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"ONE WORLD, ONE DREAM"

CHINA AND THE 2008 OLYMPIC GAMES A Predictive Study: Will China Change Policies Regarding Taiwan and Tibet in Response to Hosting the Games?

by

Peggie Duggan

Department of Intelligence Studies IN520 - Analytical Methods Dr. Jonathan Lockwood May 2008

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CHINA AND THE 2008 OLYMPIC GAMES: A Predictive Study: Will China Change Policies regarding Taiwan and Tibet in response to Hosting the Games?

"...it is impossible to ignore the public debate on political issues such as human rights which, in the present context, is imposed on sport. The Commission will not deal with this issue other than to acknowledge the existence of the debate." IOC Evaluation Report. 2001. General Introduction.

> "Freedom of Expression is a Basic Human Right" Jacques Rogge, IOC President April 10, 2008

"You don't obtain anything in China with a loud voice." Jacques Rogge, IOC President April 26, 2008

INTRODUCTION:

The Olympics represent the highest of human hopes and achievements on an even playing field – sports - an arena where countries set aside their political differences and come together to celebrate and compete in excellence. That is the hope and the prayer for every Olympic competition. Ideally, politics and nationalism is left at home. In reality, politics and nationalism are never more highlighted than at the Olympics.

This report will cover the lead up to the 2008 Olympic Games to be hosted by Beijing, China, a Communist government notorious for its human-rights abuses, and attempt to predict the potential impact and possible consequences to China's policies regarding Taiwan and Tibet.

Brief History of the Olympics:

Though scholars argue, it is generally thought "...the first ancient Olympic Games can be traced back to 776 BC. ... They continued for nearly 12 centuries, until Emperor Theodosius decreed in 393 A.D. that all such "pagan cults" be banned." (International Olympics Committee, 2008. History Section).

Our modern Olympics began in 1894 when Baron Pierre de Coubertin convened a Congress to present his idea of reviving the Olympics and established the International Olympics Committee (hereinafter, "IOC"). It was agreed the first games would be held in Athens in 1896. The largest international competition at the time, 14 countries took part with a total of 241 athletes and 43 events. In 2004, the Olympics were once again held in Athens and the numbers are astounding: 201 Nations, 10,625 athletes (4,329 women, 6,296 men), 301 events, 45,000 volunteers, and 21,500 media. (IOC. 2008. History: Olympics.)

The Winter and Summer Olympic games were held every four years, except during the World Wars, until 1992, when it was decided that they should be separated biannually.

Competition to host the games is fierce and as competitive as the Games themselves. Initially, for the 2008 Games, there were a total of 10 cities/countries

- 1. Bangkok, Thailand
- 2. Beijing, China
- 3. Cairo, Egypt
- 4. Havana, Cuba
- 5. Istanbul, Turkey
- 6. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
- 7. Osaka, Japan

- 8. Paris, France
- 9. Seville, Spain
- 10. Toronto, Canada

Out of the 10 bids, it was narrowed to five finalists: Osaka, Paris, Toronto, Beijing, and Istanbul.

July 13, 2001, the winner was announced with much fanfare: The host city and country of the 2008 Summer Olympics is Beijing, China. CNN summarized international reaction as "Beijing has won the right to stage the 2008 Olympic Games, recording a landslide victory in the face of worldwide concern on China's human rights record." (CNN.com. 2001. Mixed Reaction to Beijing 2008 Win.)

China is not the first Communist government to host the Olympics; that honor goes to Moscow of the former Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) in 1980.

International Recognition, Economics and Politics – Pluses and Minuses

On the plus side, the hosting city and nation get a chance to flaunt their glory amidst the highest pomp and circumstance with the eyes of the world wholly focused on it, bringing an influx of tourism and world recognition during the Games with future benefits of new trade, tourism, and better infrastructure.

On the minus side, the economics are extraordinary. While figures vary enormously, it is estimated that China will spend between \$15 - \$45 Billion. This considerable range is due to how the costs are calculated. The costs are broken out between the country's Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games (OCOG) and Non-OCOG costs. The IOC Evaluation Commission report regarding the Beijing Bid states: "The operational budget – as presented –

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appears reasonable." While no figures were given, "The Commission dealt with a number of detailed cost items covering, among others, taxation, disposal of assets, subsidies, OCOG capital investment, technology costs in the Village, administration and cash flows." Under the Non-OCOG budget, the IOC Report states, "The non-OCOG budget covering environmental development, roads and railways, airport and venue and village costs is very large at US\$14.256 billion." (IOC Report – Evaluation Committee. 2001. Beijing.)

"Officially China is spending around £20bn (\$38.5 billion) on the Olympics. It's not just building stadiums; it's building a new subway system, new highways, a new airport, even a new sewage system. The Chinese capital is being re-made for the Olympics." (Wingfield-Hayes. 2006. "Olympic Games the Chinese Way." 2).

In his 2005 "Estimating the Cost and Benefit of Hosting Olympic Games: What can Beijing Expect from Its 2008 Games?," Jeffrey G. Owen states:

In addition to the standard projections of economic impact, Olympic studies also include longer term benefits sometimes referred to as the "Olympic Legacy." These legacy effects, derived from positive publicity from the Games, include increased tourism after the Games, attraction of business, and infrastructure investments that improve the urban environment. Legacy impacts are generally not incorporated into the economic impact numbers, but rather offered as an additional, unquantifiable benefit. The lack of any ex post study that finds improvements in economic growth or living standards due to megaevents should cast some suspicion on the legacy effects of Olympics, or at least the ability of such effects to be transformed into real economic benefits to the local economy.

And, indeed, as part of its evaluation, the IOC reported: "There is acknowledgement that there exists a large legacy for Chinese sport and the City and its citizens from the venues and infrastructure improvements. China should benefit in those sports that are currently less developed, by the Olympic Games opportunity and exposure."

Under the Environmental Section, the Evaluation states:

"Beijing currently faces a number of environmental pressures and issues, particularly air pollution. ...These plans will require a significant effort and financial investment. The result would be a major environmental legacy for Beijing from the Olympic Games, which includes increased environmental awareness among the population." (IOC Evaluation Report. 2001. Beijing.)

Politically, the IOC Evaluation Commission takes the stance,

"As stated, the Commission has a defined technical evaluation role but it is impossible to ignore the public debate on political issues such as human rights which, in the present context, is imposed on sport. The Commission will not deal with this issue other than to acknowledge the existence of the debate and its continuation. Members of the IOC will have to reach their own conclusions." (IOC Evaluation Report. 2001. General Introduction.)

The reality is that the Olympics are political:

Olympic Events:

Berlin 1936 – Games used for Nazi Aryan supremacist propaganda. Black US athlete Jesse Owens won four gold medals.
Mexico 1968 – U.S. sprinters expelled for giving black power salute.
Munich 1972 – Eleven Israeli athletes killed by Palestinian terrorists.
Moscow 1980 – Boycott over Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.
Atlanta 1996 – Bomb killed one person and hurt 110.
(Blitz. 2008. Olympics chief pleads for more time for China., 3)

The Wall Street Journal cited 19 instances of politics and the Olympic Games. (WSJ.

2008. "The Olympics and Politics," R2.) (See, Actors and Perceptions, IOC and International

Community.)

It is actually part of the IOC contract rules that the OCOG is "to ensure that no political

demonstration or meeting is held on Olympic sites," which may be an interesting challenge for

China.

ACTORS AND PERCEPTIONS:

For purposes of this analysis, which is written for an American audience, the actors have been narrowed to only five, partly due to time and space constraints, and because the scope of this report covers a world-wide event that necessarily, if wholly complete in its coverage, would require the perspective of every country on the planet. Therefore, the Actors are (1) China, (2) Taiwan, (3) Tibet, (4) the IOC and (5) the International Community. Because of the fluid nature of the situation unfolding within the next 100 days (countdown to the Games), we begin with these five, but can reduce the number of Actors as events unfold before concluding this report.

Hypothesis:

The primary hypothesis of this paper is that the perceptions of the Actors regarding the success or failure of hosting the Olympic Games will necessitate movement on the part of China in easing its stance on the One-China Principle and the methods China uses to accomplish its goal. In the process of validating such a hypothesis, the following questions must be addressed:

What is China's perception of the success or failure of hosting the Olympic Games?
What is Taiwan's perception of the success or failure of hosting the Olympic Games?
What is Tibet's perception of the success or failure of hosting the Olympic Games?
What is the IOC's perception of the success or failure of hosting the Olympic Games?
What is the International Community's perception of the success or failure of hosting the Olympic Games?

How have these perceptions influenced the behavior of these Actors vis `a vis one another?

To what extent do the Actors view the Games as a bargaining chip?

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What are the implications of these interacting perceptions on the likelihood that China will ease its stance on its goal of the One-China Principle and change its behavior in achieving that goal?

<u>China</u>

China's history dates back over *four thousand years*. From an American perspective, that is almost inconceivable. To the Chinese, however, it is as much a part of their DNA as celebrating Thanksgiving is to us. They have seen dynasties come and dynasties go, conquerors come and go, they have seen their borders expand and contract over millennia. Deep within their bones is the conviction that they are one of the oldest, most advanced and civilized cultures and, whether threatened from within or without, China *endures*.

The following sections were adapted and summarized from the U.S. Army. 1994. "Army Area Handbook – China – History," written by Rinn-Sup Shinn, and Robert L. Worden, and made available by the University of Maryland-St. Louis libraries. Any material in quotes, unless otherwise noted, are taken from this source up to the section entitled, "1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre."

<u>Tiananmen Square = Revolutionary Movement</u>

For the past 100 years China has been revolutionized multiple times. Tiananmen Square figures prominently each time there is a major shift in the county. Built in the 1400s, capable of holding half a million people, it is where the Chinese people come to protest. In 1919, what became known as the The May Fourth Movement for Science and Democracy, 3,000 students protested imperialism and the concessions of their government, represented by the Treaty of Versaille, post World War I. In an effort to reclaim China for China, the Nationalist party was

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formed, which lasted until 1949, when defeated, it fled to Taiwan. Then the Communist party, led by Chairman Mao, achieved recognition and triumph in 1949 – each successive ruling party ruthlessly shaking the society to its roots, urging, demanding, imposing and purging its population through aggressive educational and agrarian reform, establishment by the State of a centrist economic policy, and a Communist political governance albeit with a Chinese bent. Regardless of the name of the party, each succeeding governing group recognized first and foremost the necessity to unite a disparate, far-flung China divided by class, language dialects, rural against urban, educated class vs. peasant class. In order to achieve unity, under the banner of Chinese nationality and brotherhood, all dissent was ruthlessly stamped out and quashed. Between the two styles, Nationalist and Communist, it is estimated millions of people died.

Mao's heavy hand alternated between suppression and repression with bouts of resurgence of the need for an intellectual renaissance to encourage a more modern China to emerge. Initiating The Great Leap Forward in an attempt to meet the needs of a country post-WWII, post-Mao's Revolution, resulted in the establishment of large communes (5,000 people), but the effort tripped and fell in on itself in economic failure until even Mao acknowledged change was needed and resigned from the Chairmanship in 1959. Succeeded by a more moderate leadership, change was instituted returning some of the initiative back to local areas, gradually improving and balancing the needs of the population and political infrastructure. However, Mao became concerned over the shifting away from Communism towards capitalism and, by 1962, was back in true form with another program to purify the country, The Socialist Education Movement (1962-1965) that called for a realignment of the education system in conjunction with the working schedule of the communes. Intellect was out, manual labor was back. By 1966, The Socialist Education Movement morphed into the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which in turn acted as a massive internal shakedown of the actual Communist party, creating extraordinary civil unrest. It was the military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), who stepped forward and brought order out of chaos, reasserting control of the country and of the Communist party.

The Tiananmen Square Protest of 1976

On April 5, 1976, Tiananmen Square filled with people still mourning the death of Premier Zhou (January 1976) to celebrate the Qing Ming festival, which takes place 106 days after the Winter Solstice. In silent protest against the repressive regime, known as the Gang of Four, people lay wreaths and poems at the foot of the monument to The People's Heroes. The government, known as the Gang of Four which included Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, reacted harshly to the threat this represented. Mao died September 9, 1976. By October 1976, the Gang of Four were out, and the disgraced former acting Premier Deng Xiaoping was recalled and rehabilitated, emerging in 1978 as the Leader of the Chinese Communist Party. It was Deng who instituted the next shift to modernize China with the advent of the Four Modernizations Program, "placing economic progress above the Maoist goals of class struggle and permanent revolution."

Deng's successor, Zhao Ziyang, from 1980-1989, consolidated and pushed for the successes of the Four Modernizations program, leading to new agreements with the outside world in areas of trade, education, economics, and technology and a gradual return of individual ownership and enterprise with the mindset of personal responsibility versus the responsibility to the State.

The period beginning in 1959 through the '70s had resulted in a significant cooling and withdrawal from Soviet influence and, by the end of the '70s, a rapprochement with the West, specifically the United States, began.

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It started with a cultural exchange, progressed to some trade agreements, and suffered a crash in 1989 with the event that became known as Tiananmen Square Massacre.

Tiananmen Square Massacre - 1989

From April 15 through June 4, 1989, a series of protests were held in Tiananmen Square. Coinciding with the beginning of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Mikail Gorbachov was visiting China in June, allowing for foreign reporters to be on hand during the demonstrations. Composed of labor activists, students, and intellectuals calling for democratic reforms, it began with a sit-in, escalated to hunger strikes, and ended with the People's Republic of China's military facing off against the protesters with tanks and indiscriminate firing into the crowds. Film footage was initially sent out live before the PRC banned it and was then smuggled out of the country. The numbers of dead and injured are unconfirmed and range from a few to several hundred to thousands, depending on the source. The Chinese government remains convinced it took correct action, and information about the actual events of the Tiananmen Square Massacre are heavily censored within China. The International Community, on the other hand, reacted very strongly to the images and actions taken by the PRC, up to and including sanctions, especially regarding the sale of arms to China.

Human-Rights Abuses:

Six years after the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre, the 1995 "China Human-Rights Fact Sheet," was prepared by the *Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights*. It is based on information provided by *Amnesty International-USA, the Committee to Protect Journalists, the Francois-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights, Human Rights in China, the International Campaign for Tibet, the Puebla Institute* and the *RFK Memorial Center for Human Rights*. The document summarized China's progress: Human rights violations in the People's Republic of China (PRC) remain systematic and widespread. ... This fact sheet identifies the most common types of abuses, including arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment of prisoners, severe restrictions on freedom of expression and association and violations specific to women.

Controls on Expressions and Associations:

Although the Chinese Constitution guarantees freedom of association and assembly, national regulations severely limit association and give the authorities absolute discretion to deny applications for public gatherings or demonstrations. ... In this manner, independent advocacy on labor, human rights, environmental, development or political issues is effectively outlawed

On 4 June, 1994, the fifth anniversary of the Tiananmen Square crackdown, China promulgated new implementing regulations for the 1993 State Security Law. The repressive new measures threaten the few legal means of operation left to democracy and human rights activists, independent religious adherents and other independent voices, by criminalizing: contact with and funding from foreign organizations defined as "hostile"; the publication or dissemination of "written or verbal speeches" or "using religion" to carry out activities "which endanger state security;" and the creation of "national disputes." The regulations also give state security officials virtually unlimited power to detain individuals, confiscate property and determine what constitutes a "hostile" organization.

Restrictions on Free Speech and the Media: Although the PRC's 1982 Constitution guarantees citizens freedom of expression and of the press, its preamble mandates adherence to "four basic principles"-- the CCP's leadership, socialism, dictatorship of the proletariat and Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought.

The primary mechanism of control over the news media and publishing is selfcensorship. Chinese journalists, editors and publishers are expected to make the information they disseminate conform to CCP Propaganda Department guidelines. For example, *news coverage is required to be "80% positive and 20% negative."* Sanctions for infringements range from official criticism of the coverage to the demotion, firing or imprisonment of the individuals responsible and the closing or banning of the offending publication. (emphasis added)

Suppression of Religious Freedom: The PRC prohibits all religious activities outside establishments registered under the official branches of four state-recognized religions (Buddhism, Taoism, Christianity and Islam), established by the PRC government during the 1950s, through which Chinese and Tibetan religious adherents are required to practice their faith. ...

China's laws restricting contact with foreign coreligionists, *prohibiting parents from exposing children under the age of 18 to religion*, and outlawing nongovernment-controlled churches violate the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. ... Decree 145 gives authorities substantial leeway in restricting religious activities deemed harmful to "national unity" or "social stability," (emphasis added)

Torture and Ill-Treatment of Prisoners: Torture of detainees is endemic in Chinese detention centers and prisons. Although China became party to the UN Convention Against Torture in 1988, the government has not taken effective measures to diminish the risk of prisoners being tortured or ill-treated. In many detention centers, beatings, inadequate food and poor hygiene appear to be a routine part of the process of eliciting confessions and compliance from detainees. Such treatment is applied to ordinary prisoners as well as political detainees.

According to prisoner reports, methods commonly used by guards include: beatings using electric batons; rubber truncheons on hands and feet; long periods in handcuffs and/or leg irons, often tightened so as to cause pain; restriction of food to starvation levels; and long periods in solitary confinement. Furthermore, corrupt authorities at detention centers, prisons and labor camps have extorted large sums of money from families of detainees for the state's provision of "daily supplies" and "medical expenses."

...PRC authorities acknowledge that there are some 1.2 million prisoners and detainees in China.

Lack of Judicial Independance and Due Process:

Few legal safeguards exist in China to ensure fair trials, and the judicial system is controlled at every level by CCP political-legal committees that may determine the outcome of cases before the court hears evidence presented at trial. ...

Arbitrary Detention: In addition to judicial convictions, PRC authorities consistently use administrative procedures to detain hundreds of thousands of Chinese and Tibetans each year. ... The most common forms of administrative detention are:

1) "reeducation through labor," under which police, without trial, can send individuals to labor camps for up to four years; and

2) "shelter and investigation," under which police can detain people without charge or trial for up to three months, a time limit that is routinely ignored.

The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has determined that the practice of "reeducation through labor" is "inherently arbitrary" when intended for "political and cultural rehabilitation." According to PRC government sources, 100,000 people are sent to "reeducation through labor" camps and one million are "sheltered" each year.

Death Penalty

During the past two years, there has been a dramatic increase in the use of the death penalty in China. This growth in the number of death sentences and executions is partly due to anti-crime campaigns launched by the government. Defendants can be put to death for criminal offenses, including nonviolent property crimes such as theft, embezzlement and forgery. In 1993, 77% of all executions worldwide were carried out in China. On a single day, 9 January 1993, 356 death sentences were handed down by Chinese courts; 62 executions took place that day. During that year alone, 2,564 people were sentenced to death. At least 1,419 of them are known to have been executed.

Tibet

In Tibet, hundreds of Tibetans have been incarcerated for peacefully expressing their political and religious beliefs. Conditions in prisons are reported to be dismal, with numerous accounts of torture and ill-treatment. In particular, PRC law enforcement officials have perpetrated violent acts against Tibetan women in detention centers and prisons. Buddhist nuns and lay women have been subject to torture or violent, degrading and inhuman treatment, including assault, rape and sexual abuse. In June 1994, one Tibetan nun died while in custody, reportedly as a result of a beating by guards. PRC authorities also have severely restricted religious practice; out of the 6,000 Buddhist monasteries that were destroyed by the PRC since its 1949 invasion of Tibet, only a few hundred have been rebuilt.

PRC policies, including population transfers of hundreds of thousands of Chinese into Tibet, threaten to make Tibetans a minority in their own land and to destroy Tibetans' distinct national, religious and cultural identity. (emphasis added)

Women:

Violations Resulting from Family Planning Policy: The Chinese Constitution mandates the duty of couples to practice family planning. Since 1979, the central government has attempted to implement a family planning policy in China and Tibet that the government states is "intended to control population quantity and improve its quality." Central to this initiative is the "one child per couple" policy. Central authorities have verbally condemned the use of physical force in implementing the one-child policy; however, its implementation is left to local laws and regulations.

To enforce compliance, local authorities employ incentives such as medical, educational and housing benefits, and punishments including fines, confiscation of property, salary cuts or even dismissal. Officials also may refuse to issue residence cards to "out of plan" children, thereby denying them education and other state benefits.

Methods employed to ensure compliance have also included the forced use of contraceptives, primarily the I.U.D., and forced abortion for pregnant women who already have one child. In Zheijang Province, for example, the family planning ordinance states that "fertile couples must use reliable birth control according to the provisions. In case of pregnancies in default of the plan, measures must be taken to terminate them." As an official "minority", Tibetans are legally allowed to have more than one child. However, there have been reports of forced abortions and sterilizations of Tibetan women who have had only one child. There are also reports of widespread sterilization of certain categories of women, including those suffering from mental illness, retardation and communicable or hereditary diseases. Under previous local regulations superseded by the 1994 Maternal and Infant Health Care Law, such sterilization was mandatory in certain provinces. Under the new law, certain categories of people still may be prevented from bearing children.

Violations Against Female Children: The one-child policy, in conjunction with the traditional preference for male children, has led to a resurgence of practices like female infanticide, concealment of female births and abandonment of female infants. Female children whose births are not registered do not have any legal existence and therefore may have difficulty going to school or receiving medical care or other state services. The overwhelming majority of children in orphanages are female and/or mentally or physically handicapped.

The one-child policy has also contributed to the practice of prenatal sex identification resulting in the abortion of female fetuses. Although the government has outlawed the use of ultrasound machines for this purpose, physicians continue the practice, especially in rural areas. Thus, while the average worldwide ratio of male to female newborns is 105/100, Chinese government statistics show that the ratio in the PRC is 114/100 and may be higher in some areas. (China Human Rights Fact Sheet. 1995. 1-10)

While some improvements have occurred in the intervening 13 years, Amnesty

International's April 2008, "The People's Republic of China – The Olympics Countdown

- crackdown on activists threatens Olympics legacy" states "It is increasingly clear that

much of the current wave of repression is occurring not in spite of the Olympics, but

actually because of the Olympics." (Id. 1) In its 32 page report, Amnesty International

cites specific cases that confirm the 1995 assessment.

One of the more recent challenges China has faced is quality control on its products. A recent spate of tainted pet food, children's toys that contained toxic lead, and fake pharmaceuticals has heightened people's awareness that just because it is cheap, it doesn't mean it is safe. China moved to correct its quality control problems:

- On 21 August 2007, the SPC [the Supreme People's Court] issued a new judicial interpretation clarifying that courts could apply the death penalty to those who damage electric power facilities resulting `serious consequences' in line with Article 119 of the Criminal Law. The consequences included: `killing one or more people, seriously injuring at least three people or slightly injuring ten people or more'; and `causing a power cut for six hours or longer which affects the life of 10,000 households or industrial production`.
- On 29 November 2007, the SPC, the Supreme People's Procuratorate (SPP) and the State Food and Drug administration (SFDA) issued a draft joint judicial interpretation clarifying that those who sell or make counterfeit medicine that cause `extremely severe harm' to patients could be sentenced to death. The consequences included: `severe deformity or grievous physical injuries among more than three people' and 'light injuries of more than ten victims' after using fake medicine. (Id. 24)

While China has successfully made the transition from a closed society to more openness,

including moving away from a centrally-planned and managed economy to a more market-based

economy becoming a global force to be reckoned with, there are still challenges:

"...China in 2007 stood as the second-largest economy in the world after the US, although in per capita terms the country is still lower middle-income. Annual inflows of foreign direct investment in 2007 rose to \$75 billion. By the end of 2007, more than 5,000 domestic Chinese enterprises had established direct investments in 172 countries and regions around the world. The Chinese government faces several economic development challenges: (a) to sustain adequate job growth for tens of millions of workers laid off from state-owned enterprises, migrants, and new entrants to the work force; (b) to reduce corruption and other economic crimes; and (c) to contain environmental damage and social strife related to the economy's rapid transformation. (CIA. 2008. World Factbook-China.)

The environmental challenge dovetails wonderfully with the hosting of the 2008

Olympics, a major focus of the IOC. As stated in the introduction, China has and is investing

anywhere from \$15 billion to \$45 billion for its coming out party as a major dominant force on

the world stage.

Quoting a statement made by Wu Bangguo during a meeting with IOC President

Jacques Rogge on 8 August 2007, Amnesty International reports:

China will keep its promises and provide good services for the big Olympic family and the audience of the Olympic Games [...] Through successfully hosting the Olympic Games, we not only want to display before the world an even more open and more harmonious China, but also want to extensively carry forward the Olympic spirit in China [...] I believe that with the great support of the Chinese Government and people and with the guidance and assistance of you, Mr. President, the IOC and other international organizations, we definitely shall be able to host the Olympic Games `with characteristics and at a high level' and to leave behind valuable legacies for China, the world and the Olympic Games. (Amnesty International. 2008. China: The Olympics Countdown. 26)

The Wayward Progeny: Taiwan and Tibet -

China has maintained its claim of sovereignty over both Taiwan and Tibet as part of its

One-China Principle and this has caused problems both internally and externally for China. It is

worth noting that China's theme for the 2008 Olympic Games is "One World, One Dream."

<u>Taiwan</u>:

Background:

In 1895, military defeat forced China to cede Taiwan to Japan. Taiwan reverted to Chinese control after World War II. Following the Communist victory on the mainland in 1949, 2 million Nationalists fled to Taiwan and established a government using the 1946 constitution drawn up for all of China. Over the next five decades, the ruling authorities gradually democratized and incorporated the local population within the governing structure. In 2000, Taiwan underwent its first peaceful transfer of power from the Nationalist to the Democratic Progressive Party. Throughout this period, the island prospered and became one of East Asia's economic "Tigers." The dominant political issues continue to be the relationship between Taiwan and China - specifically the question of eventual unification - as well as domestic political and economic reform. (CIA. 2008. World Factbook-Taiwan.)

In the March 22, 2008 elections, on a vote of 58.5% to 41.6%, the Nationalist party

(KMT), represented by Ma Ying-jeou, was elected President, and will assume power May 20,

2008. May Ying-jeou favors more cordial relations with China, yet is very outspoken regarding

the independence of Tibet, which will not sit well with China.

The question of sovereignty still hangs in the balance as the 2008 Olympic Games

approach in August.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) has made strong statements in a White Paper

addressing the issue of Taiwan:

Since the KMT ruling clique retreated to Taiwan, although its regime has continued to use the designations "Republic of China" and "government of the Republic of China," it has long since completely forfeited its right to exercise state sovereignty on behalf of mainland China and, in reality, has always remained only a separate state on the island of Taiwan.

The formulation of the One-China Principle and its basic meaning. On the day of its founding, the Central People's Government of the PRC declared to governments of all countries in the world, "This government is the sole legitimate government representing the entire people of the People's Republic of China.

It is ready to establish diplomatic relations with all foreign governments that are willing to abide by the principles of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty." Shortly afterwards, the Central People's Government telegraphed the United Nations, announcing that the KMT authorities had "lost all basis, both de jure and de facto, to represent the Chinese people," and therefore had no right to represent China at all. One principle governing New China's establishment of diplomatic relations with a foreign country is that it recognizes the government of the PRC as the sole legitimate government representing the whole of China, severs or refrains from establishing diplomatic relations with the Taiwan authorities." (PRC Taiwan Affairs Office. 2005.)

Regarding international relationships with Taiwan, China states:

The Chinese Government has expressed its appreciation to the international community for widely pursuing a one-China policy. In August 1993, we published the white paper, The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China. In Chapter V of this document, "Several Questions Involving Taiwan in International Relations," we explained our position and policy on a number of issues, including relations between Taiwan and countries maintaining diplomatic ties with China, ...

Taiwan is ineligible for membership in the United Nations and other international organizations whose membership is confined to sovereign states. The United Nations is an inter-governmental international organization composed of sovereign states. After the restoration of the lawful rights of the PRC in the United Nations, the issue of China's representation in the UN was resolved once and for all and Taiwan's re-entry became totally out of the question. The Taiwan authorities have asserted that Resolution 2758 of the UN resolved only "the problem of China's representation," but not "the problem of Taiwan's representation," but not "the problem of Taiwan's representation," and demanded participation in the UN. We will never permit such a separatist act of creating "two Chinas' or "one China, one Taiwan."

All members of the UN should adhere to the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and related UN resolutions, abide by norms governing international relations, including mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and never, in any form, support Taiwan's joining the UN or other international organizations whose membership is confined to sovereign states.

• • • •

The Taiwan question is the most crucial and most sensitive issue in the relations between China and the United States. The three Sino-US joint communiques are the basis for the healthy and steady development of relations between the two countries. For over 20 years, the United States has promised to adhere to a One-China Policy, which has brought to itself benefits such as the establishment of diplomatic relations with China, the development of Sino-US relations and the relative stability of the Taiwan situation. Regrettably, the United States has repeatedly contravened its solemn understandings with China made in the August 17 Communique and continued its sale of advanced arms and military equipment to Taiwan. Recently, some people in the US Congress have cooked up the socalled Taiwan Security Enhancement Act and are attempting to include Taiwan in the TMDS. This is gross interference in China's internal affairs and a grave threat to China's security, obstructing the peaceful reunification of China and jeopardizing the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large. The Chinese Government is firmly against such actions. (Id., emphasis added)

The U.S. State Department has its own stance. In "Overview of U.S. Policy Towards

Taiwan," James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs,

testified on April 21, 2004:

It is useful to reiterate the core principles of our policy:

- The United States remains committed to our one China policy based on the three Joint Communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act;
- The U.S. does not support independence for Taiwan or unilateral moves that would change the status quo as we define it;
- For Beijing, this means no use of force or threat to use force against Taiwan. For Taipei, it means exercising prudence in managing all aspects of cross-Strait relations. For both sides, it means no statements or actions that would unilaterally alter Taiwan's status;
- The U.S. will continue the sale of appropriate defensive military equipment to Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act; and
- Viewing any use of force against Taiwan with grave concern, we will maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion against Taiwan.

Our foremost concern is maintaining peace and stability in order to advance U.S. interests, spare the region the dangers of war, safeguard Taiwan's democracy, and promote China's constructive integration into the global community as well as the spread of personal freedom in China. Because the possibility for the United States to become involved in a cross-Strait conflict is very real, the President knows that American lives are potentially at risk. Our one-China policy reflects our abiding commitment to preserve peace in the Taiwan Strait so long as there are irreconcilable differences.

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While strongly opposing the use of force by the P.R.C., we must also acknowledge with a sober mind what the P.R.C. leaders have repeatedly conveyed about China's capabilities and intentions. The P.R.C. refuses to renounce the use of force regarding Taiwan despite our consistent representations stating they should do so. P.R.C. leaders state in explicit terms that China considers Taiwan's future a "vital national interest" and that the P.R.C. would take military action in the event Taiwan declares independence. While we strongly disagree with the P.R.C.'s approach, and see military coercion as counter-productive to China's stated intent to seek a peaceful outcome, it would be irresponsible of us and of Taiwan's leaders to treat these statements as empty threats.

What is more, P.R.C. military modernization and the increasing threat to Taiwan indicate to us that Beijing is preparing itself to react in just such a possibility. We

encourage the people of Taiwan to regard this threat equally seriously. ...(Id., 2004.)

While the two major economic powers trade words and attitude regarding Taiwan,

Taiwan's voters expressed themselves in the 2008 elections by voting in Ma Ying-jeou in a

landslide victory (58.5% to 41.6% of the vote), who will take the presidency May 20, 2008. The

President-elect is of the Nationalist Party (KMT) and favors better relations with China.

The president-elect wasted no time in laying out his blueprint for "100 years of peace in the Strait." In his post-election press conference on Sunday, Ma said his first goal was the normalization of economic relations with the mainland. These included regular chartered flights leading to scheduled commercial flights; more mainland Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan; and Beijing's liberalization of regulations on Taiwanese financial firms setting up shop in Chinese cities. Ma said he hoped these breakthroughs would smooth the way toward a Free Trade Agreement with the mainland, which would underpin the multi-dimensional "cross-Strait common market."

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Ma also reiterated his earlier reassurances to the CCP authorities that the KMT administration would not seek de jure independence during his tenure based on his "three-no's" [no independence, no unification, no use of force] policy. The president-elect was at pains to point out that Taipei would be a "responsible stakeholder, not a troublemaker" in the global community.

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It is well-known that while Ma has "nationalist" and patriotic inclinations, he is a fervent anti-Communist—and an ardent critic of China's shabby record in the areas of democracy and human rights. ... Ma noted that "freedom and democracy" were the core values of Taiwan and that he would never compromise Taiwan's sovereign status and the interests of its people. He is perhaps the only well-known Taiwan politician who has attended all the annual memorials marking the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre. Several years ago, he famously said that "unless Beijing overturns the verdict on Tiananmen Square, there will be no hope for national reunification" (United Evening News (Taiwan), March 23). Soon after the outbreak of large-scale Tibetan demonstrations earlier this month, Ma suggested the possibility of Taipei boycotting the Olympic Games. At his post-election press conference, Ma qualified his Olympics statement by saying that he would only consider a no-show for the Taiwan team if repression of Tibetans were to worsen in the coming months. The president-elect, however,

reiterated his "support for Tibetan autonomy," adding that he would be happy to invite the Dalai Lama to visit Taiwan. (Lam. 2008. China Brief: "Ma Ying-jeou and the Future of Cross-Strait Relations")

Tibet

Tibet's history is as tumultuous as China's, especially as they conquered one another

down through centuries and millennia. Today, the very existence of Tibet is disputed, as the

Chinese claim it as a province, and the exiled government, led by the Dalai Lama, has claimed it

as an independent nation.

The website of the Government of Tibet in Exile presents its position regarding the Status

of Tibet:

At the time of its invasion by troops of the People's Liberation Army of China in 1949, Tibet was an independent state in fact and law. The military invasion constituted an aggression on a sovereign state and a violation of international law. Today's continued occupation of Tibet by China, with the help of several hundred thousand troops, represents an ongoing violation of international law and of the fundamental rights of the Tibetan people to independence.

The Chinese Communist Government claims it has a right to "ownership" of Tibet. It does not claim this right on the basis of its military conquest in 1949 or alleged effective control over Tibet since then or since 1959. The Chinese Government also does not base its claim to "ownership" on the so-called "Seventeen Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet" which it forced upon Tibet in 1951. Instead, China's alleged legal claim is based on historical relationships primarily of Mongol or Manchu rulers with Tibetan lamas and, to a lesser extent, of Chinese rulers and Tibetan lamas. The main events relied on by the Chinese Government occurred hundreds of years ago: during the height of Mongol imperial expansion, when the Mongol Emperors extended their political supremacy throughout most of Asia and large parts of Eastern Europe; and when Manchu Emperors ruled China and expanded their influence throughout East and Central Asia, including Tibet, particularly in the 18th century.

It is not disputed that at different times in its long history Tibet came under various degrees of foreign influence: that of the Mongols, the Gorkhas of Nepal, the Manchu Emperors of China and the British rulers of India. At other times in Tibet's history, it was Tibet which exercised power and influence on its neighbours, including China. It would be hard to find any state in the world today that has not been subjected to foreign domination or influence for some part of its history. In Tibet's case the degree and length of foreign influence and interference was quite limited. Moreover, relationship with the Mongol, Chinese and Manchu rulers, to the extent they had political significance, were personal in nature and did not at any time imply a union or integration of the Tibetan state with or into a Chinese state.

However fascinating Tibet's ancient history may be, it's status at the time of the Chinese invasion must, of course, be judged on the basis of its position in modern history, especially its relationship with China since 1911, when the Chinese overthrew the foreign Manchu rule and became the masters of their own country. Every country can go back to some period in history to justify territorial claims on neighbouring states. That is unacceptable in international law and practice.

The reader of China's White Paper "*Tibet: Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation*" will be struck by the scant attention its authors pay to Tibet's modern history in the decades before 1949. This is because from 1911 to the completion of the Chinese occupation in 1951, there is no evidence of Chinese authority or influence in Tibet which can support China's claim. In fact, the preponderance of the evidence shows precisely the opposite: that Tibet was to all intents and purposes a sovereign state, independent of China. This conclusion is supported by most legal scholars and experts on the subject.

The International Commission of Jurists' Legal Enquiry Committee on Tibet reported in its study on Tibet's legal status:

Tibet demonstrated from 1913 to 1950 the conditions of statehood as generally accepted under international law. In 1950, there was a people and a territory, and a government which functioned in that territory, conducting its own domestic affairs free from any outside authority. From 1913-1950, foreign relations of Tibet were conducted exclusively by the Government of Tibet, and countries with whom Tibet had foreign relations are shown by official documents to have treated Tibet in practice as an independent State. [*Tibet and Chinese People's Republic*, Geneva, 1960, pp. 5,6]

Forty years of independence is clearly sufficient for a country to be regarded as such by the international community. Many members of the United Nations today have enjoyed a similar or even shorter period of independence. But in Tibet's case, even its ancient history has been selectively re-written by the Chinese Government's propaganda machine to serve the purpose of defending its claim to "ownership."

China, on the other hand, is quite clear on its position. In its White Paper, entitled, "Tibet

– Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation," referenced above, China states:

Tibet is located in southwest China. The ancestors of the Tibetan race who lived there struck up links with the Han in the Central Plains long before the Christian era. Later, over a long period of years, the numerous tribes scattered on the Tibet Plateau became unified to form the present Tibetan race. By the Tang Dynasty (618-907), the Tibetans and Hans had, through marriage between royal families and meetings leading to alliances, cemented political and kinship ties of unity and political friendship and formed close economic and cultural relations, laying a solid foundation for the ultimate founding of a unified nation. ...

(It is worth noting that today, China's population ethnic makeup is composed of "Han Chinese

91.9%, Zhuang, Uygur, Hui, Yi, Tibetan, Miao, Manchu, Mongol, Buyi, Korean, and other

nationalities 8.1%" (CIA. 2008. The World Factbook - China.) China goes to great effort to

trace roots flowing forward from that point up to 1911 and the founding of the Republic of China

(1911-1949):

In the autumn of 1911, revolution took place in China's interior, overthrowing the 270-year-old rule of the Qing Dynasty and establishing the Republic of China.

Upon its founding, the Republic of China declared itself a unified republic of the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui, Tibetan and other races. In his inauguration statement on January 1, 1912, Sun Yat-sen, the provisional first president of the Republic of China, declared to the whole world: "The foundation of the country lies in the people, and the unification of lands inhabited by the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui and Tibetan people into one country means the unification of the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui and Tibetan races. It is called national unification." The five-color flag used as the national flag at that time represented the unification of the five main races. In March the Nanjing-based provisional senate of the Republic of China promulgated the republic's first constitution, the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China, in which it was clearly stipulated that Tibet was a part of the territory of the Republic of China.

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The People's Republic of China was founded in 1949 after decisive victories in the Chinese People's War of Liberation. Beiping, Hunan and the provinces bordering on Tibet--Yunnan, Xinjiang and Xikang--were all liberated peacefully from the rule of the former Kuomintang government. In light of the history and reality of Tibet, the central people's government decided to do the same for Tibet. In January 1950, the central government formally notified the local authorities of Tibet to "send delegates to Beijing to negotiate the peaceful liberation of Tibet." However, the then Tibetan Regent Dagzhag Ngawang Sungrab and others who were in control of the Tibetan local government, supported by some foreign forces and disregarding the interests of the country and the Tibetans, rejected the central government's call for negotiation on the peaceful liberation of Tibet. They deployed the main body of the Tibetan army in the Qamdo area in east Tibet for armed resistance. Under such circumstances, the central government was left with no choice and had to order the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to cross the Jinsha River in October 1950, and Qamdo was liberated.

Following this event, the central government once again urged the Tibetan local government to send delegates to Beijing for negotiations. The central government's adherence to the policy of peaceful negotiations greatly supported and inspired the patriotic forces in Tibet. The upper-class patriotics, represented by Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme, stood for peaceful negotiation, winning the endorsement and support of the majority. The 14th Dalai Lama who had assumed power ahead of time accepted the proposal. In his letter to the central people's government in January 1951, he said, "I have come to govern at the warm and earnest request of all Tibetans"; "I have decided to fulfill the people's desire through peaceful means"; and delegates would be sent "to seek a solution to the Tibetan issue with the central people's government." In February 1951, the Dalai Lama appointed Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme as his chief plenipotentiary and Kemai Soinam Wangdui, Tubdain Daindar, Tubdain Legmoin and Sampo Dainzin Toinzhub as delegates and sent them to Beijing to handle with full power the negotiations with the central people's government.

On May 23, 1951, the Agreement of the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet (i.e., the 17-Article Agreement) was signed after the delegates of the central people's government and the Tibetan local government had reached agreement on a series of questions concerning Tibet's peaceful liberation.

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On April 22, 1956, the Dalai Lama became chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region. ... Since then, the Tibetan people shook off forever the fetters of imperialist enslavement and trammels and rejoined the large national family. Like our sibling races throughout the country, the Tibetan people fully enjoy all rights of national equality, and are embarking on a bright road of freedom and happiness. (PRC: Information Office of the State. 1992. Tibet.)

In fact, in 1959, the Dalai Lama fled from Tibet to India after a failed Tibetan uprising.

India granted him land for his government in exile and for the 100,000 Tibetans who joined him.

The Dalai Lama, the spiritual and head of state of Tibet, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in

1989 and the United States Congressional Gold Medal in 2007, and, in between, a multitude of

awards from countries all around the world (*see*, Appendix C). The Dalai Lama's position has always been one of an effort to peaceably resolve their differences with China, asking that China recognize the independence of the Tibetan people. More recently, the Dalai Lama has bent slightly towards China, emphasizing autonomy and "reunification of their territory and their people," rather than independence from China. (Thurman. 2008. "Why Beijing Needs Tibet's Help, 1)

Since the failed uprising in 1959, there have been intermittent protests in Lhasa, the former capital of Tibet in China, as well as other scattered Tibetan areas, most notably in March 1989 (not to be confused with the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre), and again on March 10, 2008, leading up to the Olympic Games.

Beginning on Monday, March 10, "Hundreds of monks begin a protest on the 49th anniversary of the Tibetan uprising against Beijing rule, which led to the exile of the Dalai Lama, now living in India." (CNN.com. 2008. A Timeline of Tibetan Protests). Over the course of four days, the protests changed from peaceful to violent:

- About 300 monks from Drepung Monastery on the outskirts of Tibet's capital, Lhasa, peacefully march toward Barkhor Street in the central city, but Chinese People's Armed Police stop them before they reach the city. Police arrest monks suspected to be ringleaders. All the monks were seeking the release of fellow Drepung monks, who apparently were detained as they tried to celebrate the Dalai Lama's receipt of the U.S. Congressional Gold Medal in October.
- Fifteen monks from Sera Monastery near Lhasa, joined by two laypeople, lead a peaceful pro-Tibet march from Tsuklakhang Temple, proclaiming pro-independence slogans, distributing pamphlets, and raising the banned Tibetan national flag at Barkhor Street. They are arrested immediately following brief protests, and are reportedly beaten. Nearby shops are ordered to close. More armed forces are deployed to warn people not to take part in any more protests. The whereabouts and conditions of the detained monks are unknown.

- More than 130 monks from Lutsang Monastery in Qinghai Province, which borders Tibet, and 200 laypeople converge outside a government assembly hall and shout slogans supporting the Dalai Lama. Police stop the protest. There are no reports of arrests.
- Twenty local Chinese officials convene a meeting of monks from Ditsa Monastery in Qinghai, but 70 monks walk out carrying a portrait of the Dalai Lama and shouting pro-independence slogans. No reports of arrests.

Tuesday through Thursday, it becomes progressively more violent:

Tuesday, March 11

- About 2,000 Chinese troops fire tear gas to disperse hundreds of monks from Sera Monastery who are calling for the release of their fellow monks and shouting pro-Tibet slogans.
- Lhasa city authorities cancel leaves for all government employees.

Wednesday, March 12

- About 100 Tibetan nuns from Chutsang Nunnery on the west side of Lhasa march peacefully toward Barkhor Street, but Chinese People's Armed Police block them. No reports of arrests.
- Monks from Gaden Monastery, about 30 miles east of Lhasa, launch a protest. Police surround and seal off the monastery.

Thursday, March 13

- The same group of nuns who protested a day earlier and were turned back try to carry out the protest march again. They have not returned to the nunnery.
- Two monks from Kirti monastery in Sichuan Province stab themselves in the chest, hands and wrists. A reporter for Radio Free Asia says they were protesting the arrest of 17 people in the Sera Monastery protest Monday. RFA says the two monks are in critical condition and not expected to survive. Other monks from Sera Monastery are staging a hunger strike to protest the arrests.
- Police arrest around 500 students from Tibet University.

Friday, March 14

• Monks from Ramoche Temple attempt to hold a protest march, but police block streets and prevent the demonstration. Laypeople join in and scuffles break out. There are reports of protesters setting fire to vehicles, shops and a main market in Lhasa.

China reacted with heavy police and military response, forcibly restraining the monks

within their monasteries and insisting on a reeducation program that requires the monks to

denounce the Dalai Lama. Figures on deaths and injuries vary depending on the source. The

Chinese admit to 22 dead and many injured; the exiled Tibetans say more than 140 dead.

Melinda Liu of Newsweek pointed out in "China's Dangerous Game":

It didn't take long after the outbreak of violent protests in Tibet two weeks ago before China's well-oiled propaganda machine roared into overdrive. ...

...To justify its crackdown, the government has portrayed the upheaval as a ruthless conspiracy spun by the exiled Dalai Lama, triggering bloody, racially motivated attacks by Tibetans against Han Chinese. ...

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This could make life very awkward for Beijing if, as many assume, it decides between now and August that the only way to tamp down the Tibet issue is to agree to face-to-face talks with the Dalai Lama. The regime's dilemma, however, is entirely of its own making. By censoring media, imprisoning cyber-dissidents and employing sophisticated Web policing techniques, Chinese authorities have raised a generation of youth more or less accepting of the news that's spoon-fed to them. Most young Chinese know nothing about the Dalai Lama, who fled Lhasa in 1959 after a failed revolt—and thus have no trouble buying Beijing's portrayal of him as a nefarious "splittist." "A lot of people [in China] simply aren't aware of the complexities of the Tibet situation," says Rebecca MacKinnon, a Hong Kongbased expert on China's Internet.

This makes it hard for ordinary Chinese to evaluate official declarations. The government insists that security forces have used maximum restraint since the trouble began. A small government-selected group of foreign media brought to Tibet for two days last week were told that "lethal measures" were not employed in Lhasa, and that of the 22 deaths in the city, most were "innocents" killed by rioters. (Exiled Tibetan rights groups say more than 140 people died in the crackdown across a vast part of western China.) The yawning gap between the two estimates, and the restricted information accessible to most mainland Chinese—CNN and the BBC were blacked out in China when grisly photos of

Tibetan shooting victims in Sichuan province were shown—has led many citizens to believe the Tibetans are simply fabricating the death toll.

The escalation of Tibetan-Chinese ethnic tension comes against "a backdrop of rising nationalism," says MacKinnon. But rallying citizens around the Chinese flag is not a new tactic for Beijing. The fever pitch of anti-Tibet, pro-Han sentiment now evident in the media, in ordinary conversation and on the Internet resembles eruptions of mass ire in the past, such as that following NATO's accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, China's downing of a U.S. spy plane on Hainan Island in 2001 and when Japanese officials refused to revise discussions of World War II in school textbooks in 2005. In all three cases, the Chinese government allowed angry youths to stage wild protests, letting them trash the U.S. and British embassies in 1999 and Japanese commercial establishments in 2005.

Stoking nationalism against purportedly internal targets, however, is a tricky business. Rabid demonstrations can spin out of control and turn on the government. ...

From there, it escalated into world view. The timing for notoriety and public attention

could not have better from the Tibetans' point of view and nor worse from China's point of view.

The International Olympic Committee (IOC)

The IOC's proclaimed agenda, as stated in the IOC's Olympic Charter, is not to simply

arrange for world-wide competition in sporting events, but to "place sport at the service of the

harmonious development of man, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with

the preservation of human dignity." And,

....create a way of life based on the joy found in effort, the educational value of good example and respect for universal fundamental ethical principles." (Olympic Charter, Fundamental principles, paragraph 2); and,

"Mission and Role of the IOC":

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13. to encourage and support a responsible concern for environmental issues, to promote sustainable development in sport and to require that the Olympic Games are held accordingly;

- 14. to promote a positive legacy from the Olympic Games to the host cities and host countries;
- 15. to encourage and support initiatives blending sport with culture and education; (IOC. Olympic Charter. 2007. The Olympic Movement, pp 14-15) ...

Today, education through Olympism is therefore universal, essentially based on the fundamental human values.

Once again, in a paradox of those stated values, when evaluating and eventually selecting

Beijing, China (infamous for its human-rights abuses) as the host of the 2008 Olympics, the

Evaluation Committee said,

"...it is impossible to ignore the public debate on political issues such as human rights which, in the present context, is imposed on sport. The Commission will not deal with this issue other than to acknowledge the existence of the debate." (IOC Evaluation Report. 2001. General Introduction. Emphasis added.)

The IOC, as a body, is supposed to stand above politics, but changes in the Olympic

Charter regarding environmentalism (see Introduction) would seem to contradict that position,

especially as global warming has become such a hot issue politically with China as the number

two culprit. Moreover, throughout its history, the IOC has meddled quite strongly and the

Games themselves have been a focal point:

1920 Antwerp -The Olympic ideals state that all countries should be allowed into the Games, but Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, Turkey and Hungary are not invited

1948 London – Germany and Japan, aggressors in WWII, are not invited to the Games

1956 Melbourne– A political free-for-all. The Soviet Union invades Hungary after it announces it will withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. The Netherlands and Spain withdraw in support of Hungary. Switzerland also withdraws. Forty-five Hungarians defect during the Games. Egypt, Lebanon and Iraq boycott the Games in protest over British and French actions in Egypt over the Suez Canal. China boycotts the Games, protesting the inclusion of athletes from Taiwan.

1964 Tokyo – The IOC asks the South African National Olympic Committee to denounce segregation in sports. When the South African committee fails to comply, its invitation to the Games is revoked.

1968 Mexico City – The Games begin just 10 days after Mexican police and soldiers kill more than 200 pro-democracy protesters just miles away...

1972 Munich – The IOC withdraws Rhodesia's invitation after several African nations threaten a boycott. During the competition, the Palestinian terrorist group Black September kidnaps and kills 11 Israeli athletes and coaches, demanding the release of 234 Palestinians. ...

1976 Montreal – Twenty-six African nations boycott the Games when the IOC fails to ban New Zealand after its rugby team tours South Africa. Taiwan withdraws after it is denied the right to compete as the Republic of China. Drug allegations against East Germany also lead to controversy.

1980 Moscow – In the largest boycott in Olympic history, more than 60 countries join the U.S. in response to the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. Fifteen countries march in the opening ceremony with the Olympic flag rather than national flags as a form of protest.

1984 Los Angeles – The Soviet Union, Cuba and Eastern Bloc countries boycott the Games and later organize the Friendship Games. Iran and Libya also boycott, citing separate political reasons. Taiwan returns to the Olympic Games under the name Chinese Taipei, and China appears in the Olympics for the first time since 1952.

1988 Seoul – Political and economic pressures lead South Korea, which is a dictatorship when awarded the Games, to hold its first democratic elections ahead of the Games. The IOC denies North Korea's rquest to be a joint host. In response, North Korea refuses to participate, and Cuba and Nicaragua stay away as a sign of solidarity.

1992 Barcelona – Germany competes under one flag for the first time since 1964. Protests move from the political to the economic: During the medal ceremonies, some U.S. athletes who have endorsement deals with Nike drape American flags over the logo of Olympic team sponsor Reebok on their team sweats.

1996 Atlanta – Two Cuban boxers defect shortly before the Olympics begin. One person is killed in a bombing at Centennial Olympic Plaza.

2008 Beijing – Violent antigovernment protests by Tibetans draw attention to China's human-rights record, press freedom and continued repression of the Falun Gong religious movement. U.S. film-maker Steven Spielberg protests China's Sudan policies by withdrawing from production duties at the opening ceremonies. Seven Cuban soccer players defect during an Olympic qualifier in Florida. (Wall Street Journal. 2008. "The Olympics and Politics," R2) "Freedom of Expression is a Basic Human Right" Jacques Rogge, IOC President April 10, 2008

"You don't obtain anything in China with a loud voice." Jacques Rogge, IOC President April 26, 2008

The International Community

The entire International Community herein presented as one actor, though, of course, individually, it would be considered a multitude of entities, each with its own form of government, custom, language, and agenda.

At a bare minimum, 205 countries, known as National Olympic Committees (NOCs), will be participating in the Olympics, barring any boycotting. While many countries will choose sides, the countries most likely to have influence are the United States, the European Union, and India. All three are major trading partners of China, as well as having ongoing negotiations on a variety of issues. The United States is working with China on the Six Party Talks regarding North Korea. According to the U.S. Treasury, as of 2006, China and Japan held 47% of U.S. foreign debt.

One major component is the Fourth Estate – the Media, composed of print, radio, television, and the internet. At the last Summer Olympics in 2004, there were 201 NOCs, 10,625 athletes (4,329 women, 6,296 men), 301 events, 45,000 volunteers, and 21,500 media. (IOC, 2008. History; Olympics.) Last, but not least, are Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), again, each with their separate agendas from human rights (i.e., Amnesty International) to politics (i.e., Students for a Free Tibet), free speech activists (i.e., Reporters Without Borders), as well as environmentalists.

March 24, 2008 – The Olympic Torch

In 2007, China announced that there would be a 130 day tour of the Olympic Torch,

beginning in Olympia, Greece, then to Athens, from there to China, and onward around the

world, culminating in a climb of Mt. Everest.

"As the prelude to the Beijing Olympic Games, the Beijing 2008 Olympic Torch Relay is one of the most important ceremonies and a major means to spread and promote the Olympic spirit," said BOCOG President Liu Qi. "As one of the grand ceremonies for the Beijing Olympic Games, the Torch Relay of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games has set its theme as the 'Journey of Harmony' and the slogan 'Light the Passion, Share the Dream'."

Liu said, the torch will be passed in all the five continents around the world and throughout China. It is our hope that the Beijing Olympic Torch Relay will once again spread the Olympic spirit all over the world and demonstrate Chinese people's passion for the Olympic Movement. The relay will showcase the people, beautiful sceneries, cultural heritage in countries, regions and cities along the relay route. It will enhance mutual understanding and friendship among people of different countries. Moreover, it will further expound the rich implication of our theme slogan "One World One Dream".

By March 17, the world was very much up in arms in support of the Tibetan protests and

accusations began to fly regarding the actual events, as well as an outcry for an independent

viewpoint of international diplomats and journalists to visit the area.

March 24, the flame was lit and the relay of the Olympic Torch began its run only to

stumble against protestors in every city outside of China. By April 10, the Economist reported:

A lament for Tibet, sung in three Western cities and heard with fury in China

The torch's bad week started in London on April 6th, where hundreds of protesters dogged it, as it was passed from famous hand to hand. At one point, protesters were blocked as it was whisked to Chinatown to give China's ambassador the chance to clasp it for a while. China's flag had an outing too. Hundreds of Chinese students were bused in. Some protesters were unruly, and 37 arrested.

The torch was guarded not just by the police but by a phalanx of Chinese men in blue-and-white tracksuits. Their jurisdiction was hazy, but their demeanour

unmistakable. As Lord Coe, chairman of the committee organising the 2012 London Olympics, was heard to say, they were "thugs". Their presence outraged even those who could not find Tibet on a map.

In the next stop, Paris, the parade was a fiasco. A giant banner, showing the five Olympic rings as handcuffs, was hung from the Eiffel Tower and another on the façade of Notre Dame cathedral. The athletes carrying the flame were virtually invisible behind the Chinese guards and French policemen on rollerblades. In the end they moved the flame onto a bus.

San Francisco responded by announcing a route that turned out to be a decoy. Protesters gathered on one side of town while the torch was rushed by bus to the other. For a few blocks the torchbearers ran, amid police three lines deep, along a mostly empty thoroughfare until protesters caught up with the parade. At that point the torch disappeared into another bus and left for the airport.

Protesters everywhere have demanded that China talk to the Dalai Lama, or just get "out, out, out" of Tibet. The torch itself has become an issue—in particular the plan to parade it through Tibet in June. But China has shown no sign of wavering on either the international or domestic parts of the itinerary. At a meeting in Beijing of the International Olympic Committee, Liu Jingmin, of China's games-organising team, said he was confident the international component could be completed.

The Chinese press has portrayed the disruptions as marginal, amid massive shows of support by ordinary citizens. State television aired a brief comment by Paula Radcliffe, a British marathon runner, endorsing the importance of the protesters' cause while condemning their methods. The Chinese subtitle, however, removed the endorsement.

The Chinese press have called the thugs in blue and white "valiant and heroic". It has reported that the squad is made up of officers from the paramilitary People's Armed Police, who have been training for this role since last August, including learning to give orders in five languages.

The relay is still due to visit a dozen other countries, including India, home to the Dalai Lama and the government-in-exile. With each protest, the pressure mounts on Western leaders not to attend the opening ceremony for the games in August. This week, France's president, Nicolas Sarkozy, spelled out his condition for going: fresh dialogue between China and Tibet. Britain's prime minister, Gordon Brown, managed to say both that he was not going and that he was not boycotting (maybe he had recalled an important EU meeting). Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, the Democratic contenders for the American presidency, said George Bush should stay away. Kevin Rudd, Australia's prime minister, talked in a speech in Beijing of "significant human-rights problems" in Tibet.

Just as damaging for China in the long run, however, may be the effect on ordinary citizens. One place the Tibetan flag no longer flies is in the window of a bed shop in the English city of Sheffield. Its owner is a Tibetan sympathiser, who displayed the flag last month. Two young Chinese, apparently students, visited and made threats. That night his windows were smashed. A celebration supposed to mark China's emergence as a friendly global power has made some people think for the first time that its rise is something to fear. (Economist. 2008. Olympic Flame – Torch Song Trilogy)

It was a public relations nightmare. By April 4, the Financial Times reported that "The

Chinese government is set to hire an international public relations agency in the wake of the

Tibet crisis. The agency will advise it on strategies to repair its image before the Beijing

Olympics." (Pickard and McGregor. 2008. Beijing Seeks PR Advisors on Tibet.)

Meanwhile, China had cried foul, claiming Western media bias, going so far as to

demand an apology from CNN for a newscaster's comments. Amazingly, CNN did apologize,

but the Chinese rejected it for lack of sincerity.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry demanded Tuesday that CNN's Jack Cafferty apologize for remarks he made last week, in which he called the Chinese "goons and thugs" and said products manufactured in China are "junk."

She said Cafferty's remarks "reflected his arrogance, ignorance and hostility towards the Chinese people, ignited indignation of Chinese (at) home and abroad and will be condemned by those who safeguard justice around the world."

"CNN would like to clarify that it was not Mr. Cafferty's, nor CNN's, intent to cause offense to the Chinese people, and [CNN] would apologize to anyone who has interpreted the comments in this way.

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Cafferty, who appears daily on CNN's "The Situation Room," made the remarks as host Wolf Blitzer was comparing today's China to that of 20 or 30 years ago.

"I don't know if China is any different, but our relationship with China is certainly different," Cafferty said. "We're in hock to the Chinese up to our eyeballs because of the war in Iraq, for one thing. They're holding hundreds of billions of dollars worth of our paper. We are also running hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of trade deficits with them, as we continue to import their junk with the lead paint on

them and the poisoned pet food and export, you know, jobs to places where you can pay workers a dollar a month to turn out the stuff that we're buying from Wal-Mart.

"So I think our relationship with China has certainly changed," he said. "I think they're basically the same bunch of goons and thugs they've been for the last 50 years." (CNN. 2008. China demands apology from Cafferty.)

April 25, 2008, China's state media announced that it would meet with a private

representative of the Dalai Lama soon. (The Toronto Star: Associated Press. 2008. China Offers

to Meet Dalai Lama Aides.")

April 27, 2008, the Guardian newspaper reported via its Beijing correspondent,

The Chinese Communist party's official mouthpiece has poured fresh scorn on the Dalai Lama, only two days after the government's abrupt announcement that it would meet his aides within days.

Yesterday's People's Daily commentary claimed: "The Dalai clique have always been masters at games with words and the ideas that they have tossed about truly make the head spin ... Those who split the nation are criminals to history."

The renewed attack came as a leading Tibetan official launched an extraordinarily frank condemnation of the handling of recent protests in Tibet.

Bai Ma, chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference committee in Qinghai province, said: "It is regrettable that authorities in Lhasa failed to take firm action to control the situation during the first few hours of the March 14 riots ... They did not have enough police. They had guns, but they could not open fire without permission from above."

He told the South China Morning Post that the situation at the Drepung and Sera monasteries in Lhasa remained tense because of the patriotic education programme targeting monks. "The heavy-handed and arbitrary tactics [of the government] only create more animosity." (Branigan. 2008. China Ridcules Dalai Lama, despite 'talks'".)

April 26-27, 2008 – In an interview given to the Financial Times: "Olympics chief

pleads for more time for China," Jacques Rogge said,

"There will never be a solution whereby the political world or the pressure groups will not try to leverage the games. You cannot stop that because of the prestige of the games and what they represent for mankind."

Mr. Rogge says while he understands the depth of emotion in the west on China's human rights record, public expectations about the country's pace of change are unrealistic.

"It took us 200 years to evolve from the French Revolution. China started in 1949. ..." Back in 1949, Mr. Rogge pointed out, the UK was a colonial power. So too were Belgium, France and Portugal, "with all the abuse attached to colonial powers. It was only 40 years ago that we gave liberty to the colonies. Let's be a little bit more modest".

China may not be a role model in the west, Mr. Rogge concedes, but "we owe China to give them time."

"You don't obtain anything in China with a loud voice. That is the big mistake of people in the west wanting to add their views. To keep face [in Asia] is of paramount importance. All Chinese specialists will tell you that only one thing works – respectful, quiet but firm discussion.

"Otherwise the Chinese will close themselves. That is what is happening today. There's a lot of protest, a lot of very strong verbal power, and the Chinese, they close themselves." (Blitz. 2008. "Olympics Chief pleads. 3)

In another article in the same *Financial Times* issue, "Olympics chief warns west," Mr. Rogge questioned the media attention. "I wonder if Tibet would be front page today were it not that the Games are being organized in Beijing. It would probably be page 4 or 5." (Blitz and McGregor, 2008. 1)

This effectively presents and concludes a rather extensive historical context, as well as

the most current events within which to place the Actors, and the hypothesis of this paper:

HYPOTHESIS:

The primary hypothesis of this paper is that the perceptions of the Actors regarding the

success or failure of hosting the Olympic Games will necessitate movement on the part of China

in easing its stance on the One-China Principle and the methods China uses to accomplish its

goal.

RESEARCH DESIGN:

This paper utilizes the Lockwood Analytic Method for Prediction (LAMP) technique. It

is comprised of 12 steps:

1. Determine the issue (behavior) for which you are trying to predict the most likely future. 2. Specify the "actors" involved in the issue. 3. Perform an in-depth study of how each actor perceives the issue in question. 4. Specify all possible courses of action for each actor. List your assumptions. 5. Determine the major scenarios (changing environments/conditions) within which you will compare the alternate futures. List your assumptions. 6. Calculate the total number of permutations of possible "alternate futures" for each scenario. 7. Perform a "pair wise comparison" of all alternate futures to determine their relative possibility. 8. Rank order the alternate futures for each scenario from highest relative probability to the lowest based on the number of "votes" received. Assuming that each scenario occurs, analyze the possible futures with the 9. highest relative probabilities (i.e., most votes) in terms of its/their consequences for the issue in question. 10. State the potential of a given alternate future to "transpose" into another alternate future. Determine the "focal events" that must occur in our present in order to 11. bring about a given alternate future. 12. Develop indicators (measures) for the focal events.

(Lockwood and Lockwood. 1993. Using the LAMP Technique.)

What sets apart the LAMP technique from other predictive methodologies, i.e., Delphi, hypothesized futures, and scenarios, is that LAMP acknowledges and embraces the act of free will on the part of the actors. "...LAMP is based on one key assumption about the future; that it is the sum total of the interaction of free will of the national actors involved." (Lockwood & Lockwood, 1993. IN520 - The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP). Joint Military Intelligence College, 21) By tasking the analyst with the 12 steps of considering each actor's perceptions and then focusing on the issue under consideration, LAMP assists the analyst to avoid "mirror-imaging," (putting his/her own assumptions/values and biases upon the actor, which can adversely affect the analysis and, in fact, invalidate the analysis.

As this paper is considering an ongoing event, it was necessary to adapt within the 12 step process so that the reader is able to understand the past (historical context), the present (the events occurring concurrently with the build-up to the Games), and thus lay the foundation of the possible outcomes.

While every effort was made to present the perceptions of the actors, bias is possible due to being an American, and not of native origin.

POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION FOR INTERESTED ACTORS:

Initially, there were five actors that could reasonably be expected to impact the hypothesis: (1) China, (2) Taiwan, (3) Tibet, (4) The IOC, and (5) the International Community. In analyzing the Actors and their Perceptions, it has become clear that modifications in the relationships have taken place. With the advent of Taiwan's new presidency effective May 20, 2008 and already being felt, Taiwan's contentions with China can be reasonably thought to be on delay at least past the 2008 Olympic Games. The IOC and the International Community act only in support of one of the two remaining Actors: China and Tibet.

Courses of Action:

- MAIN China can maintain its current One-China Principle, resulting in Tibet maintaining its current position.
- STALL China can signal willingness to talk and negotiate, while blocking with preconditions Tibet will not accept.
- NEG China can decide to negotiate in good faith with Tibet.

Assumptions:

China is between a rock and a hard spot. The rock: China's One China
 Principle. The hard spot: China has invested heavily in both money and face to host the 2008
 Olympics.

2. China has a chip on her shoulder – since the 1800's, she has not been able to take her rightful place in the world – and she is just about to have her coming out party. Since the 1980's, her leadership has attempted to modernize China and to a great extent has succeeded beyond everyone's wildest dreams. By blocking access to the outside world through censorship and shaping her peoples' opinion through only one mirror (China's leadership), the Chinese are very nationalistic and convinced the world is against them and wants to spoil China's triumph – the Games. The world is coming to China in August and has been guaranteed full uncensored media coverage.

3. It is worth noting that Hu Jintao, the current General Secretary and President of the People's Republic of China, was the Secretary of the Party Committee of Tibet Autonomous Region, and first secretary of the Party Committee of Tibet Military Command from 1988-1992, during one of the bloodiest Tibetan uprisings in 1989.

4. China is insistent that Tibet is an internal matter and that the events of the week of March 10 cried out for a civil defense response as any civilized government would do. However,

China was caught off-guard by the outcry for Tibet and lost much face during the Torch run(s) around the world.

5. **Tibet** wants independence. The Dalai Lama is willing to concede independence as a nation, but insists on autonomy and reunification as an ethnic, national group with its own customs, religion, language and territory. The Tibetans want "…real political autonomy, respect for their culture, economic development that better protects Tibet's fragile environment and the freedom to openly practice Buddhism." (Thurman. 2008. Why Beijing, 1)

6. The Dalai Lama is 72 years old. China is of the opinion if they wait 10 years, he'll be dead and the problem will no longer be an issue. The strength of public opinion may vanish with the loss of the Dalai Lama. But the loss of the Dalai Lama may actually incite his people to truly mourn and rise up.

7. The IOC has been playing a strange game. On the one hand, the Evaluation Committee stated it had hopes that the Games would be beneficial in loosening China's repressive policies. On the other, they are appalled by the international public's protesting of the Torch Relay and do not want anything more to spoil the Games, so the President, Jacques Rogge, is publicly stating hands off China, give them time to change.

8. The International Community has had a mixed reaction with (a) some nations' leaders stating they will boycott the Opening Ceremonies, but not the games themselves; others taking both a weaker and stronger position or simply stating they are reserving judgment regarding attending the Games; (b) the media have a vested interest in being present at the Games, but will fiercely defend their rights to report openly without censorship as agreed to by China; and, (c) The NGOs and activists – whether human-rights, politics, or environmentalists

will be out in full force, like hounds closing to the fox due to the short time span before the Games.

9. While either of the two actors can act first, it is likely that China and Tibet will act and the IOC and the International Community will respond to the others' moves.

10. Time is a factor. The Games are to be held August 8-24, 2008 – a mere 100 days away as of today. (April 29, 2008). Initially, there is this narrow window of opportunity to bring pressure to bear on China. Long term consequences may not be so easily manipulated. History and experience says that China will hold her ground regarding her claims to Taiwan and Tibet and ignore public opinion.

11. The Olympic Games –China and Tibet, as well as the IOC and the International Community - and do not forget the 10,000 athletes(!) - consider the Games a bargaining chip.

12. The Black Swans. (Nassim Nicholas Taleb's definition of a Black Swan is a large-impact, hard-to-predict, and rare event beyond the realm of normal expectations.)

(a) Terrorism. From the terrorists' perspective, this would be the ideal time to strike. With 205 countries present, full media coverage, and a world watching – it doesn't get more inviting than that. The likelihood of taking out some of your patrons would be a crimp in the execution, however, there would be no hesitation to go for the Gold in this one instance.

(b) The sudden death of the Dalai Lama. If due to natural causes, there would be much mourning and a possible uprising. If the Dalai Lama dies from unnatural causes, all eyes and fingers would point to China.

(c) A large quality control event, similar to the recent spate of tainted pet food, children's toys contaminated with toxic lead, and fake pharmaceuticals.

MAJOR SCENARIOS:

The timing is critical to all parties. Whatever happens will take place before or during the Games because that is the maximum pressure point for change.

Scenario 1: As the Games get closer or during the Games, Tibet once again rises up against China.

Assumptions:

1. If Tibet rises up again, China will be forced to either crush it or let go of it. China will do one of those two actions in front of the entire world, not behind closed doors as in the past.

2. If China chooses to crush the uprising, the IOC and the International Community will respond. The IOC can choose to move the Games, depending on the timing; the International Community could bring extraordinary pressure to bear on their individual countries to not only boycott the Games, but individually and voluntarily boycott China's goods.

3. The Chinese people can retaliate by boycotting (as they did during the March 2008 uprising).

4. The People's Republic of China (PRC) can choose to retaliate by changing the value of their currency to affect all investments by China, as well as to China.

5. China announces that it will accept the Dalai Lama's proposal for a Tibet that is autonomous with reunification of the Tibetan people and territory that is within and under China's sovereignty, as outlined in Robert A.F. Thurman's "Why Beijing Needs Tibet's Help." The following assumptions would prevail if China took this course of action:

Assumptions:

An agreement could be reached that would be advantageous to both parties:

- For more than 50 years, six million Tibetans have not accepted assimilation and unity with the Chinese, and never will. The problem will not go away when the Dalai Lama dies.
- The Dalai Lama is the key person to help persuade the Tibetans to negotiate without violence.
- The Tibetans want the reunification of their territory and people...real political autonomy, respect for their culture, economic development better protects Tibet's fragile environment and the freedom to openly practice Buddhism.
- As for improving Tibet's environment, this could be accomplished by removing the large colonies of Han Chinese Beijing has established throughout the province, along with the huge military infrastructure currently holding down the Tibetan population. The Tibetans could then work to preserve their local flora and fauna by returning to their time-tested social and agricultural practices, which succeeded for millennia in keeping their country green.
- For China, allowing the return of the Dalai Lama and his followers, granting autonomy and reunification of the Tibetan people and territory, "the payoff would be enormous. China could quickly confirm the legitimacy of its rule over Tibet by holding an internationally monitored plebiscite there."
- The wider world would wildly applaud a referendum, creating more good will than the Olympics could. China would also benefit economically. Its tourist industry would profit, as would Han investment in the province.
- And even after it granted autonomy, China could continue to enjoy the fruits of the Tibetan plateau, which include rich mineral deposits, wood, wool and other animal products, exotic herbs and attractive tourist destinations. To kick-start measures, Beijing should declare the entire plateau a national environmental preserve. This wouldn't block all development, but it would allow China to enlist international help to ensure its activities there were green and sustainable.
- As all the above suggests, improving relations between China and Tibert would offer enormous benefits for both sides; most important, real freedom within China for Tibetans and world respect and global peace for China. (Thurman. 2008. 1-2)

PERMUTATIONS OF BEHAVIOR:

For the scenario, there are three courses of action and two actors: China and Tibet. (The

IOC and the International Community would react in support, rather than take initial action.)

Utilizing the following formula:

X = number of courses of action (3: MAIN, STALL, NEG).

Y = number of actors (2: China and Tibet. (The IOC and the International Community would react in support, rather than take initial action..)

Z = number of permutations of "possible futures" for each scenario.

- $X_{2}^{y} = Z$
- $3^2 = 9$

Possible Future #	CHINA	TIBET	Remarks
1	MAIN	MAIN	Leading up to the Games –
			pre-3/10/08 – Tibet
			Protests
2	MAIN	NEG	
3	MAIN	STALL	
4	STALL	MAIN	
5	STALL	NEG	
6	STALL	STALL	Current Situation 4/28/08
7	NEG	MAIN	
8	NEG	NEG	T & T Desired Situation
9	NEG	STALL	

Table 1

- MAIN China can maintain its current One-China Principle, resulting in Tibet maintaining its current position.
- STALL China can signal willingness to talk and negotiate, while blocking with preconditions Tibet will not accept.
- NEG China can decide to negotiate in good faith with Tibet.

PAIRWISE COMPARISON FOR EACH SCENARIO:

Table 2 -

Scenario 1:

As the Games get closer or during the Games, Tibet once again rises up against China.

Possible Future #	CHINA	TIBET	#VOTES
1	MAIN	MAIN	3
2	MAIN	NEG	6
3	MAIN	STALL	3
4	STALL	MAIN	9
5	STALL	NEG	4
6	STALL	STALL	4
7	NEG	MAIN	2
8	NEG	NEG	6
9	NEG	STALL	0
			37

- MAIN China can maintain its current One-China Principle, resulting in Tibet maintaining its current position.
- STALL China can signal willingness to talk and negotiate, while blocking with preconditions Tibet will not accept.
- NEG China can decide to negotiate in good faith with Tibet.

<u>Possible Future #1</u> – *China and Tibet maintain their current positions*: In this, we see the status quo. However, because the scenario calls for an uprising by the Tibetans, this would call forth a response by China to crush it as she has in the past by flooding the affected area with local police and the military with troops, tanks, and live ammunition. The repercussions would be shattering for China, and, perhaps, worthwhile to the Tibetans, even though the death toll could be high. It would also immediately shift to an alternate future.

<u>Possible Future #2</u> – *China maintains her stance, while Tibet negotiates*: The uprising is in progress. This is a form of the status quo, in that China has been steadfast in her insistence of the One-China Principle – unity at all costs. China uses controlled force, i.e., riot police – it may

be small enough because China is prepared for Tibet to cause problems and China can quash it before it gets going too far. For Tibet, through the offices of the Dalai Lama, this too is another form of status quo where the Dalai Lama uses the media to get his message of peace across to the outside world to bring pressure to bear on the PRC. For the Tibetans in the middle of the uprising, they will depend on the Dalai Lama and the International Community to get the word out to bring pressure and loss of face to China. China's population is convinced it is the Dalai Lama's fault that the Tibetans are uprising and will back China's leadership to take strong measures, especially as they are ill-informed regarding the Dalai Lama, and the majority of the population is Han (91%).

<u>Possible Future #3</u> – *China maintains, Tibet stalls* – The uprising is ongoing. Depending on whether the Tibetans can begin and maintain a peaceful uprising, they will look to the world as the victim of China's brutality, i.e., if the entire Tibetan population, religious and lay, simply sat down, or began walking, or both, in utter quiet or a chanting of a mantra. If this was seen by the outside world, it would have a profound effect on world opinion. Any force used against this population would recall Ghandi's tactics and successes. The only possible move by China against the Tibetans would be a strict ring of encirclement of equally silent, fully armed combatants.

<u>Possible Future #4</u> – *China stalls and Tibet maintains* –The uprising is in progress – world attention is sharply focused. China uses controlled force, i.e., riot police. China signals her willingness to be accommodating, but loads the diplomatic table with pre-conditions that the Dalai Lama will not accept. Depending on China's finesse and her new public relations firm, she could garner sympathy from the world, especially if the Games have commenced as the uprising would be loud and very inconvenient and most likely violent. In fact, China could initiate the

violence by sending in a group to look like Tibetans and begin burning and looting. It would be particularly effective if they dressed as Tibetan monks.

<u>Possible Future #5</u> – *China stalls and Tibet Negotiates* – The uprising is in progress – China uses controlled force, i.e., riot police. This is where China makes overtures, while clearly making it impossible for Tibet to negotiate, i.e., China will initiate talks with the Dalai Lama, but the uprising must cease before the talks begin.

<u>Possible Future #6</u> – *China stalls, Tibet stalls* – The uprising is in progress – and we are at a stalemate. China will begin talks as soon as the uprising stops; in fact, China issues an invitation to the Dalai Lama to come to China to talk with guarantee of safety of his person – if the uprising ceases. The Dalai Lama could respond that China has pushed the Tibetans too far and that he is more than willing to come to talk, but his people would need to see something tangible in order to cease their uprising. China will use force to quell the uprising.

<u>Possible Future #7</u> – *China negotiates in good faith; Tibet maintains* – The uprising is in progress, China stands to face a boycott of the Games, or cancellation of the Games, or an international boycott, which if seriously done could result in China's economy being destroyed. China could face all three in the midst of a Tibetan uprising. China announces that it will accept the Dalai Lama's proposal for a Tibet that is autonomous with reunification of the Tibetan people and territory that is within and under China's sovereignty. Tibet's position is highly unlikely, but possible if unconvinced of China's sincerity.

<u>Possible Future #8</u> - *China negotiates in good faith; Tibet negotiates in good faith* – The uprising has been effective. China announces that it will accept the Dalai Lama's proposal for a Tibet that is autonomous with reunification of the Tibetan people and territory that is within and under China's sovereignty. At risk was China's place in the world, but at what cost? China's

other ethnic minorities may also begin to rise up and seek autonomy or outright independence. Still, negotiations can take a *long* time. Both participants/combatants are from a very long line of history and understand *endurance*.

<u>Possible Future #9</u> – *China negotiates in good faith; Tibet stalls* – The uprising is in full swing. Tibet signals willingness to talk and negotiate but loads the diplomatic table with preconditions, such as reverting to independence as a nation for Tibet. China would find that untenable, yet try to save something from the resulting disaster.

ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATE FUTURES, FOCAL EVENTS, AND KEY INDICATORS:

Here the analysis is concerned with the consequences of each possible future with the highest relative probabilities, i.e., most votes, for the issue in question: I chose to group together steps 9, 10, 11, and 12 for coherency and reader's ease for following the shifts:

<u>Possible Future #4</u> (9 votes)– *China stalls and Tibet maintains* – The uprising is in progress – world attention is sharply focused. China uses controlled force, i.e., riot police. China signals her willingness to be accommodating, but loads the diplomatic table with pre-conditions that the Dalai Lama will not accept. Depending on China's finesse and her new public relations firm, she could garner sympathy from the world, especially if the Games have commenced as the uprising would be loud and very inconvenient and most likely violent. In fact, China could initiate the violence by sending in a group to look like Tibetans and begin burning and looting. It would be particularly effective if they dressed as Tibetan monks.

Focal Event – Tibet rises up against China before or during the Games.

Key Indicator – The uprising is in progress;

Key Indicator – China moves to suppress it;

Key Indicator – It begins peacefully and turns violent.

Key Indicator – China "spins" the uprising as a "child's tantrum," staged deliberately to stop the Games.

Key Indicator – The Media presents China's position as reasonable.

Alternate Future#1:

If the uprising occurred before the Games, it is likely this strategy would boomerang on China – if for no other reason than it happened in March, it's happening in August, fix the problem. China could find itself facing the same upwelling of support, but much stronger, with intense diplomatic pressure, as well as financial pressure from businesses invested in China, and the International Community could again resort to protests in other countries; boycotting the Games, boycotting any businesses of their own country doing business with China. A boycott of China's products would occur, but as Chinese products are so pervasive ("Made in China"), the likelihood of holding firm on this would be difficult to maintain.

Focal Event: China overreacts in quelling the uprising by utilizing major force, i.e., the military with tanks, reckless shooting, multiple deaths and injuries.

Key Indicator – the Media is present and gets the action on film and via live reportage.

Key Indicator – China shuts down the Media.

Key Indicator – The Chinese people begin protesting and China permits it.

Focal Event: The International Community begins protests.

Key Indicator – In countries throughout the world, people are protesting in the streets, writing letters, blogging on the Internet.

Key Indicator – Leaders of countries begin diplomatic intervention.

Key Indicator – Leaders of countries begin speaking to the media, making strong statements of support for Tibet and against China.

Focal Event – Boycotts begin.

Key Indicator - countries call for boycotts against China;

Key Indicator – The Chinese call for boycotts of all countries supporting Tibet.

Key Indicator – The boycotts continue past the Games well into October,

November, December (major shopping time for the West due to holidays).

Key Indicator – Businesses proceed to dial back production, orders, and/or close factories.

Alternate Future #2 –

If the uprising occurred during the Games as laid out in Possible Future #4, China would garner sympathy – unless and until word got out that China had planted the "Tibetan Looters" and the resulting violence, mayhem and deaths was China's fault. In this scenario, China would pay dearly in the public's eyes with intense diplomatic pressure, as well as financial pressure from businesses invested in China, and the International Community could again resort to protests in other countries; boycotting the Games, boycotting any businesses of their own country doing business with China. A boycott of China's products would occur, but as Chinese products are so pervasive ("Made in China"), the likelihood of holding firm on this would be difficult to maintain. China's population would suffer a tremendous psychological blow to their national pride and have a deep sense of shame if they could be brought to believe the story. Otherwise, the Chinese will counter with their own boycott.

Focal Event: China overreacts in quelling the uprising by utilizing major force, i.e., the military with tanks, reckless shooting, multiple deaths and injuries.

Key Indicator – the Media is present and gets the action on film and via live reportage.

Key Indicator – China shuts down the Media.

Key Indicator – The Chinese people begin protesting and China permits it.

Focal Event: The International Community begins protests.

Key Indicator – In countries throughout the world, people are protesting in the streets, writing letters, blogging on the Internet.

Key Indicator – Leaders of countries begin diplomatic intervention.

Key Indicator – Leaders of countries begin speaking to the media, making strong statements of support for Tibet and against China.

Focal Event - Evidence surfaces that China planted the "Tibetan Looters."

Key Indicator – Media reports begin to surface of rumors, then substance

regarding the "Tibetan Looters" actually being a Chinese prop to lessen popular support for the Tibetans.

Focal Event – Boycotts begin.

Key Indicator – countries call for boycotts against China;

Key Indicator – The Chinese call for boycotts of all countries supporting Tibet.

Key Indicator – The boycotts continue past the Games well into October,

November, December (major shopping time for the West due to holidays). This is much more likely than in Alternate #1 just because the outrage and revulsion on the part of countries and people outside of China would be wholly unforgiving.

Key Indicator – Businesses proceed to dial back production, orders, and/or close factories.

<u>Possible Future #2</u> (6 votes) – *China maintains her stance, while Tibet negotiates*: The uprising is in progress. This is a form of the status quo, in that China has been steadfast in her insistence of the One-China Principle – unity at all costs. China uses controlled force, i.e., riot police – it may be small enough because China is prepared for Tibet to cause problems and China can quash it before it gets going too far. For Tibet, through the offices of the Dalai Lama, this too is another form of status quo where the Dalai Lama uses the media to get his message of peace across to the outside world to bring pressure to bear on the PRC. For the Tibetans in the middle of the uprising, they will depend on the Dalai Lama and the International Community to get the word out to bring pressure and loss of face to China. China's population is convinced it is the Dalai Lama's fault that the Tibetans are uprising and will back China's leadership to take strong measures, especially as they are ill-informed regarding the Dalai Lama, and the majority of the population is Han (91%).

Focal Event – Tibet rises up against China before or during the Games.

Key Indicator – The uprising is in progress;

Key Indicator – China moves to suppress it;

Key Indicator – It begins peacefully and turns violent.

Key Indicator – China "spins" the uprising as a "child's tantrum," staged deliberately to stop the Games.

Focal Event - Protests

Key Indicator – Media coverage of protests both within and without China. Focal Event – Boycotts Key Indicator – Countries outside China begin organizing boycotts against China and their own companies that do business with China.

Key Indicator – The Chinese people begin organizing boycotts against foreign businesses within China, as well as boycotting imports.

Alternate Future #1 – This future could be called tit-for-tat – The International Community swings out in full support making the Torch Run seem mild in comparison. Boycotts on both sides are launched. Everyone's economy suffers. Nobody wins.

Focal Event – Boycotts

Key Indicator – Countries outside China begin organizing boycotts against China and their own companies that do business with China.

Key Indicator – The Chinese people begin organizing boycotts against foreign businesses within China, as well as boycotting imports.

<u>Possible Future #8 (6 votes)</u> - *China negotiates in good faith; Tibet negotiates in good faith* – The uprising has been effective. China announces that it will accept the Dalai Lama's proposal for a Tibet that is autonomous with reunification of the Tibetan people and territory that is within and under China's sovereignty. At risk was China's place in the world, but at what cost? China's other ethnic minorities may also begin to rise up and seek autonomy or outright independence. Still, negotiations can take a *long* time. Both participants/combatants are from a very long line of history and understand *endurance*.

Focal Event – China offers to have talks with the Dalai Lama.

Key Indicator – The talks actually begin.

Focal Event – Out of the talks, the outline of an agreement emerges.

Key Indicator – Both parties announce the outline of an agreement.

Key Indicator – More meetings are scheduled to ratify the agreement.

Focal Event – An Agreement is reached between both parties.

Key Indicators – Beginning movements by China's government to lessen oppression within Tibet. Tibetans are allowed to return to Tibet.

Key Indicator – The Dalai Lama is allowed to freely visit Tibet and return to India.

Alternate Future #1 - In the eyes of the world, both parties win. However, if China were to backslide post the Olympics, there would be an outcry, but more muted due to the timing – it would be less immediate as the Games have passed and the world has moved on.

Focal Event – China begins to stall on talks.

Key Indicator – Obstacles suddenly surface; the talks stall.

Key Indicator – the Media pays some attention and reviews the progress of the

talks between China and Tibet in the person of the Dalai Lama.

Key Indicator – The Dalai Lama begins holding press conferences, questioning China's sincerity.

Key Indicator – Protests are mild in support of Tibet.

Key Indicator – No boycotting.

SUMMATION AND REVIEW OF TRANSPOSITION OF ALTERNATE FUTURES AND FOCAL POINTS:

In this section, an analysis of "indications and warning" problem(s) that allow for the recognition of when a particular alternate future is about to occur.

Under Possible Future #4 – Alternate Future #1 & 2- The indications and warnings would be the same as in March 2008, with a stronger reaction against China in the Alternate #2 where word is spread that China itself planted the "Tibetan Looters" and was the motivating force behind the resulting violence. The International Community shuns China, shines a great big light on China's human-rights abuses, and proceeds to sanctions immediately.

Under Possible Future #2 – Alternate Future #1 - The indications and warnings would be the same as in March 2008. What could throw a major spanner in the works would be a Black Swan, particularly if it is the death of the Dalai Lama. Every major uprising in China, whether in Tibet or in Beijing, began during a period of mourning the loss of a personage. The Tibetans could feel bereft and alone, especially as there is no current successor for the Dalai Lama. The escalation of a Tibet uprising would be like a very hot forest fire and would necessitate China to truly crack down in reaction or let go of the province and allow the Tibetans their autonomy. The problem would be that there would be no natural and acknowledged spiritual leader in place to take control of the autonomous region.

CONCLUSION:

The primary hypothesis of this paper was that the perceptions of the Actors regarding the success or failure of hosting the Olympic Games would necessitate movement on the part of China in easing its stance on the One-China Principle and the methods China uses to accomplish its goal. I believe the analysis proves the hypothesis correct.

As has been demonstrated by the analysis above, the Possible Future #4 with its modern "spin," and treachery is both a sign of our times and, quite possibly, my own bias showing against China. In analyzing the possible futures, all the voting was done by one analyst and it is quite possible I tilted the potential and strength of the votes. Personally, I would have liked Possible Future #3 with its strategy of strength through non-aggressive free will and the Chinese counter-strategy, something the Brits never thought of. It would be quite difficult to corral and maintain such a silent force on either side, but the world's response would be immediate. Had the Palestinians done just the Tibetan role, Israel would have settled quickly. The positivist in me wants the Possible Future #8, which would appear a win-win for both parties/combatants. It is just that I do not think it is possible within the time frame of 100 days to reach critical mass and have China yield.

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Appendices:

Appendix A– Map of China Appendix B– Map of Taiwan Appendix C– Map of Tibet; List of Major Awards and Honorary Conferments Received – Dalai Lama

Appendix D– Symbol and Explanation of the Beijing Olympic Games

APPENDIX A

MAP OF CHINA

Available from CIA World Factbook https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html




Appendix B

Map of Taiwan Available from CIA World Factbook https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tw.html



Appendix C

Map of Tibet - Showing Historical and Contemporary Boundaries Available from Friends of Tibet http://www.friends-of-tibet.org.nz/tibet.html



From the Dalai Lama's bio: available at: <u>http://www.dalailama.com/page.16.htm#top</u>

List of Major Awards and Honorary Conferments Received

Date	Name of the Award	Awarded by	Country
Oct. 22, 2007	Presidential Distinguished Professor	Emory University, Atlanta	U.S.A.
October 17, 2007	U.S. Congressional Gold Medal	U.S. Congress, Washington	U.S.A.
October 8, 2007	Ahimsa Award	Institute of Jainology, London	U.K.
September 20, 2007	Doctor Honoris Causa	University of Muenster, Muenster	Germany

June 8, 2007	Doctor Honoris Causa	Southern Cross University, Melbourne	Australia
May 12, 2007	BILD Award	BILD Magazine, Germany	Germany
May 9, 2007	Doctor Honoris Causa	Smith College, Northampton	U.S.A.
December 10, 2006	Order of the White Lotus	Republic of Kalmykia, Russian Federation	Kalmykia
October 14, 2006	Doctor Honoris Causa	University of Rome 3, Rome	Italy
September 19, 2006	Doctor Honoris Causa	University of Buffalo, New York	U.S.A.
September 9, 2006	Honorary Citizenship	Canada	Canada
May 4, 2006	Doctor Honoris Causa	University of Santiago, Santiago	Chile
February 16, 2006	Ben Gurion Negev Award	Ben Gurion University, Be'er Sheva	Israel
November 6, 2005	Inspiration & Compassion Award	American Himalayan Foundation, San Francisco	U.S.A.
September 25, 2005	Doctor Honoris Causa	Rutgers University, New Jersy	U.S.A.
August 12, 2005	Manhae Peace Prize	Manhae Foundation	South Korea
July 27, 2005	Hessian Peace Prize	Parliament of Hesse, Wiesbaden	Germany
October 7, 2004	Doctor Honoris Causa	Universidad Iberoamericana, Mexico City	Mexico
October 5, 2004	The Gold Medal	National University of Mexico (UNAM), Mexico City	Mexico
September 27, 2004	Doctor Honoris Causa	University of Costa	Costa Rica

		Rica, San Jose	
September 24, 2004	Doctor Honoris Causa	University of Puerto Rico, San Juan	Puerto Rico (U.S.A.)
September 23, 2004	Doctor Honoris Causa	University of Miami	U.S.A.
September 18, 2004	Doctor Honoris Causa	Nova Southeastern University, Miami	U.S.A.
May 28, 2004	Humphreys Memorial Award for Services to Buddhism	Buddhist Society of U.K.	U.K.
April 27, 2004	International Acharya Sushil Kumar Peace Award	University of Toronto	Canada
April 27, 2004	Doctor Honoris Causa	University of Toronto	Canada
April 20, 2004	Doctor Honoris Causa	Simon Fraser University, Vancouver	Canada
April 19, 2004	Doctor Honoris Causa	Univerisity Of British Columbia, Vancouver	Canada
April 16, 2004	2nd Citizens Peace Building Award	University of California, Irvine	U.S.A.
October 9, 2003	Award for Promotion of Human Rights	Foundation Jaime Brunet, Madrid	Spain
September 19, 2003	Human Right Award	International League for Human Rights, New York	U.S.A.
September 5, 2003	Doctor Honoris Causa	University of San Francisco	U.S.A.
June 3, 2003	Manfred Bjorkquist Medal	Sigtuna Foundation, Stockholm	Sweden
December 5, 2002	Basavashree Award	Basavakendra, Sri Murugha Math, Chitradurga	India

November 7, 2002	Doctor Honoris Causa	Mongolian University of Science & Technology	Mongolia
November 7, 2002	Doctor Honoris Causa	National University of Mongolia	Mongolia
October 14, 2002	Human Rights Prize	University of Graz	Austria
July 6, 2002	Man of the Year	Croatian Academic Society	Croatia
May 21, 2002	Peace Award 2000	UN Association of Australia	Australia
December 5, 2001	Doctor Honoris Causa	University of Tromso	Norway
November 26, 2001	Doctor Honoris Causa	University of Lusiada Porto	Portugal
June 10, 2001	Ecce homo Order	Kancelaria Kapituly Orderu	Poland
October 16, 2000	Doctor Honoris Causa	Comenius University, Bratislava	Slovakia
December 12, 1999	Diwaliben Mohanlal Mehta Award for International Peace & Harmony	Diwaliben Mohanlal Mehta Charitable Trust	India
November 24, 1999	Life Time Achievement Award	Hadassah Women's Zionist	Israel
October 12, 1999	Boddhi Award	American Buddhist Congress	U.S.A.
April 16, 1999	Doctor of Theology	Florida International University	U.S.A.
April 9, 1999	Doctor Honoris Causa	University of Buenos Aires	Argentina
April 7, 1999	Doctor Honoris Causa	University of Brasilla	Brazil
November 11, 1998	Doctor Honoris Causa	Seton Hill College, Greensburg	U.S.A.

May 15, 1998	Doctor of Laws	University of Wisconsin, Madison	U.S.A.
May 11, 1998	Doctor of Divinity	Emory University, Atlanta	U.S.A.
May 8, 1998	Doctor of Humane Letters	Brandeis University, Boston	U.S.A.
May 8, 1998	Juliet Hollister Award	Juliet Hollister Foundation, New York	U.S.A.
November 25, 1997	Paulos Mar Gregorious Award	Paulos Mar Gregorious Committee	India
September 11, 1997	Doctor of International Diplomatic Science	University of Trieste, Trieste	Italy
June 1, 1997	Doctor Honoris Causa	Regis university, Denver	U.S.A.
May 31, 1997	Doctor Honoris Causa	University of Colorado, Boulder	U.S.A.
March 23, 1997	Doctor of Social Sciences	National Sun Yat-sen University, Kaohsiung	Taiwan
March 23, 1997 March 23, 1997			Taiwan Taiwan
	Sciences Doctor of Honoris	University, Kaohsiung Chu San University,	
March 23, 1997	Sciences Doctor of Honoris Causa The President's Medal	University, Kaohsiung Chu San University, Kaohsiung Indiana University,	Taiwan
March 23, 1997 July 26, 1996	Sciences Doctor of Honoris Causa The President's Medal for Excellence Doctor of Buddhist	University, Kaohsiung Chu San University, Kaohsiung Indiana University, Bloomington Rissho University,	Taiwan U.S.A.
March 23, 1997 July 26, 1996 April 5, 1995	Sciences Doctor of Honoris Causa The President's Medal for Excellence Doctor of Buddhist Philosophy	University, Kaohsiung Chu San University, Kaohsiung Indiana University, Bloomington Rissho University, Tokyo	Taiwan U.S.A. Japan
March 23, 1997 July 26, 1996 April 5, 1995 January 2, 1995	Sciences Doctor of Honoris Causa The President's Medal for Excellence Doctor of Buddhist Philosophy Doctor of Letters Franklin D. Roosevelt,	University, Kaohsiung Chu San University, Kaohsiung Indiana University, Bloomington Rissho University, Tokyo Nagpur University Franklin & Eleanor	Taiwan U.S.A. Japan India
March 23, 1997 July 26, 1996 April 5, 1995 January 2, 1995 June 4, 1994	Sciences Doctor of Honoris Causa The President's Medal for Excellence Doctor of Buddhist Philosophy Doctor of Letters Franklin D. Roosevelt, Freedom Medal World Security Annual	University, Kaohsiung Chu San University, Kaohsiung Indiana University, Bloomington Rissho University, Tokyo Nagpur University Franklin & Eleanor Roosevelt Institute New York Lawyer's	Taiwan U.S.A. Japan India U.S.A.

Letters

March 20, 1994	Fellow of University	Hebrew University, Jerusalem	Israel
March 14, 1993	International Valiant for Freedom Award	The Freedom Coalition, Melbourne	Australia
September 17, 1992	Honorary Professor	Novosibirsk State University	Buriat
September 11, 1992	Honorary Professor	Kalmyak State University	Kalmyk
June 6, 1992	Doctor Honoris Causa	University of Rio de Janeiro	Brazil
May 5, 1992	Doctor of Laws	University of Melbourne	Australia
February 16, 1992	Doctor of Sacred Philosophy	Lafayette University, Aurora	U.S.A.
October 10, 1991	Wheel of Life Award	Temple of Understanding, New York	U.S.A.
October 10, 1991	United Earth prize	Klaus Nobel United Earth	U.S.A.
August 23, 1991	Peace and Unity Award	National Peace Conference, Delhi	India
April 17, 1991	Advancing Human Liberty Award	Freedom House, New York	U.S.A.
March 25, 1991	Shiromani Award 1991	Shiromani Institute, Delhi	India
April 6, 1991	Distinguished Peace Leadership Award 91	Nuclear Age Peace Foundation	U.S.A.
December 8, 1990	Doctor Honoris Causa	Karnataka University	India
January 14, 1990	Doctor of Divinity	Central Institute for Higher Tibetan Studies, Sarnath	India

December 10, 1989	The Nobel Peace Prize	Norwegian Nobel	Norway
		Committee	
December 4, 1989	Prix de la Memoire	Foundation Danielle Mitterrand, Paris	France
September 23, 1989	Recognition of Perseverance of Times of Adversity	World Management Council	U.S.A.

APPENDIX D

Accessed from http://www.olympic.org/uk/games/beijing/open_embleme_uk.asp:



The official emblem of Beijing 2008 entitled "Chinese Seal-Dancing Beijing" cleverly combines the Chinese seal and the art of calligraphy with sporting features, transforming the elements into a human figure running forward and embracing triumph. The figure resembles the Chinese character "Jing", which stands for the name of the host city and represents a particularly significant Chinese style. The artwork embodies four messages:

- Chinese culture,
- the color of red China
- Beijing welcomes friends from all over the world

- to challenge the extreme and achieve the perfect and promote the Olympic motto of "Citius, Altius, Fortius (Faster, Higher, Stronger).