accommodate religious extremists. It should be noted however that Mubarack's policy of keeping the Rafah crossing closed was deeply unpopular across a wide swathe of Egyptian society, and the reopening of the crossing is seen by many Egyptians as an enlightened foreign policy decision in the name of Pan-Arabism rather than in support of Hamas. The government has legalized and tolerates Islamic parties like the Muslim Brotherhood, but the military itself is a predominantly secular institution that will protect its own interests. The Egyptian government will likely tolerate political Islam when the two groups have shared interests, ignore it when their interests diverge (only giving in when popular sentiment forces them to), and will respond with force to any effort to violently change the status quo.

Tunisia

The transitional government of Tunisia suffers from a deficit of both popular trust and practical power. Thus it is likely to tread more carefully than the Egyptian government in the

coming months. This may have emboldened religious radicals. Brothels, which had been long

tolerated under the Ben Ali regime, have been targeted by clerics in the months following the

revolution, with at least one Tunis brothel burned to the ground by a religious mob. Rather than

face the baying crowds, the government has forced the targeted brothels to close (Telegraph

2011). Several Islamic political parties have formed and are gaining influence. It is unlikely that

the transitional government will be willing to oppose the actions of politically-minded clerics

where their aims apply to Tunisian society. Indeed, as the case of the Tunis brothels shows, the

government may be willing to aid them in achieving their goals. However, there are lines that

the government is willing to draw. For instance, the transitional government deployed tanks to

churches to protect the country's Christian minority against potential harassment from

extremists. The transitional government is willing to extend a certain amount of influence to

religious groups when it comes to Tunisian society. What is unclear is what the transitional

government would do if these religious groups posed a serious challenge to the government itself

or to the stability of Tunisia.

Step 4. Specify all possible courses of action for each actor.

There are three broad courses of action available to the Egyptian and Tunisian

governments: Status Quo, Reform, and Fight. Status quo is simply carrying on with "business as

usual," involving no significant reforms in response to demands for change nor substantial action

against those demanding change. This is a more plausible CoA for the Egyptian government, as

the military regime enjoys a fairly stable position. This is less plausible for the Tunisian

government, given that it has a short-term transitional mandate to rewrite the Constitution and

hold free elections. Reform is a very broad CoA. Reform can mean anything from a

government making substantial reforms in response to popular demand, such as weakening

military influence over the government, or perhaps introducing and enforcing Sharia (both the Egyptian and Tunisian constitutions have references to Islamic law, but in reality it is rarely enforced outside of family law), to the government stepping down completely. (Note that for the purposes of this analysis, the Tunisian transitional government stepping down after a free election will be considered Status Quo rather than Reform, as the government's mandate is to step down after elections.) Fight is responding to popular sentiment for reform with widespread violence, similar to what the Mubarak regime chose in the early days of the Egyptian Revolution, or Qaddafi's war in Libya. This could involve fighting groups like Al-Qaeda or fighting members of the general populace.

Al-Qaeda's options include Integration, Dissent, and Fight. Integration requires AQ to work hand-in-hand with the government to attain their goals. This could involve AQ members seeking positions in government or simply becoming influential in society and gaining leverage over the government. Dissent is a broad CoA that involves a spectrum of possible actions, from passive resistance to organizing opposition parties. It could involve protests, community activism (how the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas rose to popularity), and radical preaching. Fight is a CoA familiar to Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda could resort to terrorism to silence prominent members of government and society who are opposed to AQ's goals. Alternatively, AQ could break from their terrorist history and attempt an organized uprising against the government, complete with fielded forces and organized tactics. It is also possible that Al Qaeda could focus on terrorist acts in Egypt and Tunisia aimed at Western citizens, with the intent of undermining the regimes through negative media attention and damaging the tourism industry (a major driver of economic activity in Egypt). This would be in line with previous attacks such as the 1997

Luxor massacre, committed by the Al Qaeda affiliated group Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (BBC 2002).

These CoAs are oversimplified by necessity. It is entirely possible that an actor could choose multiple CoAs, such as AQ simultaneously integrating with a government and dissenting against it, or dissenting and fighting. The governments of Egypt and Tunisia could choose to both reform and fight. For simplicity's sake, the CoA that an actor chooses in a scenario will be understood to be the primary focus of that actor's intent, even though elements of other CoAs may be present.

Step 5. Determine the major scenarios within which alternative futures will be compared.

Scenario I: Peace (Relative stability prevails. Egyptian and Tunisian regimes remain in power without crackdowns on extremist groups. Al Qaeda and associates commit little to no terrorist acts, relying instead upon promoting extremist views and biding time as the situation in-country develops.)

Scenario II: Conflict (Actors select aggressive stances—Egypt and Tunisian governments violently crack down on extremist groups, while Al Qaeda commits to a campaign of terrorism)

Step 6. Calculate the total number of permutations of alternative futures for each scenario.

The LAMP method utilizes the formula $X^Y = Z$, where X equals the number of courses of action available to each actor. In this study, X is 3. Y is the number of actors, which is 3. Z is the total number of alternative futures that will be compared. This formula ($3^3 = 27$) yields twenty-seven alternative futures that must be compared. There are two scenarios which will yield a total of 54 alternative futures.

Table 1

Possible Permutations

Egypt/Tunisia: Q = Status Quo, R = Reform, F = Fight

Al-Qaeda: I = Integrate, D = Dissent, F = Fight

Alternate Future #	Egypt	Tunisia	Al-Qaeda
1	Q	Q	I
2	Q	Q	D
3	Q	Q	F
4	Q	R	I
5	Q	R	D
6	Q	R	F
7	Q	F	I
8	Q	F	D
9	Q	F	F
10	R	Q	I
11	R	Q	D
12	R	Q	F
13	R	R	I
14	R	R	D
15	R	R	F
16	R	F	I
17	R	F	D
18	R	F	F

19	F	Q	I
20	F	Q	D
21	F	Q	F
22	F	R	I
23	F	R	D
24	F	R	F
25	F	F	I
26	F	F	D
27	F	F	F

Step 7. Perform a pair wise comparison of all alternative futures to determine their relative probability.

In order to complete this pair wise comparison, each alternate future must be compared to the others. Whichever future is more likely to occur is awarded one "vote." The total number of comparisons (and votes) is determined by the formula $V = n(n-1)/2$, where n equals the number of alternate futures (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993, 40). In this case the formula results in $V = 27(27-1)/2 = 351$ votes per scenario. This distribution of votes through the pair wise comparison method is listed below.

The pairwise comparison in both scenarios will have some similarities. This is because each actor has the same COAs (and therefore the same alternate futures) in each scenario. The similarities arise from the fact that some alternate futures are very probable while others are very improbable, regardless of scenario. For example, in both the Peace and War scenarios, alternate future 25 (Egypt-Fight, Tunisia-Fight, Al Qaeda-Integrate) is highly improbable because it is

illogical that Al Qaeda would attempt to integrate into a government that is at war with Islamic

terrorist groups. During the voting, Al Qaeda's Fight COA tended to receive more votes because

AQ is a terrorist organization and violence has historically been their primary course of action.

Voting one alternate future over another is not always such a clear matter though, and this is

where the results differ between the two scenarios. In scenario I, when two similarly likely

alternate futures are compared, the alternate future that involves actors choosing less

confrontational COAs will be selected. In scenario II, the alternate future that has more

confrontational COAs will be selected.

Table 2 (Scenario I—Peace)

Alternate Futures and Pairwise Comparison Votes

Alternate Future #	Egypt	Tunisia	Al-Qaeda	Votes
1	Q	Q	I	6
2	Q	Q	D	17
3	Q	Q	F	17
4	Q	R	I	14
5	Q	R	D	21
6	Q	R	F	13
7	Q	F	I	6
8	Q	F	D	13
9	Q	F	F	19
10	R	Q	I	14
11	R	Q	D	22
12	R	Q	F	15

13	R	R	I	12
14	R	R	D	18
15	R	R	F	10
16	R	F	I	4
17	R	F	D	12
18	R	F	F	18
19	F	Q	I	2
20	F	Q	D	12
21	F	Q	F	22
22	F	R	I	6
23	F	R	D	21
24	F	R	F	23
25	F	F	I	0
26	F	F	D	5
27	F	F	F	9

Table 3 (Scenario II—Conflict)

Alternate Futures and Pairwise Comparison Votes

Alternate Future #	Egypt	Tunisia	Al-Qaeda	Votes
1	Q	Q	I	8
2	Q	Q	D	20
3	Q	Q	F	18
4	Q	R	I	10

5	Q	R	D	22
6	Q	R	F	20
7	Q	F	I	3
8	Q	F	D	11
9	Q	F	F	24
10	R	Q	I	6
11	R	Q	D	12
12	R	Q	F	12
13	R	R	I	8
14	R	R	D	13
15	R	R	F	20
16	R	F	I	2
17	R	F	D	8
18	R	F	F	14
19	F	Q	I	2
20	F	Q	D	16
21	F	Q	F	24
22	F	R	I	6
23	F	R	D	16
24	F	R	F	26
25	F	F	I	0
26	F	F	D	6
27	F	F	F	24

Step 8. Rank order the alternate futures for each scenario from highest relative probability to the lowest based on the total number of "votes" received.

Table 4 (Scenario I—Peace)

Alternate Future #	Egypt	Tunisia	Al-Qaeda	Votes
24	F	R	F	23
11	R	Q	D	22
21	F	Q	F	22
5	Q	R	D	21
23	F	R	D	21
9	Q	F	F	19
14	R	R	D	18
18	R	F	F	18
2	Q	Q	D	17
3	Q	Q	F	17
12	R	Q	F	15
4	Q	R	I	14
10	R	Q	I	14
6	Q	R	F	13
8	Q	F	D	13
13	R	R	I	12
17	R	F	D	12
20	F	Q	D	12
15	R	R	F	10
27	F	F	F	9

1	Q	Q	I	6
7	Q	F	I	6
22	F	R	I	6
26	F	F	D	5
16	R	F	I	4
19	F	Q	I	2
25	F	F	I	0

Table 5 (Scenario II—Conflict)

Alternate Future #	Egypt	Tunisia	Al-Qaeda	Votes
24	F	R	F	26
9	Q	F	F	24
21	F	Q	F	24
27	F	F	F	24
5	Q	R	D	22
2	Q	Q	D	20
6	Q	R	F	20
15	R	R	F	20
3	Q	Q	F	18
20	F	Q	D	16
23	F	R	D	16
18	R	F	F	14
14	R	R	D	13
11	R	Q	D	12

12	R	Q	F	12
8	Q	F	D	11
4	Q	R	I	10
1	Q	Q	I	8
13	R	R	I	8
17	R	F	D	8
10	R	Q	I	6
22	F	R	I	6
26	F	F	D	6
7	Q	F	I	3
16	R	F	I	2
19	F	Q	I	2
25	F	F	I	0

Step 9. Assuming that each scenario occurs, analyze the possible futures with the highest relative probabilities in terms of their consequences for the issue in question.

The LAMP method stresses that most consumers are interested only in the top three to five most likely futures. Based on vote distribution, this study will consider the top five futures. They will be analyzed in detail to shed light on their consequences.

SCENARIO I: Peace

Alternate Future 24 (23 votes) Egypt cracks down harshly on dissenters and extremist groups, the transitional Tunisian government submits to pressure for significant reform, Al Qaeda resorts to violence against one or both regimes.

This scenario involves Al Qaeda carrying on a campaign of violence against the Egyptian and/or Tunisian governments. The Egyptian military regime will violently suppress Al Qaeda and other forms of radical politicized Islam, in response to provocations such as sectarian violence against Egyptian Christians and attacks on police officers. The relatively weak Tunisian government will give in to demands to incorporate political Islam, in the hopes of placating hardline reformists and staving off terrorists attacks and civil unrest. In this future, Al Qaeda will resort to terrorist attacks to try to kill key members of government and inflict mass casualties in order to undermine public confidence in the regimes.

Alternate Future 11 (22 votes) Egypt makes significant reforms to placate religious groups. Tunisia stays the course and holds elections. Al Qaeda finds it more advantageous to pursue mostly peaceful dissent.

In this scenario, Cairo faces substantial pressure from religious groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and calls for reform from the leading clerics at Al-Azhar. Faced with the potential of a second uprising, the regime embraces reform, loosens restrictions on political Islamic parties, and introduces more Sharia based laws. In this environment, AQ members find it advantageous to pursue mostly peaceful dissent to encourage further reforms, and join an umbrella of other radical political Islamic groups to put pressure on the government to make further reforms or to step down. The Tunisian government largely escapes the unrest in Egypt and carries on with business.

Alternate Future 21 (22 votes) Egypt cracks down harshly on dissenters and extremist groups, the Tunisian transitional government maintains order without cracking down or reforming, Al Qaeda resorts to violence against one or both regimes.

In this future, the Egyptian regime uses its massive security apparatus to crack down on Al Qaeda and other forms of radical politicized Islam, in response to provocations such as sectarian violence against Egyptian Christians and attacks on police officers. Meanwhile, the Tunisian transitional government manages to balance the competing demands of different groups without giving up order or making substantial concessions. Al Qaeda stays true to form and resorts to terrorist attacks to try to kill key members of government and inflict mass casualties in order to undermine public confidence in the regimes.

Alternate Future 5 (21 votes) The Egyptian military regime maintains power without cracking down or reforming, the Tunisian government submits to pressure for significant reform, Al Qaeda resorts to primarily peaceful dissent against one or both regimes.

This future is the most complex of the top five alternate futures. The Egyptian regime has the tacit, if unenthusiastic support of most of its citizens. The level of popular unrest is not enough to concern the regime, and the security apparatus is capable of maintaining order. The relatively weak Tunisian government will give in to demands to incorporate political Islam, in the hopes of placating hardline reformists and staving off terrorists attacks and civil unrest. Al Qaeda will try to emulate the example of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas by putting terrorism on the back burner and focusing on political dissent and fostering close ties to legal and illegal Islamic organizations in order to gain prestige and influence.

Alternate Future 23 (21 votes) Egypt violently cracks down on Al Qaeda and other extremist groups, Tunisia embraces reform, and Al Qaeda pursues a policy of mostly peaceful dissent.

In this scenario, an Egyptian crackdown on extremists prompts Al Qaeda to focus its efforts in Tunisia. The Tunisian government's precarious hold on power is threatened by

popular religious unrest, and the government gives in to demands for religious reform. After allowing the enforcement of Sharia and permitting radical Islamic groups to form organized parties, Al Qaeda members find it advantageous to pursue a policy of mainly peaceful dissent. AQ may join an umbrella of other extremist groups to put pressure on the government to pursue further reforms or to step down.

SCENARIO II: Conflict

Alternate Future 24 (26 votes) Egypt cracks down harshly on dissenters and extremist groups, the transitional Tunisian government submits to pressure for significant reform, Al Qaeda resorts to violence against one or both regimes.

This scenario involves Al Qaeda carrying on a campaign of violence against the Egyptian and/or Tunisian governments. The Egyptian military regime will violently suppress Al Qaeda and other forms of radical politicized Islam, in response to provocations such as sectarian violence against Egyptian Christians and attacks on police officers. The relatively weak Tunisian government will give in to demands to incorporate political Islam, in the hopes of placating hardline reformists and staving off terrorists attacks and civil unrest. In this future, Al Qaeda will resort to terrorist attacks to try to kill key members of government and inflict mass casualties in order to undermine public confidence in the regimes.

Alternate Future 9 (24 votes) The Egyptian military regime maintains its hold on power without cracking down or reforming, Tunisia cracks down harshly on dissenters and extremists, Al Qaeda resorts to violence against one or both regimes.

In this future, the military regime in Egypt has the tacit, if unenthusiastic support of most of its citizens. The level of popular unrest is not enough to concern the regime, and the security

apparatus is capable of maintaining order. The Tunisian government violently cracks down on Al Qaeda and other radical opposition groups. In this environment, Al Qaeda and its associates may choose to put pressure on Tunisia through terrorism in order to try to force the government to make Islamic political reforms or to step down.

Alternate Future 21 (24 votes) Egypt cracks down harshly on dissenters and extremist groups, the Tunisian transitional government maintains order without cracking down or reforming, Al Qaeda resorts to violence against one or both regimes.

In this future, the Egyptian regime uses its massive security apparatus to crack down on Al Qaeda and other forms of radical politicized Islam, in response to provocations such as sectarian violence against Egyptian Christians and attacks on police officers. Meanwhile, the Tunisian transitional government manages to balance the competing demands of different groups without giving up order or making substantial concessions. Al Qaeda stays true to form and resorts to terrorist attacks to try to kill key members of government and inflict mass casualties in order to undermine public confidence in the regimes.

Alternate Future 27 (24 votes) Egypt and Tunisia crack down harshly on dissenters and extremist groups, Al Qaeda resorts to violence against one or both regimes.

In this future both the Egyptian and Tunisian governments use violent means to crack down on Al Qaeda and other extremist groups, possibly in response to attacks or attempts to foment sectarian unrest a la Iraq. Al Qaeda resorts to terrorist attacks to try to kill key members of government and inflict mass casualties in order to undermine public confidence in the regimes.

<u>Alternate Future 5</u> (22 votes) The Egyptian military regime maintains power without cracking down or reforming, the Tunisian government submits to pressure for significant reform, Al Qaeda resorts to primarily peaceful dissent against one or both regimes.

This future is the most complex of the Scenario II futures. The Egyptian regime has the tacit, if unenthusiastic support of most of its citizens. The level of popular unrest is not enough to concern the regime, and the security apparatus is capable of maintaining order. The relatively weak Tunisian government will give in to demands to incorporate political Islam, in the hopes of placating hardline reformists and staving off terrorists attacks and civil unrest. Al Qaeda will try to emulate the example of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas by putting terrorism on the back burner and focusing on political dissent and fostering close ties to legal and illegal Islamic organizations in order to gain prestige and influence.

Step 10. Determine the focal events that must occur in the present in order to bring about a given alternate future.

A focal event in LAMP analysis is a significant occurrence that influences the relative probability of the alternate futures. The focal events that must occur to bring about each alternate future are listed below.

<u>*SCENARIO I: Peace*</u>

Future #24 Egypt cracks down violently on radical opposition groups, Tunisia makes significant political concessions, and Al Qaeda begins a campaign of violence. (23 votes)

FOCAL EVENT- Egypt experiences wave of terrorist attacks

FOCAL EVENT- Mass unrest in Tunisia

FOCAL EVENT- Egyptian government commits to secular path

Future #11 (22 votes) Egypt makes significant reforms to placate religious groups, Tunisia stays the course, and Al Qaeda pursues mostly non-violent dissent. (22 votes)

FOCAL EVENT- Mass unrest in Egypt

FOCAL EVENT- Lack of terrorism and public unrest in Tunisia

FOCAL EVENT- Relaxation of regime stances against religious political parties and Sharia

Future #21 Egypt cracks down violently on radical opposition groups, Tunisia embraces the status quo, and Al Qaeda begins a campaign of violence. (22 votes)

FOCAL EVENT- Egypt experiences wave of terrorist attacks

FOCAL EVENT- Lack of terrorism and public unrest in Tunisia

FOCAL EVENT- Egyptian government commits to secular path

Future #5 Egypt embraces the status quo, Tunisia makes significant political concessions, and Al Qaeda focuses primarily on non-violent dissent. (21 votes)

FOCAL EVENT- Lack of terrorism and public unrest in Egypt

FOCAL EVENT- Mass unrest in Tunisia

FOCAL EVENT- Relaxation of regime stances against religious political parties and Sharia

Future #23 (21 votes) Egypt violently cracks down on Al Qaeda and other extremist groups, Tunisia embraces reform, and Al Qaeda focuses primarily on non-violent dissent. (21 votes)

FOCAL EVENT- Egypt experiences wave of terrorist attacks

FOCAL EVENT- Mass unrest in Tunisia

FOCAL EVENT- Relaxation of regime stances against religious political parties and Sharia

SCENARIO II: War

Future #24 Egypt cracks down violently on radical opposition groups, Tunisia makes significant political concessions, and Al Qaeda begins a campaign of violence. (26 votes)

FOCAL EVENT- Egypt experiences wave of terrorist attacks

FOCAL EVENT- Mass unrest in Tunisia

FOCAL EVENT- Egyptian government commits to secular path

Future #9 Egypt embraces the status quo, Tunisia cracks down violently on radical opposition groups, and Al Qaeda begins a campaign of violence. (24 votes)

FOCAL EVENT- Lack of terrorism and public unrest in Egypt

FOCAL EVENT- Tunisia experiences wave of terrorist attacks

FOCAL EVENT- Tunisian government commits to secular path

Future #21 Egypt cracks down violently on radical opposition groups, Tunisia embraces the status quo, and Al Qaeda begins a campaign of violence. (24 votes)

FOCAL EVENT- Egypt experiences wave of terrorist attacks

FOCAL EVENT- Lack of terrorism and public unrest in Tunisia

FOCAL EVENT- Egyptian government commits to secular path

Future #27 Egypt and Tunisia crack down violently on radical opposition groups, and Al Qaeda begins campaign of violence. (24 votes)

FOCAL EVENT- Egypt and Tunisia experience wave of terrorist attacks

FOCAL EVENT- Egyptian and Tunisian governments commit to secular path

Future #5 Egypt embraces the status quo, Tunisia makes significant political concessions, and Al Qaeda focuses primarily on non-violent dissent. (22 votes)

FOCAL EVENT- Lack of terrorism and public unrest in Egypt

FOCAL EVENT- Mass unrest in Tunisia

FOCAL EVENT- Relaxation of regime stances against religious political parties and Sharia

Step 11. Develop indicators (measures) for the focal events.

Each focal event has a number of key indicators that an analyst could use to predict the relative probability of an alternate future occurring. These indicators foretell the actor's decisions.

FOCAL EVENT-Egypt/Tunisia experience wave of terrorist attacks

> KEY INDICATOR-Abrupt increase in AQ propaganda against regime

> KEY INDICATOR-Recruitment of young men and boys in mosques and slums

> KEY INDICATOR-Surveillance of regime and western targets

FOCAL EVENT-Mass unrest in Egypt/Tunisia

>KEY INDICATOR-Large anti-government protests following Friday sermons

>KEY INDICATOR-Acts of vandalism and protests vs. brothels, liquor stores, etc

>KEY INDICATOR-Organized campaign for implementation of Sharia

>KEY INDICATOR-Large scale work and transportation disruptions

FOCAL EVENT-Regimes commit to secular path

>KEY INDICATOR-Security forces crack down on Al Qaeda and other radical Islamic groups

>KEY INDICATOR-Restrictions placed on Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic political groups

>KEY INDICATOR-Statements of support for existing laws from national leaders

>KEY INDICATOR-No significant new laws or constitutional changes proposed

FOCAL EVENT- Relaxation of regime stances against religious political parties and Sharia

>KEY INDICATOR-Religious parties permitted to register and run for elections without undue restrictions

>KEY INDICATOR-Regimes introduce new Sharia-based laws

>KEY INDICATOR-Regimes enforce existing Sharia-based laws

FOCAL EVENT-Lack of terrorism and public unrest

KEY INDICATOR-Military and police not on heightened state of alert

KEY INDICATOR-No large gatherings in public forums

KEY INDICATOR-State officials continue routine travel

Step 12. State the potential of a given alternate future to "transpose" into another alternate future.

Each alternate future is a combination of decisions made by actors. In a given future, if an actor changes its course of action, the future could "transpose" into a different alternate future. This final step assesses the likelihood of such an occurrence.

Scenario I: Peace

Alternate future #23 is one COA away from futures #5 and #24. If the Egyptian government changes its approach to radical Islamic groups, transposition could occur, depending on the response of Al Qaeda. Future #11 could transpose into future #21 if the Tunisian government suddenly changes tack from appeasement to confrontation. Additionally, the borders between courses of action may be nebulous, particularly when applied to Fight and Status Quo, as well as Status Quo and Reform. Categorizing which course of action an actor is following may be a matter of degrees, with a minor change potentially causing the actor to fall into a different COA.

Scenario II: Conflict

In this scenario, three of the top five alternate futures (numbers 5, 21, and 27) involve Egypt and Al-Qaeda choosing the Fight course of action, with the distinguishing factor being the Tunisian government's COA. There is particular potential for transposition in Tunisia's case

because the Tunisian government has a precarious hold on power that could lead to it switching COAs with little warning. Future #9 is one course of action away from #27 and would only require a provocation to prod the Egyptian regime into the Fight COA. Additionally, the borders between courses of action may be nebulous, particularly when applied to Fight and Status Quo, as well as Status Quo and Reform. Categorizing which course of action an actor is following may be a matter of degrees, with a minor change potentially causing the actor to fall into a different COA.

Conclusion

The repercussions of the Arab Spring revolutions in Egypt and North Africa are still playing out. How Al Qaeda operates in the post revolutionary environment both influences and is influenced by the decisions of the government regimes. This study suggests that Al Qaeda will stay true to their roots and pursue a campaign of terrorism against the Egyptian government, the Tunisian government, or both. Even in the "Peace" scenario, the pairwise comparison resulted in Al Qaeda choosing the Fight course of action in two of the top five futures. This is in line with both historical and current rhetoric about Al Qaeda being at war with the secular regimes in North Africa, elections being un-Islamic, and the need for Jihad to bring about Sharia in Arab lands. Al Qaeda's actions will occur in the wider context of the decisions that the Egyptian and Tunisian governments make. In Egypt's case it seems likely that the regime will not make significant concessions to the demands of radical political Islamic groups. It is more likely that Cairo will stick to the status quo or crack down on radical Islamic influences. These LAMP results are in line with the historical tendency of the military-backed government to pursue a secular agenda. The course of action that the Tunisian government chooses is the most

difficult to predict. The Tunisian government has a very tenuous hold on power, making the decisions of its leaders difficult to foretell and more likely to change with little notice.

The results of this study may be of interest to anyone holding a stake in the future of North Africa. Egypt is very influential in the Arab world and the wider Islamic world, with a substantial population, a large modern military, and some of the most highly esteemed political and religious leaders in the Middle East. How the region develops in the post-revolutionary environment will be closely watched from Washington to Tel Aviv, and Algiers to Jakarta by government officials, dictators, academics, would-be revolutionaries, and terrorists. Al Qaeda's actions in Egypt and Tunisia may be imitated by terrorist groups elsewhere, in the hopes of fomenting unrest against secular governments in other Islamic countries. Leaders of other Arab states will keep a nervous eye on the policies that come out of Cairo and Tunis, and how their citizens receive them. Analysts and observers of the region would do well to pay close attention to the most valuable product of the LAMP process: the key indicators that give insight as to what alternate futures the actors are progressing towards. Armed with this information, an analyst can hope to avoid strategic surprise as the repercussions of the Arab Spring play out. The future of all three actors is uncertain, but perhaps with persistent observation and close analysis, some light may be shed on the path they will tread.

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