Predictive Analysis of Potential Reactions
To Iranian Attainment of Nuclear Power Status

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ABSTRACT

If Iran becomes the latest addition to the "nuclear power club," what are the potential reactions by the United States, Israel and Egypt? The Iranian nuclear program has dominated the headlines, academic classrooms and the topic has been a persistent concern within the international community since the Iranian Revolution in 1979. While the Iranian regime claims their nuclear ambitions are for peaceful purposes like energy, others in the immediate region and international community believe differently. Nearly all analysts, historians, and international experts agree that a nuclear-armed Iran will drastically change the balance of power in the Middle East. However, most literature published in the last ten years focuses on the question "Will Israel use military force against Iran's nuclear facilities in the future," rather than looking at the broader implications and reactions of relevant powers. This paper will try to peel back the various layers surrounding the specific research question by utilizing the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP) to explore the potential reactions of the United States, Israel and Egypt if Iran becomes the ninth confirmed nuclear power. This paper will not try to predict nor outline future international events, but rather, help the audience gain a better understanding of possible future scenarios applicable to this study's research question.

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"Iran will never give up enrichment - at any price. Even the threat of military attack will not stop us."
-Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iranian Ambassador to IAEA, February 2010

"Now the international community has an obligation to intervene to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon."
-Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli Prime Minister, March 2010

INTRODUCTION

In today's international arena, while countries like the United States and Russia are making a concerted effort to dismantle and minimize their respective nuclear arsenals, in hopes of one day eliminating mankind's most destructive weapons, Iran may be well on its way to becoming the ninth confirmed nuclear power in the next few years. By most intelligence estimates, Iran could possess the know-how to construct a nuclear weapon by as early as 2013, and a nuclear warhead that could reach the U.S. by 2015 (Stewart & Entous, 2010). Either way, the international community must be fully prepared to deal with the latest member of the nuclear club.

For the past thirty years, since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Iran has gone against repeated international calls to unveil its true intentions regarding its nuclear program. More recently, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khomeini have claimed that Iran's nuclear program is only for peaceful purposes which Iran is entitled to. But numerous government reports, from the United States and Europe to Israel and Asia argue that Iran is not being truthful or entirely transparent when it comes to its nuclear ambitions.

In the event that Iran does become a nuclear power, it will not only shape the balance of power in the Middle East, it will have far reaching consequences for the entire world and it would affect virtually every country's national security doctrine. With the

United States concentrated on two wars in the broader Middle East region, Iran seems intent on pursuing a nuclear program and further complicating an already volatile region. Another primary challenge with this situation is the question of nuclear proliferation to non-state actors and transnational groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and al Qaeda, which Iran has consistently sponsored over the years in proxy wars against Iraq, Israel and the United States (Council on Foreign Relations, 2007).

This paper will develop alternate future scenarios in respect to the specific research question outlined later. It is neither the objective nor the intent of this paper to determine whether or not Iran will continue or abandon its nuclear program. Rather, the paper will develop scenarios and consider the full range of possibilities and reactions if Iran *were* to become the ninth confirmed nuclear power in the world. By utilizing the LAMP Method for Prediction, this predictive study will try to add to the current debate on the topic and clarify some of the gaps in the literature by focusing on the potential reactions by the United States, Israel and Egypt. This study will employ the use of qualitative data from a variety of governmental and nongovernmental sources to bring a more cohesive and accurate portrait of the alternate future scenarios.

The majority of the literature surrounding Iran's nuclear program seems to always go back to the question of whether Israel or the United States will use preventive force against Iran's nuclear facilities. The debate rarely reaches beyond that to determine other possibilities or scenarios. As a result, the specific research question for this paper is: What are the potential reactions of the United States, Israel, and Egypt to Iranian attainment of nuclear power status? For this paper, Iran will serve as the focus of the study while the national actors are the three other relevant powers (U.S., Israel, Egypt).

While other relevant powers like Russia, China, and England could have been chosen for this study, due to time limitations and research constraints, the three states selected represent key regional and international powers that have critical national security interests directly linked to the research topic. In other words, the three countries provide a unique perspective at looking at the issue by bringing varying worldviews—international superpower (United States), regional enemy (Israel), and intent Arab leader (Egypt) into the study.

QUALITATIVE LITERATURE REVIEW

Iran's long pursuit of nuclear power status has stretched back many decades and the debate surrounding nuclear proliferation in the Middle East has gone on even longer. In this respect, there has been an abundance of literature written about various scenarios surrounding this complex topic and Iran's determination to become the preeminent leader in the Arab world. As Dr. Lockwood writes in "The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP) monograph, scenarios are essentially "stories about the future that describe hypothetical developments and conditions in a relatively holistic manner" (Lockwood & Lockwood, 1993, 17). Scenarios and alternate futures will be clarified in the research design phase of this paper, but it is important to note here as well. These scenarios are essentially 'imaginations of the mind,' a product of rigorous and thoughtful analysis that can help policymakers and intelligence officials make critical foreign policy and national security decisions on a wide range of areas. This topic is no exception, and the researcher would argue, there may be no current issue more critical to study than Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons. For purposes of giving the reader a clearer insight into the events leading up to the Iranian Revolution and the decades since, the researcher has

included in this literature review a condensed version of the history of Iran leading up to the Revolution in order to put the current debate in context. Please not, a more in-depth review of the history and events of the 1900's in Iran could be examined but due to research and time constraints some details have been left out of this paper.

OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF IRAN

Iran has a rich and complex history that many people often subconsciously forget about due to the more prevailing view of Iran's history which is the timeframe since the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the rhetoric that currently dominates the headlines. However, the history of Iran is much more complex than just the recent developments of and there is a wide abundance of historical research surrounding this. For much of its history, since well before 1500 B.C., Iran has proven to be a key player in the region and its location "has given it strategic importance" by bridging the gap between the East Asian countries and its Middle Eastern counterparts (Wagner, 2003, 22). Persia, or what Iran was known as until 1935, became a major trading hub for both Eastern and Western nations for many centuries, and although this often resulted in various conflicts along the way, Iran remained mostly independent from outside forces during this time. However, beginning in the 1700's, the Russian Empire and what is now modern Turkey, began to carve up sections of Persia, while Britain watched closely during the 1800's until it too decided to push for influence in the Persian region. It is at this time, during the early 20th century, that "weak" Shah's, like Muzaffar-ed-Din were under intense pressure from the Persian people to limit foreign influence on Iranian affairs (Wagner, 2003, 23). Outside influences continued during the first great war of the 20th century as Britain cemented its

partnership with the newest Shah, Ahmed Shah, and sealed a partnership that handed Britain virtually total oversight over Iranian affairs.

For the next few decades (1920-1960's), Iran changed socially, culturally, and politically, with yet again, the help and assistance from various outside supporters. A major point in Iranian history began during the reign of Rezah Shah, who took over as Emperor after World War I. During his reign, Rezā Shāh sought to reform his country and become a major power in the Middle East, a model outlined by Turkey during that time (Wagner, 2003, 30). However, opposition clerics and strong religious leaders in Iran crushed any hopes for turning Iran into a republic. While there was constant pushback from religious fundamentalists, modernization continued under Rezā Shāh in other areas like reforming the judicial system and weeding out corrupt judges, building a lasting infrastructure with projects like the Trans-Iranian Railway, and strengthening the education system by promoting equal opportunity, building technical and vocational colleges, and increasing teachers pay (Wagner, 2003, 34-35). In many aspects, Iran was well on its way to becoming a modern Middle Eastern republic that transitioned away from religious doctrine to a more secular approach to life.

This trend toward modernization and diplomatic and economic ties with regional neighbors and international powers continued when Rezā Shāh's son, Mohammad Rezā Shāh Pahlavi, rose to power in the 1940's when his father was forced out of power. Mohammed Rezā would serve as Shāh of Iran from 1941 until the Iranian Revolution in 1979, which is seen as the turning point for Iran's shift toward a more radical form of government and its recent relations with countries like Israel and the United States. Yet

before the overthrow, Mohammed Rezā had outlined a promising future for Iran and even said:

> "My sole aim in life is the constant improvement of the welfare of Iran and the Iranian nation. My deepest wish is to preserve the independence and sovereignty of the country, to bring the Iranian nation up to the level of the most progressive and prosperous societies of the world, and to renew the ancient grandeur of this historic land. In this task, as in the past, I will withhold nothing, not even my life" (Jablonski, 1984, 57).

As Mohammed Rezā outlined his plans for the Iranian nation, the Americans and other leading powers stood by the Shah's side and vowed to show that Iran was a critical ally in the Persian Gulf. President Eisenhower promised nearly $45 million in economic assistance to the Shah in 1953 when the Reza came back from a brief stint in exile during Mossadegh's rule (Wagner, 2003, 60). The close ties between Shah Rezā , the United States and other countries continued through the 1950's, 1960's and into the mid 1970's. In fact, the Shah regularly hosted his foreign counterparts and diplomatic friends at various state functions and parties. In October 1971, Mohammed Rezā hosted an extravagant party to celebrate his thirtieth anniversary as Shah of Iran and a variety of reforms that had been touted as the "White Revolution." Among those in attendance were various kings from Denmark, Belgium, Greece, and Jordan, as well as the emperor of Ethiopia and Prince Philip and Princess Anne of the United Kingdom. In addition, in a sign of strategic and diplomatic partnership, Vice President Spiro Agnew traveled to Iran to show his support for the Shah as did French Prime Minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas. In all, there were 13 presidents and 10 sheikhs as well as various ambassadors and foreign diplomats (Wagner, 2003, 19-20). The partnership between Iran and the United

States and other Western countries had hit its pinnacle and as the 1970's came to a close, so too did the diplomatic relations between these countries.

The Persian nation experienced decades of cordial relations with much of the same countries that it now derides and scorns. In fact, the first Pahlavi Shah, Rezā Shāh, was the first Muslim leader to formally recognize the State of Israel and although the two states enjoyed relatively peaceful relations during that time, the Islamic Revolution in 1979 ignited what has become a bitter and decades-long political fight between the two countries. The Iranian Revolution was a political and social revolt by religious clerics and followers who sought to overthrow and end the Pahlavi dynasty. It was headed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a religious fundamentalist and a harsh critic of the Pahlavi dynasty, that spoke out against the domestic and foreign policies of Mohammed Reza, especially the Shah's "support of Western interests and his alliance with Israel, which only further enflamed Khomeini and his supporters" (Wagner, 2003, 54). Even though the cleric was arrested multiple times and even sent into exile, Ayatollah Komeini's influence continued to grow and the radicalization of Iran came to an apex. While Reza Shah was hosting dignitaries and celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of his reign, Khomeini was preparing for the overthrow of the moderate government and calling for the replacement of an Islamic government instead (Wagner, 2003, 57).

A series of political decisions by Reza Shah Pahlavi eventually resulted in his overthrow. It began with the constant presence of Western allies in the Iranian capital and the cultural influence that came with that presence. American diplomats, Western scholars, and CIA agents were viewed with disdain and contempt throughout the 1970's as the Shah's support eroded. In addition, Reza Shah decided to establish a single

political party known as the "Rastakhiz," in a last effort to consolidate his power and remain on the throne. Iranians believed they had the right to disagree with the Shah's policies, even quietly. The single party instead of strengthening the Shah's rule further alienated the Iranian base. In another move that further brought discord in Iran was the Shah's decision to change the Iranian calendar. For centuries, Persians measured their time through the Islamic calendar which dated back to the days of Mohammed and his trip to Mecca. The move was seen as a major rejection of Islamic culture and tradition and it sparked a fury of speeches from Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in exile (Wagner, 2003, 60-61). The remaining months of the Pahlavi dynasty were numbered and Khomeini would make sure the Shah's reign would end in protests and violent eruptions throughout the country. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned to Iran shortly after the Shah was forced to flee the country in January 1979. Khomeini was now in a position to take control of the government and install a more radical and Islamic form of leadership, one that the Iranian people had been in favor of leading up to the revolution. Khomeini became Supreme Leader of Iran in December 1979 and installed a theocratic aligned government to replace the moderate doctrines of the Pahlavi dynasty and any remnants of it.

Beginning in the 1980's, most of the literature surrounding Iran's pursuit of nuclear power status takes hold and begins to become a major cause for concern among those in the international community. No longer a Western ally, and no longer a moderate government heavily supported and armed by a Anglo-Western coalition, Iran's shift toward radical and regional enemy takes hold during this time.

MAJOR ACTORS PERCEPTIONS

Israel—This actors perception in respect to specific research question

Since its creation in 1948, the State of Israel has remained controversial and a target of Islamic extremism in the Middle East. From the Six-Day War and the War of Attrition, to the Yom Kippur War and the ongoing conflict with Palestine, Israel has experienced over seven decades of armed conflicts. However, the most damaging war may be one that has yet to occur. The Iranian Revolution in 1979 not only ushered in a new regime, headed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, but it also marked the beginning of a tense and combative relationship with Israel. Since then, the leaders of the Republic of Iran have continually threatened the Jewish state by calling Israel "illegitimate," "fraudulent," and calling for the Zionist regime to be "whiped off the map" (Pedatzur, 2007). The calls for the annihilation of Israel would be merely theatrical rhetoric, but Iran has been constructing and improving a nuclear weapons program. Most Israeli officials believe that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, they will use them against Israel in the coming years. Israel has repeated its concerns to the international community regarding this matter. In fact, when former Deputy Chief of Staff to the Israeli Army, Dan Halutz, was asked in 2004 how far Israel would go to stop Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons, he replied, "2,000 kilometers," or the estimated distance between Iran and Israel (Cordesman, 2007). What can be taken away from this back and forth rhetoric are two competing interests. First, Iran seems intent on furthering its nuclear weapons program, scattered throughout the country. Secondly, Israel stands firm that it will not allow Iran to become a nuclear power in the Middle East.

Aside from the historical outline of Iran, there are various scenarios that have been published on Iran's nuclear weapons pursuit. For instance, one scenario that is constantly brought up is an Israeli *preventive* strike on Iran's nuclear facilities (emphasis

added on preventive). The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings

Institution conducted a simulation exercise titled "Osiraq Redux: A Crisis Simulation of

an Israeli Strike on the Iranian Nuclear Program" in February 2010. This three-day

simulation involved three "country teams" that represented the U.S. National Security

Council, the Israeli Cabinet and the Iranian Supreme National Security Council and how

each would react in a crisis situation surrounding an Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear

facilities. The American team consisted of ten members all of whom had served in senior

positions in the U.S. government and U.S. military. The Israeli team included six

American experts on Israel with close ties to Israeli policymakers, while the Iranian team

consisted of a half-dozen American experts on Iran that had either lived in Iran, traveled

to Iran, of Iranian heritage, or had served the U.S. government with responsibility on

Iranian politics.

The "game" began with Israel attacking Iran's nuclear facilities and without

warning the American administration. The report notes that since the past two

administrations (George W. Bush and William J. Clinton) made it clear they did not want

Israel to use military force against Iran, "Washington should not assume that it will be

notified if Jerusalem makes the decision to do so despite American opposition" (Pollack,

2010, 2). The strike, as the report argues, is a successful one that destroys most of Iran's

nuclear facilities,, but does not completely rid the nation of its nuclear capabilities. The

American delegation is thrown into crisis mode and urges the Israeli Cabinet to exercise

full restraint from launching any further attacks—not only against Iran—but also against

proxy groups like the Hamas and Hezbollah or the Palestinians. While the United States

is trying to calm the situation by reaching out to the Iranians, the Iranians refuse to

believe the U.S. was unaware of an impending attack and some even argue it was Israel's way of strategically shifting the situation in the region and bringing America into a war with Iran (Pollack, 2010, 3). On the other hand, Iran's reaction to the preventive attack on its facilities only emboldened them to push forward with retaliatory strikes into Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. The author writes, "The Iran team was motivated by a combination of anger at the unprovoked Israeli strike (and the humiliating damage it inflicted) [but] the Iran team saw opportunities to weaken Israel and demonstrate that Jerusalem would pay a heavy price for attacking Iran" (Pollack, 2010, 3). As a result, the Iranian team tried to achieve as many goals as possible even at the loss of the nuclear program. For example, Iran fired small ballistic missiles at the Dimona Nuclear Research Facility as well as at Israeli military bases and also asked Hamas and Hezbollah to escalate attacks on the Gaza Strip and Palestinian/Israeli borders.

On an interesting note, the Iran team immediately withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty after the first Israeli attack, and began "mount[ing] terrorist attacks against Europe in the hope that doing so would convince European governments to turn on Israel and the United States" (Pollack, 2010, 3). Finally, it is important to note that the Iranian team made an aggressive assault on Israel following the unprovoked attack because as they put it, "we felt we had nothing to really lose at that point— certainly we did not feel the Israeli's could do much more damage to us since they had destroyed the one they we cared about that they were capable of destroying" (Pollack, 2010, 3). While this scenario does shed some light on the situation and possible reactions of the various parties involved, the report, like so many others uses the preemptive or preventive attack, *before* Iran has the nuclear bomb as a decisive catalyst in the scenario

development. The report also fails to address the complexity of an Israeli airstrike on

Iran's nuclear facilities. Iran is believed to have dozens of nuclear facilities, strategically

scattered around the country in varying disguises and under varying levels of cover—

some are above ground and some are well insulated in underground fortresses. Also, the

distance separating Israel from Iran makes sustained aerial attacks on these facilities

equally as difficult as locating them.

Egypt—This actors perception in respect to specific research question

There is an abundant amount of governmental and nongovernmental reports on

US-Egyptian and Egyptian-Iranian relations, which serve this paper well. The Camp

David Peace Accords in 1979 serves as the foundation for the evolving multilateral

relationship between Egypt, the United States, and Israel. While the relationship between

the United States and Egypt or Israel and Egypt has not always been as diplomatically

engaging as some would like, Egypt has proven to be a moderating force and a

welcoming partner against terrorism in a region that is constantly experiencing tension

and conflict. More recently, Egypt's prominence and strategic position in the Middle East

has been underscored by President Barack Obama's 2009 Cairo speech. The speech,

which aimed to strengthen the relationship between the United States and the Muslim

community, was received with relative acceptance and gratitude in Egypt. One Middle

Eastern Affairs specialist writes, [the] "Egyptians feel that the United States has shown

their country respect commensurate with its perceived stature in the Arab world (Sharp,

2009, 1).

In addition to the seemingly strong political and diplomatic partnership between

the United States and Egypt is Egypt's outright willingness to contain Iran's regional

influence. Egypt views itself as the eminent Arab leader in the region and has, at times,

been a fierce rival of Iran. For instance, during the Cold War, Egypt aligned with the

Soviet Union while the Shah of Iran was heavily supported with military and economic

aid from the American and British governments. But shortly after the Iranian Revolution,

in 1980, Egypt and Iran swapped strategic partnerships, with Iran developing closer ties

to the Soviet Union and Egypt becoming a partner with the United States and a cordial

neighbor to Israel. Aside from the Camp David Accords and Cairo's peace agreement

with Jerusalem, was the assassination of Anwar Sadat, the President of Egypt. The

assassination of President Sadat further complicated and already bitter rivalry between

Iran and Egypt because Iran "applauded the assassination" and even "nam[ed] a street

after the assassin (Khalid Islambouli)" (Sharp, 2009, 11). As a result, the 1980's saw a

complete freeze in Iranian-Egyptian relations that have yet to fully thaw.

Egypt is also the only Arab country without an embassy in Tehran, which is seen

as a major diplomatic statement in the international community that relations between the

two countries are far from cordial (Farrar-Wellman, 2010). This can be attributed to the

assassination of Sadat, the ongoing tensions between Israel and Palestine (which Egypt

has supported Israel to a certain extent, and Egypt's close relationship with America).

Finally, over the past couple of decades, Egypt has been an outspoken critic of Iran's

alleged nuclear weapons program and has been disappointed in Iran's unwillingness to let

in foreign IAEA inspectors. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak has repeatedly said that

Iran has every right to pursue a peaceful nuclear energy program, but the President has

also said, "A nuclear armed Iran with hegemonic ambitions is the greatest threat to Arab

nations today" (Teheri, 2009).

In a recent report published by The Rand Corporation titled, <u>A Nuclear Iran: The</u> <u>Reactions of Neighbors</u> the authors argue that if Iran became a nuclear power, Saudi Arabia and Egypt would be most likely to follow suit and pursue their own nuclear program. Furthermore, a senior UAE diplomat told The Rand Corporation that if Egypt doesn't feel completely assured of U.S. guarantees of safety and support from the American nuclear umbrella, then "Gulf States could opt for funding an Egyptian nuclear weapon while distancing themselves from any [American or] Saudi guarantees" (Kaye & Wehrey, 2007, 113). Finally, the report reemphasizes the nationalism factor that could drive Egypt to pursue its own bomb. The authors write, "if Iran goes nuclear the Egyptian public will wonder why Egypt has abstained from this option and why has Egypt not invested in a nuclear option – why should Egypt be inferior to Israel and Iran" and this could further drive the belief in Cairo that "Egypt should be the rightful proprietor of the "Arab bomb" (Kaye & Wehrey, 2007, 114). In summary, the available knowledge and information on Iranian-Egyptian relations shows that 1) the two nations have a long and complicated history of rivalry and bitterness surrounding various political and economic rifts, 2) both countries view themselves and/or want the international community to view them as the preeminent Arab leader in the Middle East, and 3) a nuclear armed Iran would drastically shift the balance of power and make Egypt second guess its own national security position in the region.

United States of America—This actors perception in regards to specific research question

As the world's only superpower, the United States occupies a unique role in the international arena and bearing in mind that the U.S. is currently involved in two wars in

the Middle East, the presence of America in that region has never been more critical or more difficult. The U.S. has not had diplomatic or trade relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran since the Iranian Revolution and the Iran Hostage Crisis. Since that time, there have been both Democratic and Republican administrations in the White House and while the rhetoric has changed from administration to administration, the policy and desire to stop Iran's nuclear program has remained the same. The United States recognizes Iran's desire to become a modern power in the Middle East but at the same time, the United States believes Iran can showcase itself to the world through other peaceful means of modernization (energy, human rights, democracy, and education). In a joint conference with Israeli President Benyamin Netanyahu in May 2009, President Barack Obama spoke of Iran's nuclear program and said:

> "Iran is a country of extraordinary history and extraordinary potential, [and] we want them to be a full-fledged member of the international community and be in a position to provide opportunities and prosperity for their people, but that the way to achieve those goals is not through the pursuit of a nuclear weapon... I believe it is not only in the interest of the international community that Iran not develop nuclear weapons, I firmly believe it is in Iran's interest not to develop nuclear weapons, because it would trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and be profoundly destabilizing in all sorts of ways. Iran can achieve its interests of security and international respect and prosperity for its people through other means…" (Atlantic Council, 2010, 12).

While Obama has shifted away from the more theatrical tone that his predecessor took, in labeling Iran a member of the "Axis of Evil," Obama is continuing to push Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons pursuit and meet its obligations to international security and peace. Secondly, the United States has accused Iran of arming militia groups connected to al Qaeda in Iraq and also supporting Hamas and Hezbollah in the Palestinian

territories. It is important to bring up this point because these proxy groups carry out various socio-political wars/battles with the support and direction of the Islamic Republic of Iran. With over 150,000 American troops on the ground in neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan, the threat that these groups pose to U.S. forces make a nuclear armed Iran an even greater challenge for American commanders and intelligence analysts. The Office of the Coordinator of Counterterrorism (State Department) detailed these concerns recently by saying that Iran remains the number one supporter of groups that are trying to derail peace efforts in the Middle East and Iran remains committed to providing "weapons, training, and funding to HAMAS and other Palestinian terrorist groups, including Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)" (Atlantic Council, 2010, 21).

Another report published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, titled, Options in Dealing with Iran's Nuclear Program highlights the complexity of the situation. First, the report outlines various scenarios to deal with Iran's nuclear ambitions and categorizes them into diplomacy, incentives, containment, sanctions, regime change, defense, deterrence, and military strike against nuclear facilities. The United States feels that Iran is trying to emerge as the hegemonic leader in a region that cannot afford a volatile and unpredictable regime to be at the forefront of Middle Eastern policy. By pursuing nuclear weapons, Iran is positioning itself to be the de facto nuclear power in the Middle East which will allow the Republic to have a heavier hand in regional politics than it currently does. Since the United States is deeply embedded in the Middle East at the moment, then "Iran cannot try to dominate the Gulf region as long as a U.S. military power is present" (Cordesman &, Toukan 2010, 10). But a military option to deal with

Iran's nuclear program doesn't seem entirely realistic at the moment, according to the report. Rather, President Obama and other Gulf State leaders are determined to pursue a diplomatic strategy and use sanctions as a crippling mechanism to try and change Tehran's behavior. However, frustration has already been displayed by those closer to the situation. For example, Saudi Arabia's Foreign Minister Prince Saud said, "Sanctions are a long term solution. They may work, we can't judge. But we see the issue in the shorter term maybe because we are closer to the threat... So we need an immediate resolution rather than a gradual resolution" (Cordesman & Toukan 2010, 13). The report concludes that the United States should continue to engage Iran in hopes of the Iranians abandoning its enrichment program. But at the same time, the report notes that engagement can only go on for so long before further action is taken. In this regard, the United States is the only actor capable of using military force the report argues. If all other options have been exhausted and Iran refuses to disband its nuclear program, then the United States must be prepared to use military force (Cordesman & Toukan, 2010, 19).

In the book, Getting Ready for a Nuclear Iran, which was published by The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, contributing author Henry Sokolski foresees three side issues that will greatly affect American foreign and domestic policy if or when Iran becomes a nuclear power. First, the author forecasts more nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, as countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey begin to reconsider their own nuclear ambitions. This sentiment has been echoed repeatedly in various literatures surrounding the topic, so further elaboration is not needed. The second thing Sokolski sees happening is a drastic increase in oil prices, which could send the American markets into a tailspin for a country that is already highly dependent on foreign oil. The author

writes, "A nuclear-ready Iran could be emboldened to manipulate oil prices upward. It

might attempt this either by threatening the freedom of the seas (by mining oil transit

points as it did in the l980s, or by threatening to close the Straits of Hormuz), or by using

terrorist proxies to threaten the destruction of Saudi and other Gulf state oil facilities and

pipelines" (Sokolski, 2005, 2). Finally, the author believes Iran will increase its support

for terrorism in hopes of diminishing the United States' influence in the Middle East.

This sentiment has also been advanced in other reports.

So what does Sokolski see as viable options in dealing with Iran? The author

outlines seven steps that he believes Washington and the international community can do

to *minimize* the threat posed by Iran, but in reality, the author believes Iran will

eventually become a nuclear power and set off and arms race in the Middle East. As a

result, Sokolski makes his entire argument futile but still outlines the seven steps as

follows (researchers critique in parentheses):

- Discredit Iran's nuclear program through a series of follow-on meetings to the 2005 NPT Review Conference to clarify what activities qualify as being peaceful. (Who is to lead this new conference and will Iran, or regional neighbors for that matter, see it as legitimate and enforceable?)

- Increase the costs for Iran and regional neighbors to leave or infringe the NPT by establishing country-neutral rules against violators who withdraw. (What kinds of costs—economic, military, diplomatic and how is this implemented?)

- Securing Russian cooperation on this issue by offering Moscow a lucrative nuclear cooperation agreement. (This is highly unlikely considering Iran signed a nuclear deal with Iran in 2005).

- Reducing Persian Gulf oil and gas production and distribution system vulnerabilities by building back-up capabilities in Saudi Arabia.

- Limit Iran's freedom to threaten oil and gas shipping by proposing a Montreux-like convention to demilitarize the Straits of Hormuz. (Any

aggressive plan by the U.S. and its allies to limit Iran's influence in the Hormuz Straight could lead to all out war and drive oil prices up).

- Isolating Iran as a regional producer of fissile materials by encouraging Israel to take the first steps to freeze and dismantle such capabilities.

- Backing these diplomatic-economic initiatives with increased U.S.-allied anti-terrorist, defense, naval border security, and nuclear nonproliferation cooperation. (There needs to be a broader agreement, besides the traditional U.S.-allied alliance (Britain, France, Canada) that allows regional neighbors in the Middle East have a heavier hand in diplomatic negotiations (Sokolski, 2005, 3).

The seven points outlined above, by Sokolski's admission, will not stop Iran from becoming a nuclear power. But the author believes it would make it much riskier (from Iran's standpoint) for Iran to continue on its path to enrichment. However, considering there is a current divide and debate among the G8 powers as to Iran's nuclear intentions, implementing all or most of these recommendations seem very distant. In fact, according to Robert J. Einhorn, a former Senior Advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and now a State Department Nonproliferation Expert, "Prospects for forging an agreed transatlantic approach toward Iran depend to a significant extent on whether the United States and Europe share a common understanding of Iran's nuclear intentions" (2004, 23). This is where regional neighbors like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iraq, can help forge a common understanding between the United States and the rest of Europe to strengthen the commitment to make sure Iran dismantles its nuclear weapons program.

Key Political and Economic Information on Actors

Actor	Head of Government & Other Key Actors	GDP (Purchasing Power Parity)	Military Strength (Available)	NPT Signer?
Iran	HoG: President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Other State Actors: • Supreme Leader Ali Ali Hoseyni Khāmene'i • Islamic Revolutionary Guards	$876 billion (2009 est.) $853.8 billion (2008 est.) $801.7 billion (2007 est.) (all figures in 2009 $)	Males: 20,763,890 Females: 20,157,570 (2010 estimates)	Yes
United States	HoG: President Barack Obama Other State Actors: • Vice President Joe Biden • Senate and House of Representatives	$14.26 trillion (2009 est.) $14.61 trillion (2008 est.) $14.55 trillion (2007 est.) (all figures in 2009 $)	Males: 73,145,586 Females: 71,880,788 (2010 estimates)	Yes
Israel	HoG: Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu Other State Actors: • President Shimon Perez • Mossad (Special Ops) • Knesset (Legislature)	$206.8 billion (2009 est.) $205.8 billion (2008 est.) $197.5 billion (2007 est.) (all figures in 2009 $)	Males: 1,771,661 Females: 1,687,698 (2010 estimates)	No
Egypt	HoG: Prime Minister Ahmed Mohamed Nazif Other State Actors: • President Hosni Mubarak	$471.2 billion (2009 est.) $450 billion (2008 est.) $419.8 billion (2007 est.) (all figures in 2009 $)	Males: 20,619,887 Females: 19,785,004 (2010 estimates)	Yes

**Information obtained from CIA World Fact Book.

SYNOPSIS – QUALITATIVE LITERATURE REVIEW

The information in the literature review tried to provide background information on the historical ties or tensions between the various countries and how the development of these relationships (or lack thereof) over the years, will affect future peace or conflict between these countries. But more importantly, the purpose of this qualitative literature review was to gather the most significant and relevant data on Iran's nuclear program and develop an understanding of potential reactions to Iranian attainment of nuclear power status. By finding and including a variety of reports from both governmental and nongovernmental sources, the literature review represents a fair and balanced assessment that tries to limit any biases or analytical fallacies that analysts are sometimes prone to.

However, the current state of literature surrounding Iran's nuclear program rarely includes much scholarly attention to the specific reactions by the United States, Israel, and Egypt (emphasis added). While much of the literature provides the historical relationship between the United States and Iran, Israel and Iran, or Egypt and Iran, there is not much information on how each actor would react to a nuclear-armed Iran. In fact, most of the literature tends to focus on what Israel might do *before* Iran becomes a nuclear power—that is, will Israel use *preventive* force against Iran's nuclear facilities? This question, although intriguing and important in the scope of international security research, does not speak to the reality of the Iranian nuclear threat. According to most experts, Iran will become a nuclear power in the next 36-48 months, and depending on how the aforementioned actors react to the latest member of the nuclear club, the situation could become much more complicated than the current literature is willing to admit.

One important factor that this paper has over the current state of literature is that this paper will utilize the LAMP Method for Prediction as its model for analysis, which will minimize biases, analytic fallacies, and help produce a more objective piece of scholarly research than is currently in the field. In addition, none of the research obtained or read for the literature review utilized a systematic analytic technique like the LAMP Method, Delphi technique, or the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). One strength of the LAMP Method is that it incorporates many similar features of the other techniques, which produces a more accurate depiction of events and a more rigorous analysis of the data. For example, both AHP and LAMP utilize a pair-wise comparisons of projected outcomes, but while, "AHP assigns a nine-point value scale to the probability of these outcomes for the purpose of selecting the most desirable outcome for decision making purposes, LAMP emphasizes prediction of the relative probability of alternate futures" (Lockwood & Lockwood, 1993, 11-12). Since the probabilities of any selected event are virtually infinite, the LAMP Method does not assign numerical values to the alternate futures. Similarly, the Delphi technique applies fixed probability ranges to alternate futures, while LAMP "emphasizes relative probability of alternate futures" and while Delphi strives for group consensus, the LAMP method forces the analyst or group to analyze all events using an "either-or" voting method (Lockwood & Lockwood, 1993, 15-16).

Specific Research Question and Hypothesis

For this paper, the specific research question is: What are the potential reactions by the Israel, the United States, and Egypt to Iranian attainment of nuclear power status?

The main hypothesis for this study is that since the United States is the only superpower in the world, the reactions by the other actors in this paper will be heavily tied to America's leadership and America's own reaction to Iranian attainment to nuclear weapons. In other words, Israel and Egypt will look to the United States as a diplomatic, economic, or military guide in determining their own reactions. While the other countries may not sign onto the same strategy as America, America's position and reaction will be a deciding factor in how these other countries move forward. For all the actors involved, the primary concern at the moment is *preventing* Iran from becoming a nuclear power. But at some point, it is believed Iran *will* become a nuclear state, which will force the other actors involved, to begin to rethink their national security strategy vis-à-vis Iran. This paper will explore the full spectrum of alternate futures and conclude which ones are most likely to occur based on rigorous analysis.

RESEARCH DESIGN

It can be argued that there is no region in the world, dominated by more uncertainty and conflict than in the Middle East. Compounding the uncertainty in this region is Iran's nuclear program and how its immediate neighbors and others in the world might react if Iran were to become the ninth confirmed nuclear state. For a scholarly project like this one, there needs to be a method for predicting those reactions and the method that will be utilized for this study is the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction, or "LAMP". While the current debate has routinely been pointed back towards preventive scenarios of stopping Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons, rarely do researchers look outward to find other, possibly more accurate, scenarios regarding the specific research question. The LAMP Method will help facilitate this analysis by

accounting for other relevant scenarios that are often overlooked which will then give the

decision maker (or reader) the ability to make a more accurate assessment. The following

twelve steps outline the LAMP Method process, as identified in the Lockwood LAMP

monograph (1993, 27-28):

1. Determine the issue for which you are trying to predict the most likely future.

2. Specify the national "actors" involved.

3. Perform an in-depth study of how each national actor perceives the issue in question.

4. Specify all possible courses of action for each actor.

5. Determine the major scenarios within which you will compare the alternate futures.

6. Calculate the total number of permutations of possible alternate futures for each scenario.

7. Perform a "pairwise comparison" of all alternate futures to determine the relative probability.

8. Rank the alternate futures for each scenario from highest relative probability to the lowest based on the number of "votes" received.

9. Assuming that each future occurs, analyze each alternate future in terms of its consequences for the issue in question.

10. State the potential of a given alternate future to transpose into another alternate future. ***

11. Determine the "focal events" that must occur in our present in order to bring about a given alternate future.

12. Develop indicators for the focal events.

(***Please note, since the LAMP monograph was originally published, there has been an important update. Step 10 "transpose" has been moved to Step 12, while Steps 11 and 12 have been moved down respectively.)

The LAMP Method, as has been mentioned, has a variety of strengths, but it also has some limitations as Dr. Lockwood mentioned in the LAMP monograph. First, for analysts that believe deeply in quantitative analysis, the LAMP method will not be appropriate. LAMP differs in that, it assumes "one can never know the absolute probability of a given future" and "the future is infinitely fluid and dynamic" (Lockwood & Lockwood, 1993, 91). In addition, LAMP does not allow for ambiguity because rather than allowing analysts to focus on the scenarios that first come to mind, LAMP forces the analyst to choose one scenario over the other in pair-wise comparison. In this regard, critics argue "that LAMP compels the analyst to examine a range of alternate futures that may seem wildly improbable" which could tempt the analyst into discrediting some of the scenarios rather than doing a rigorous analysis of all scenarios (Lockwood & Lockwood, 1993, 92). Nonetheless, the overall LAMP Method is a great analytical tool and one that can be applied to this study's specific research question.

LAMP Method Step One—**Determine the issue for which you are trying to predict the most likely future.**

In the first step, it is important for the researcher to select a topic that can be expanded on and one that can contribute to the current state of literature. The Iranian nuclear program has been at the forefront of international security debates for many decades. Yet, most of the reports that have been published, concentrate on a single scenario, or in some cases, a couple of scenarios rather than taking in the full spectrum of potential reactions of various actors. Since this paper will utilize the LAMP Method for Prediction, it is the researcher's intent to contribute a more defined and unique paper to the scholarly debate.

LAMP Method Step Two—**Specify the national actors involved.**

The national actors for this predictive study are Israel, Egypt, and the United States of America and the focus is on Iran's nuclear program. There could have been other national actors selected including Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and England. And while any criticisms for the three selected is perfectly natural, it should be noted that the three actors were chosen because each brought a unique and distinct viewpoint to the specific research question. The three actors, a regional enemy (Israel), a regional rival (Egypt) and a global superpower (United States) — are all looking at Iran's nuclear program with suspiciousness and varying levels of anxiety.

LAMP Method Step Three—**Perform an in-depth study of how each national actor perceives the issue in question.**

Step three of LAMP was addressed in the literature review section but it can be reemphasized here as well.

<u>Israel</u>

Israeli-Iranian relations have been strained for many years and over the past decade; the bitter rhetoric between the two nations has only intensified as Iran moved forward with its alleged covert nuclear weapons program. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in recent years has been a major antagonist toward the Jewish state by denying the holocaust and calling Israel "illegitimate" and and therefore 'must be wiped off the map' (Shahvar, 2009, 97). On the other side of the rhetoric, are actors like former Deputy Chief of Staff to the Israeli Army, Dan Halutz, who, when asked in 2004 how far Israel would go to stop Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons, he replied, "2,000 kilometers," or the estimated distance between Iran and Israel (Cordesman, 2007). The data that has been compiled from the qualitative literature review reveals three key aspects of Israel's

views toward Iran and its nuclear program. First, many policymakers in Israel believe that if Iran gets a nuclear weapon, the Iranians will use it against Israel without hesitation. While direct evidence to support this is virtually nonexistent, Israel points to the inflated anti-Zionist rhetoric from Iranian leaders and Iran's determination to weaken Israel at all costs, through proxy wars with Hezbollah and Hamas and by funding and providing support to terrorist groups that despise Jews. In addition, the Israeli's are becoming increasingly impatient in regards to the Iranian threat. Israel "believes time is running out and sanctions will not alter the regime's behavior. But the [Barack] Obama administration is proud of the new toothless sanctions passed by the UN Security Council" (Brodsky, 2010). As a result, there is a major divergence of opinion between the United States and one of its closest allies. How this relationship moves forward is yet to be seen, but this paper will seek answers to this question.

Egypt

The data collected on Egypt's perception suggest that Cairo believes a nuclear-armed Iran would be a devastating development in the Middle East and it could create an arms race in an already volatile region. While the Egyptian's may not feel a direct existential threat from Iran's military like other neighbors, including Iraq or Syria might feel, they would see a nuclear Iran as a major "blow to the Egyptian worldview as the leader in the Arab and Islamic worlds" (Sokolski, 2005, 38). The Egyptian's are a highly sophisticated and proud culture that believes if there should be any Middle Eastern country with the 'Arab bomb' it should be them. While it is very unlikely that Egypt would pursue any other option besides diplomacy with Iran, depending on the aggressive

nature of the Iranian regime, Egypt could resort to a more reactive decision and rethink its own national security policy.

United States

The United States has tried repeatedly to coerce Iran into abandoning its nuclear weapons program, through diplomatic outreaches (Obama's speech in Cairo) to economic sanctions passed by the United Nations. Neither has worked but the literature suggests America is not about to abandon the economic/diplomatic options in dealing with Iran. This is not to say that America is going to roll over and allow Iran to proliferate the Middle East with nuclear weapons, but the Obama administration still believes the 'carrot and stick' option could work. Aside from a direct nuclear attack on Israel, or Egypt for that matter, the United States will probably offer a nuclear protective deterrence to these countries and other allies in the region in an effort to contain and eventually try to get Iran to dismantle its nuclear program; much like Libya did in the early 2000's. But the military option is always on the table for the United States if the situation worsens and if threats become more aggressive against Israel or if proxy groups begin to escalate attacks on Israel and/or American forces in the Gulf region.

LAMP Step Four—**Specify all possible courses of action for each actor.**

There are a variety of possible courses of action that Israel, Egypt and the United States could pursue if Iran becomes a nuclear state. However, it should be noted again that any option by Israel or Egypt is likely to be dependent or at least to some extent, influenced by the United States and the current relationship among the various national actors. The courses of action for Israel, Egypt and the United States are as follows:

Israeli Options

Keep current strategy (CS)

In this situation, Israel would continue with the status quo and would continue to keep its own nuclear program ambiguous and rely on the United States and its international allies to keep diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran. The rhetoric would remain the same with Israel believing an Iranian nuclear attack was imminent but Israel would be reluctant to launch a unilateral preemptive strike in fear that it would start a nuclear war. Many experts believe Israel's ambiguity in regards to its own nuclear weapons capabilities have deterred other states from attacking Israel and that it has definitely kept the Jewish state safe. "It has been the right policy; it has helped Israel. The Arabs, knowing that Israel is a nuclear superpower and a conventional weapons superpower, probably reduced their aspirations or limited their plans" to attack Israel, says Yossi Melman, an Israeli journalist and historian (Mitnick, 2006). By not publicly acknowledging its own nuclear program, Israel may be able to continue to deter Iran from attacking because Iran will not know the size of Israel's nuclear arsenal and the full depths that Israel could do to Iran.

Publicly acknowledge a nuclear program and pursue open deterrence (OD)

In this scenario, Israel openly declares that it is a nuclear power and uses this as a deterrent to Iranian aggression. In this situation, a strategy of MAD or mutually assured destruction could be implemented, whereby, both countries have nuclear arsenals and second strike capabilities, which would mean the complete annihilation of both states, should either of them launch an attack. "The clear knowledge by each side that it would certainly be annihilated, even if it succeeded in surprising its rival with a missile attack,

formed a deterrent against the use of its missiles" (Pedatzur, 2009, 530). Instead of an

active defense, the Israeli's would take the position of an open deterrence by warning

Iran that ultimate punishment would mean the complete destruction of not only Israel but

of Iran as well. This strategy would abandon Israel's long standing policy of nuclear

ambiguity and also risk international pressure to abandon/dismantle its own nuclear

program, but this would at least make Iran reconsider launching *any* missile (nuclear or

non-nuclear) towards Israel. As Reuven Pedatzur argues,

> Israel must make it clear "that the detection of any missile
> launched from Iran in a westerly direction will mean for
> Israel the launching of an Iranian nuclear missile against it.
> In such circumstances Israel will not wait to see where the
> missile hits and whether it is equipped with a nuclear
> warhead. No attempt will be made to intercept it, but Israeli
> retaliation will automatically follow" (2009, 531).

Preventive Military Attack against Iran's nuclear facilities (PA)

The predominant policy being advocated inside Israel is a preventive military

strike against Iran's nuclear facilities. Instead of waiting for Iran to become a nuclear

power and possibly striking Israel first, some believe a preventive attack is the only

option in countering Iranian aggression and halting (or delaying) its nuclear program.

Many analysts point to Israel's bombing of the Osirak facility in Iraq in the 1980's as

evidence that Israel has the capability to destroy a nuclear program and to deter a country

from an attack. The raid, by eight Israeli F-16 fighter jets, was considered a success

considering it crippled Iraq's nuclear ambitions, and no planes were shot down or damaged

(Raas & Long, 2006, 2). But what many fail to realize is that the Osirak situation is much less

complicated than the Iranian nuclear program. First, Iran is over 2,000 kilometers or roughly

1,200 miles away from Israel—meaning, a sustained attack on *all* of Iran's nuclear facilities,

rumored to be in the dozens—is extremely unlikely. "According to one intelligence source,

Iran is estimated to have up to 70 sites that are dedicated to nuclear development" (Pedatzur, 2009, 523). Not only that, but Iran has also fortified most of the nuclear plants (up to 200 feet below ground) in underground fortresses that are difficult to detect and even more difficult to penetrate with conventional missiles. Citing the Osirak example as evidence and even propaganda for launching a preventive attack is both flawed and dangerous and could exacerbate the situation and accelerate the Iranian nuclear program following a first strike attack by Israel.

While this strategy may be attractive to Israel, the United States has openly confirmed that it does *not* want Israel to launch a unilateral attack against Iran. President Barack Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, Admiral Mike Mullen, have reiterated this position repeatedly. Speaking in Jerusalem in 2008, Adm. Mullen frowned upon a unilateral attack by Israel, saying, "This is a very unstable part of the world and I don't need it to be more unstable" (Coughlin, 2008). While it is unlikely that Israel would defy Washington's wishes at the moment, it should be noted that if Iran becomes more aggressive and continually resists U.N. sanctioned pressure, an attack could be initiated by Israel (with or without American approval or forewarning).

Egyptian Options

Keep Current Strategy (CS)

The current strategy coming from Cairo in regards to Iran is twofold. While the Egyptians are concerned about Iran's nuclear developments over the past few years and how this might change the balance of power in the region, Cairo is more focused on domestic order and stability. President Hosni Mubarak has "exhibited a high sense of insecurity towards internal and external threats, and an obsession with maintaining domestic stability" (Shama, 2009). In this respect, it seems like Mubarak is more likely to concentrate on strengthening the Egyptian state domestically which is heavily aided by American and

Western foreign aid. It is therefore likely that Egypt sees more opportunity in relying on foreign economic and military aid from the United States than challenging Iran unilaterally. However, an abrupt change in the political landscape (death of Mubarak) could change the events.

Strengthen <u>d</u>iplomatic and <u>e</u>conomic ties with Iran (DE)

The second option that Egypt has is to reconcile past grievances and disagreements with Iran in hopes that the benefits of restoring the relationship can be mutually beneficial (politically and economically). In recent years, the two countries have tried to mend relations by sending representatives to each other's countries to discuss topics like Iran's nuclear program, the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, and bilateral trade agreements. Many analysts believe the talks were a way for Iran to deflect international pressure from its nuclear weapons program, by trying to persuade its regional neighbors that the program is for peaceful purposes only (Morrow, 2006). Regardless, the two countries have had continuous meetings on issues that could help revive Egypt's faltering economy. This option is not as likely because there would need to be a major thawing in diplomatic relations between the countries, aside from what has already been initiated. In addition, American and Western influence (money) in Egypt would likely be a major contributing factor on whether or not Egypt 'jumps ship' and mends relations with Iran. When a country like Egypt, is economically and politically weak, money talks, and U.S. foreign aid ($28 billion over three decades) has been a source that Egypt continually depends upon (USAID, 2005). However, if Egypt-US relations break down, this option could hold more weight.

Pursue a <u>n</u>uclear <u>p</u>rogram to counter Iranian power. (NP)

The third option that Egypt might pursue is to begin its own nuclear weapons program to counter Iran and shift the balance of power once again in the Middle East. The contentious rivalry between Egypt and Iran has hinged on the "nationalist factor" whereby,

each country believes they should be the heir to Arab exceptionalism and the beneficiary of the only "Arab bomb" in the Middle East. A nuclear Iran would greatly challenge Egypt's nationalistic society and it could cause the Egyptian public to pressure the government to develop its own nuclear option. In fact, in 2006, President Hosni Mubarak's son and potential successor, Gamal Mubarak proposed that Egypt begin developing its own nuclear energy program, which was enthusiastically welcomed throughout the country. Some analysts believe that Gamal is positioning himself to succeed his father and he "also appears to be taking a page from the playbook of Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has turned producing nuclear energy into a matter of national pride" (Slackman, 2006). While a nuclear energy program is not a security threat to the region (or American interests), the combination of a new, charismatic leader in Egypt and a stronger, more aggressive, nuclear-armed Iran, could push Egypt toward the path of enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing. However, this option would require many variables to systemically change before Egypt pursued its own nuclear ambitions.

American Options

Keep Current Strategy (CS)

As with the two other national actors, the United States could pursue its current strategy of economic sanctions to weaken the Iranian regime in hopes of persuading Ahmadinejad into dismantling the nuclear weapons program. On June 9, 2010, the United Nations passed Resolution 1929 which put added pressure on Iranian leaders to abandon fuel enrichment but the resolution fell short of what the Obama administration was seeking. However, the fact that a resolution was passed, with 12 votes, signals that the international community may be coming together in unity to persuade Iran to change its behavior. Nevertheless, what is expected to become the reality is that Iran will become a nuclear power

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if sanctions do not work, and the United States is unlikely to continue on this path if Iran gets the bomb. This option might be pursued though if the international community finally comes together (including Russia and China, who hold veto power at the U.N. Security Concil) and implement a strategy of "maximum impact" sanctions. As the Peterson Institute for International Economic writes in their report, <u>Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: 3rd Edition,</u> "There is a better chance to avoid military escalation if sanctions are deployed with maximum impact. This was the authors' conclusion in 1990 regarding Iraq and remains their policy advice in 2007 in the confrontation with Iran over its ambitions to develop nuclear weapons" (Hufbauer, et al, 2007, 2). A final "round" of sanctions might be pursued, but only if the United States can get the unwavering support from countries like Russia and China.

Allow Iran to become a nuclear power and use <u>o</u>pen <u>d</u>eterrence (OD)

The United States has vehemently maintained the position that under no circumstances would Iran be allowed to become a nuclear weapons state. But in all likelihood, if sanctions fail to change Iran's behavior, it is quite possible that Iran will have nuclear weapons. With America involved in a two-front war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Obama administration may be reluctant to pursue the military option and further exacerbate an already chaotic region of the globe and put American troops in further danger. In the event that Iran does have a nuclear weapon, the United States may be forced into the undesirable position of using open deterrence, much like it did during the Cold War and to certain extents with Syria, Libya, and North Korea. Similar to the open deterrence option for Israel, although the U.S. does not have an ambiguous nuclear program, the United States would make it absolutely clear to Iran that any aggression against Israel or other American allies or interests in the region would be seen as a provocation for war. In this sense, the United States would use all means necessary, including its own nuclear arsenal, to punish Iran and essentially end

'modern' Persia. This option seems like the most likely if Iran becomes a nuclear state, but constantly changing variables could greatly influence or impede this option.

Launch a preventive attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. (PA)

The third option available to the United States would be to launch a preventive attack against Iran's most strategically important nuclear facilities. This option, by far the most difficult and dangerous of all the options outlined, would require the assistance and support of American allies like Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq in order to be marginally successful. By utilizing Saudi and Iraqi airfields, the United States could selectively target Iranian nuclear facilities that are most critical to its nuclear program. But at the same time, an overt military attack brings added challenges for the West and opportunities for Iran to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and rally radical jihadists in the region. This point is highlighted in the book, Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran, which points out the difficulty in pursuing the military option and the improbable nature of an attack of this magnitude:

> "Whatever might be gained in technically delaying Iran's completion of having a bomb option would have to be weighed against what might be lost in Washington's long-term efforts to encourage more moderate Islamic rule in Iran and the Middle East; to synchronize allied policies against nuclear proliferation; and to deflate Iran's rhetorical demonstrations against U.S. and allied hostility. Meanwhile, merely bluffing an attack against Iran—sometimes urged as a way around these difficulties—would only aggravate matters: The bluff would eventually be exposed, and so only embolden Iran and weaken U.S. and allied credibility further" (Sokolski, 2005, 2).

LAMP Step Five—**Determine the major scenarios within which you will compare the alternate futures.**

According to Lockwood & Lockwood, the purpose of developing scenarios "is to provide the major assumption which will influence the actions of all national actors concerned" and "to account for an additional actor without having to calculate it as part of the permutations for the alternate futures" (1993, 34-35). It is therefore important to outline the two scenarios surrounding Iran's nuclear program.

The Two Scenarios Available to Iran

Scenario 1: Iran pursues a nuclear program under the full disclosure parameters outlined by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Scenario 2: Iran defies IAEA inspections and the United Nations resolutions and attains nuclear power status.

Scenario #1 – Iran changes its behavior and begins to allow IAEA inspectors back into the country to observe its nuclear program.

This scenario assumes that Iran changes its behavior as a result of the dual-track policy pursued by the international community—economic sanctions and diplomacy. Rather than continuing to be economically burdened by the U.N.-imposed sanctions, Iran allows IAEA inspectors back into its nuclear facilities to observe and report on Iran's nuclear program. The inflamed rhetoric and anti-Western propaganda would likely continue under this scenario, but the United States and even Israel would welcome this change in Iranian behavior, and view this as evidence that the sanctions strategy has worked to a certain extent. Yet, the United States and especially Israel would continue to be suspicious of Iranian behavior and push for further measures to weaken the regime.

Scenario #2 – Iran develops a nuclear weapons arsenal and joins the "nuclear club."

In this scenario, international pressures and U.N. sanctions have failed to persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear program and results in Iran becoming the ninth confirmed nuclear state in the world. The Iranians see the sanctions as further means of Western aggression and

interference in the sovereign affairs of the Arab world and proclaims itself a nuclear

superpower. With the United States already militarily tied in the region, options are limited in

dealing with Iran on a regional level, so the deterrent option is pursued, while Israel considers

a preventive attack. Regional neighbors begin to reconsider their national security policy as a

result of this development, further complicating nuclear non-proliferation efforts in the

region.

LAMP Step Six—**Calculate the total number of permutations of possible "alternate futures" for each scenario.**

For this paper, the researcher has chosen three national actors (aside from the case

study actor, Iran), and there are three possible courses of action for each actor. For this step,

LAMP requires a formula to calculate the permutations:

$$\text{Equation}: X^y = Z$$

Where: X = Number of courses of action open to each actor (<u>3</u>)
Where: y = Number of actors (<u>3</u>)
Where: Z = Total number of alternate futures (<u>27</u>)

$$\textbf{Scenario 1: } (3^3) = 27 \text{ AND } \textbf{Scenario 2: } (3^3) = 27$$

LAMP Step Seven—**Perform a pair-wise comparison of all the alternate futures to determine their relative probability.**

In this step, the analyst uses a pair-wise comparison "to analyze the alternate

futures two at a time, always assuming that the two futures being compared at the

moment are the *only* ones that exist." Then, "[b]ased on all of the information that the

analyst is aware of at that moment, whichever future is deemed 'more likely to occur' is

given one vote" (Lockwood & Lockwood 1993, 40). For example, alternate future one is

compared with alternate future two, alternate future one is then compared with alternate

future three, et cetera. After all the permutations have been accounted for and the

alternate futures have been tallied, the alternate future with the most votes is deemed to

have the *highest relative probability.* To determine the total number of votes for all

permutations in a scenario, Lockwood & Lockwood again use a formula:

$$X = (n-1) + (n-2)…+ (n-n)$$

Where N = Total number of alternate futures to be analyzed
Where X = Total number of pair-wise comparisons that must be performed.

Applying the formula to this study, the total number of votes possible is:

$$X = (27-1) + (27-2) +…(27-27)$$
$$X = 351 \text{ Total Votes}$$

Note: The following tables on pages 42 and 43 will show Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, the total number of alternate futures, the pair-wise comparison and the total number of votes each alternate future receives. The tables on pages 45 and 46 show the ranking of alternate futures based on the number of "votes" each received.

Table 1: Pair-wise Comparison

Scenario 1: Iran changes its behavior and allows IAEA inspectors back into the country to observe its nuclear program.				
# of Possible Alternate Futures	Israel	Egypt	United States of America	# of Votes Received
1	CS	CS	CS	26
2	CS	CS	OD	20
3	CS	CS	PA	18
4	CS	DE	CS	24
5	CS	DE	OD	21
6	CS	DE	PA	15
7	CS	NP	CS	14
8	CS	NP	OD	17
9	CS	NP	PA	11
10	OD	CS	CS	9
11	OD	CS	OD	10
12	OD	CS	PA	5
13	OD	DE	CS	9
14	OD	DE	OD	11
15	OD	DE	PA	4
16	OD	NP	CS	3
17	OD	NP	OD	4
18	OD	NP	PA	4
19	PA	CS	CS	23
20	PA	CS	OD	22
21	PA	CS	PA	16
22	PA	DE	CS	23
23	PA	DE	OD	18
24	PA	DE	PA	11
25	PA	NP	CS	0
26	PA	NP	OD	8
27	PA	NP	PA	5
				351 Total Votes

CS= Current Strategy
OD=Open Deterrence
PA=Preventive Attack
DE=Diplomatic/Economic Relations
NP=Nuclear Program

Table 2: Pair-wise Comparison

Scenario 2: Iran develops a nuclear weapons arsenal and joins the "nuclear club."				
# of Possible Alternate Futures	Israel	Egypt	United States of America	# of Votes Received
1	CS	CS	CS	17
2	CS	CS	OD	19
3	CS	CS	PA	6
4	CS	DE	CS	17
5	CS	DE	OD	20
6	CS	DE	PA	4
7	CS	NP	CS	11
8	CS	NP	OD	15
9	CS	NP	PA	3
10	OD	CS	CS	16
11	OD	CS	OD	23
12	OD	CS	PA	11
13	OD	DE	CS	13
14	OD	DE	OD	20
15	OD	DE	PA	5
16	OD	NP	CS	5
17	OD	NP	OD	17
18	OD	NP	PA	3
19	PA	CS	CS	16
20	PA	CS	OD	24
21	PA	CS	PA	16
22	PA	DE	CS	6
23	PA	DE	OD	20
24	PA	DE	PA	11
25	PA	NP	CS	1
26	PA	NP	OD	19
27	PA	NP	PA	13
				351 Total Votes

LAMP Step Eight—**Rank the alternate futures for each scenario from highest relative probability to the lowest based on the number of "votes" received.**

For this step, the ranking of the alternate futures provides a clearer "roadmap" for the possible alternatives based on the relative probability, which has been determined through an "either-or" vote method. **See pages 45 & 46 for Table 3 and Table 4.**

Table 3: Ranking of Alternate Futures for Scenario 1

# of Possible Alternate Futures	Israel	Egypt	United States of America	# of Votes Received
Scenario 1: Iran changes its behavior and allows IAEA inspectors back into the country to observe its nuclear program.				
1	CS	CS	CS	26
4	CS	DE	CS	24
19	PA	CS	CS	23
22	PA	DE	CS	23
20	PA	CS	OD	22
5	CS	DE	OD	21
2	CS	CS	OD	20
3	CS	CS	PA	18
23	PA	DE	OD	18
8	CS	NP	OD	17
21	PA	CS	PA	16
6	CS	DE	OA	15
7	CS	NP	OD	14
9	CS	NP	PA	11
14	OD	DE	OD	11
24	PA	DE	PA	11
11	OD	CS	OD	10
10	OD	CS	CS	9
13	OD	DE	CS	9
26	PA	NP	OD	8
12	OD	CS	PA	5
27	PA	NP	PA	5
15	OD	DE	PA	4
17	OD	NP	OD	4
18	OD	NP	PA	4
16	OD	NP	CS	3
25	PA	NP	CS	0
				351 Total Votes

CS= Current Strategy
OD=Open Deterrence
PA=Preventive Attack
DE=Improve Diplomatic/Economic Relations
NP=Nuclear Program

Table 4: Ranking of Alternate Futures for Scenario 2

# of Possible Alternate Futures	Israel	Egypt	United States of America	# of Votes Received
Scenario 2: Iran develops a nuclear weapons arsenal and joins the "nuclear club."				
20	PA	CS	OD	24
11	OD	CS	OD	23
5	CS	DE	OD	20
14	OD	DE	OD	20
23	PA	DE	OD	20
2	CS	CS	OD	19
26	PA	NP	OD	19
1	CS	CS	CS	17
4	CS	DE	CS	17
17	OD	NP	OD	17
10	OD	CS	CS	16
19	PA	CS	CS	16
21	PA	CS	PA	16
8	CS	NP	OD	15
13	OD	DE	CS	13
27	PA	NP	PA	13
7	CS	NP	CS	11
12	OD	CS	PA	11
24	PA	DE	PA	11
3	CS	CS	PA	6
22	PA	DE	CS	6
15	OD	DE	PA	5
16	OD	NP	CS	5
6	CS	DE	PA	4
9	CS	NP	PA	3
18	OD	NP	PA	3
25	PA	NP	CS	1
				351 Total Votes

CS= Current Strategy
OD=Open Deterrence
PA=Preventive Attack
DE=Diplomatic/Economic Relations
NP=Nuclear Program

***LAMP Step Nine*—Assuming that each future occurs, analyze each alternate future in terms of its consequences for that issue in question.**

This section of the paper will analyze and discuss the findings that were derived from the tables in steps seven and eight respectively. It should be noted that the analysis of these situations requires a bit of "imagination on the part of the analyst" (Lockwood & Lockwood, 1993, 54) and as result, critics argue that this step can fall victim to a variety of analytical fallacies and biases on the part of the analyst. However, by utilizing a rigorous analysis method like LAMP, these 'stories of the future', or alternate futures as they are called, are backed up by extensive research from a variety of sources. Nonetheless, these alternate futures do not predict what *will* happen, but rather, they serve the purpose of helping the reader understand what *could* happen (vis-à-vis the specific research question). The thoughts and arguments transcribed in the subsequent sections are the authors own, developed based on careful analysis and research.

Due to research and time constraints, step nine of LAMP will address only the first four "most likely" futures for the two possible scenarios outlined. Before moving on to each future, the following points provide some interesting notes from the various tables.

- For scenario 1, the top four policy options that the United States most likely would pursue, "CS" or Current Strategy was the most likely choice in all four; whereas, in Scenario 2, "OD" or Open Deterrence was the most likely option for the United States.

- Israel was much more likely to pursue a military option (PA, or Preventive Attack) in Scenario 1 than in Scenario 2.

- In neither scenario, did Egypt's policy option "NP" or pursue its own nuclear program, come up as a likely option.

The information obtained from the pair-wise comparison is interesting because it reveals that Israel is much more likely to pursue the military option of a preventive attack *before* Iran becomes a nuclear state, whereas, the United States is even more reluctant to become entangled in a military standoff with Iran in any of the top four alternate futures. Egypt on the other hand, had an equally proportionate 'relative ranking' of DE and CS, which provides an intriguing complexity to the scenarios.

Table 5: Scenario 1-Most Likely Alternate Futures

Scenario 1: Iran changes its behavior and allows IAEA inspectors back into the country to observe its nuclear program.				
# of Possible Alternate Futures	Israel	Egypt	United States of America	# of Votes Received
1	CS	CS	CS	26
4	CS	DE	CS	24
19	PA	CS	CS	23
22	PA	DE	CS	23

Alternate Future # 1

If Iran changes its behavior and allows IAEA inspectors back into the country to supervise and monitor its nuclear program, the United States and to a lesser extent Israel would view this development as testament that current policies have worked to deter Iran from moving forward—although both countries would be reluctant to publicly admit this. Nevertheless, the United States would work with the international community and the United Nations (and IAEA) to make sure Iran is living up to its obligations and promises of full nuclear facility observation. Israeli-Iranian relations would not improve in short time, because both actors would continue to view each other as bitter enemies and the inflated rhetoric would ensue. In addition, Iranian leadership would bemoan about sabotage and interference from the Israeli's and Western powers in IAEA matters. In all

reality, this option while it might delay Iran's nuclear weapons pursuits, any (minor) incident could spur the situation into what is outlined in Scenario 2 of this paper (Iran becomes a nuclear power). But given the coercive limitations of the United States and Israel, outside of direct involvement with Iran, options other than pursuing a continued strategy of economic sanctions and international condemnation seems unlikely at this moment. Egypt would also be inclined to continue to be a secondary player in the international community, more focused on internal order and domestic issues than foreign policy. In addition, given Egypt's impending presidential transfer of power, an uncertain situation itself, a policy other than cordial relations with Iran (and not aggressive condemnation or interference) seems like the most likely option at the moment.

The consequences of this alternate future developing would be the United States possible inability to garner further international cooperation to fully derail Iran's nuclear pursuits. The international community, and more importantly China, Russia, and developing countries like Brazil, would be reluctant to pursue a more contentious policy if they see Iran cooperating with the IAEA and U.N. In addition, America's diminishing role as a superpower, could play a major factor in this area as well, while China and Russia could play a more dominant role and strengthen economic and diplomatic ties with a 'reformed' Iran.

Alternate Future # 4

In this alternate future, America and Israel both pursue its current strategy (as outlined above in A.F. #1), but Egypt develops closer diplomatic and economic ties with Iran. Iranian-Egyptian relations have been controversial ever since the Egyptians offered sanctuary to the deposed Shah of Iran, following the Iranian Revolution in 1979. But in

recent years, the two countries have held a few diplomatic meetings to work at strengthening the bond beyond the two Arab states. Recently, it was announced, that the Iranian's and Egyptian's would be opening a joint bank in Tehran, called the Misr Iran Development Bank. The Bank's Chairman and former governor of Egypt's Central Bank, Ismail Hassan, said that "banking relations could lead to broadening economic relations which could in turn lead to enhanced political ties between the two countries" (Tehran Times, 2010). Furthermore, Iran has reached out in recent months to Egypt and other regional neighbors to calm fears about their nuclear pursuits.

Taken together, a major reversal on Iran's part (allowing IAEA inspectors into the country) and an extended hand to its Arab neighbors, Iran and Egypt could mend a long and difficult relationship. However, American aid will be dangled over the Egyptian's in an effort to reinforce who holds the power in the region. Depending on the economic and political landscape in Egypt, American efforts might be futile in this endeavor. But it will nonetheless be a deciding factor in how Egyptian and Iranian relations progress.

The consequences of this alternate future occurring would be a diminished American role in the Middle East, creating the opportunity for the fundamentalist Iranian regime to restore relations with a country that is constantly battling its own fundamentalism and extremism. A more aggressive Iranian influence on Egypt would likely push many moderate Arabs in Egypt toward Iran's progressive, radical ideology.

Alternate Future # 19

For the first time, a preventive attack option shows up in Scenario 1, with Israel launching a preventive attack, and Egypt and the United States pursuing its current strategy. An Israeli preventive attack would likely occur if Israel believes Iran is only

delaying the inevitable by allowing IAEA inspectors into *some* of its nuclear facilities.
Depending on the level of accurate and actionable intelligence Israeli intelligence
services has on Iran's nuclear program, a preventive attack on the most advanced
facilities would put months years back from enrichment or development. Given the fact
that Iran has threatened to "whipe Israel off the map," the Israeli's may see this as their
best opportunity to postpone the inevitable.

The consequences of this alternate future happening would be: 1) a further strain
on an already tense U.S.-Israeli relationship, due to the fact that the Obama
Administration has publicly stated it does not want Israel to preemptively strike Iran; 2)
the chance Israeli intelligence is moderate at best, and the ordered airstrikes only take out
a small percentage of Iran's facilities—allowing Iran to withdraw from the NPT and
accelerate its nuclear program; and Iranian sponsored groups like Hamas and Hezbollah
launch proxy wars into Jerusalem and Tel Aviv on Iran's behalf.

Alternate Future #22

This alternate future continues down the same path as A.F. # 19 above, but
instead of Egypt continuing with its current strategy, they instead develop economic and
diplomatic ties with Iran. In the event of a preventive Israeli attack on Iran, Iran would
first look to its regional 'allies' for condemnation and the decades-long peace agreement
between Israel and Egypt could once again be put to the test. In other words, would the
revitalized partnership between Iran and Egypt put a strain on the peace agreement and
relations between Cairo and Tel Aviv? This is could become a major consequence for this
alternate future. Egypt would essentially be thrown into the middle between two bitter

foes and told to choose between a decades-long cordial relationship or a new, possibly prosperous frontier (trade between Egypt/Iran).

Table 6: Scenario 2—Most Likely Alternate Futures

Scenario 2: Iran develops a nuclear weapons arsenal and joins the "nuclear club."				
# of Possible Alternate Futures	Israel	Egypt	United States of America	# of Votes Received
20	PA	CS	OD	24
11	OD	CS	OD	23
5	CS	DE	OD	20
14	OD	DE	OD	20

Alternate Future # 20

Increased Iranian hostility coupled with a nuclear arsenal could lead to alternate future 20 happening. In this situation, the Israeli's launch a preventive attack against Iran and its nuclear weapons arsenal while Egypt stays on the sidelines and continues to focus on its own internal affairs. The United States on the other hand, pursues open deterrence to try and discourage any reprisal attacks against Israel or American interests in the region. America's current military commitments in the Middle East would impede an attack on Iran, and therefore it is much more likely that the United States would pursue an open deterrence option against Iran, which would involve the reassurance that any hostile acts against Israel or the United States or any attacks that were known to come from Tehran (nuclear or non nuclear) would be dealt with the harshest of realities. Although the United States has spoke out against a preemptive attack on Iran, an outright condemn of Israel would be a repudiation of Israel's right to defend itself, and therefore, it is likely the U.S. would back its ally. Iran would then have to determine whether

dropping a bomb on Tel Aviv and killing a few hundred thousand people is worth the total annihilation of its modern statehood by an attack from the United States.

The consequences of this alternate future happening would be further conflict in an already tense and vulnerable region that would put greater pressure on America's military to "clean up Israel's mess." (Pollack, 2010, 2). While a nuclear-armed Iran poses a variety of problems for the international community, Israel and the United States would see a preemptive attack differently. In this regard, the preventive attack could pose disastrous consequences for the immediate efforts in the Middle East and for Israeli-U.S. relations. According to the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, "both the U.S. and Israel need to recognize how differently they are likely to see an attack on Iran's nuclear program" and any military decision runs the risk of exacerbating a volatile region of the world into further chaos and war. Even though the United States had no direct part in the preventive attack, Iran holds the United States accountable for Israeli actions and dismisses Washington's argument that it was not an accomplice in this attack. Iran will also try to rally international support (from states and sub-state actors) against Israel and the United States for this discriminatory attack.

Alternate Future # 11

Like the United States' option in A.F. # 20, Israel also uses open deterrence as its means for dealing with a nuclear-armed Iran in alternate future 11. But whereas the United States has a known nuclear arsenal, Israel has long maintained the position of nuclear ambiguity and has never publically acknowledged a nuclear arsenal. But in this alternate future, Israel is forced to abandon the long held policy of nuclear ambiguity and use open deterrence to confront a nuclear-armed Iran. Israel would need to convincingly

show that it has nuclear weapons in order to successfully utilize the open deterrence strategy against Iran. The Israeli's would make it perfectly clear that any missile launched from Tehran would be met with mutual aggression, regardless if it were a traditional missile or a ballistic missile armed with a nuclear warhead. Rather than waiting to find out whether or not the missile was armed with nuclear weapons, the Israeli's would initiate their missile defense system to deter an attack and then subsequently launch multiple assaults on Iran, crippling their nuclear program, infrastructure and economy. Any provocation from Iran would be calls for an outright aggressive military campaign by Israel and whereas an Iranian attack would kill tens of thousands of people in Israel, an attack by Israel would kill millions, virtually ending the Iranian Republic.

In this situation, Egypt maintains a neutral stance, not wanting to interfere in a situation that has no immediate threat to its security. Egypt will continue to receive American foreign aid and reassurance from Washington that Egypt remains under America's 'nuclear umbrella.' The United States will rely upon its own nuclear arsenal as a deterrent to any Iranian aggression and America will serve as reinforcement to Israel's latest development that it too will employ the use of nuclear weapons if Iran provokes war.

The consequences of this alternate future occurring would be 1) Israel abandoning a strategy that many experts believe has kept the Jewish people safe—nuclear ambiguity; 2) the prospects for nuclear war in the Middle East are heightened with two bitter enemies staring down at one another; and 3) sub-state actors that carry out attacks on behalf of Iran, could incite a strong reaction from Israel, which could draw the two nations into calamity.

Alternate Future # 5

While the first two alternate futures had Israel preventively attacking Iran and then using open deterrence, in alternate future #5, Israel interestingly pursues the current strategy of nuclear ambiguity and relies on its defense forces to deter any Iranian aggression. However, it is important to note that under this scenario the United States has switched from its current strategy to an open deterrence strategy, which would happen if the Israeli-American relationship is strengthened and the Obama administration has informed Israel to remain mum on its own nuclear program and to rely on America's protection. Maintaining nuclear ambiguity could also help to deter an Iran that only has a single nuclear warhead. If Iran becomes a nuclear state but can only muster the technology and know-how for one bomb, a nuclear ambiguous policy would allow Israel to be perceived as having second strike capabilities and could further punish Iran should they attack.

During the same time, Tehran would be holding regional meetings with leaders from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria and trying to ease anxiety over their nuclear arsenal. Economic partnerships like the mutual bank investment, as well as new trade agreements between Cairo and Tehran could settle much of the anxiety that Egypt has regarding Iran's nuclear intentions—but not all of them. Egypt will maintain cordial, diplomatic and economic ties with Iran but be suspect to any aggressive plans coming from the Iranian Republic. A decreased American role in Egypt due to America's other commitments (regionally and domestically) could cause Egypt to rethink its own alliance with the West.

The consequences of this situation unfolding would be that Israel could rely on the U.S. when America can no longer provide such direct protection in a region where the U.S. is already stretched so thin. Concurrently, Israeli anxiety surrounding an impending attack could cause Tel Aviv to "knee-jerk" a decision against American wishes and push the region into nuclear war.

Alternate Future # 14

This alternate future tied in votes with the previous alternate future and has been deemed just as likely to occur as A.F. #5. In this scenario, the United States and Israel pursue open deterrence and Egypt develops closer diplomatic and economic ties with Iran. After consulting with the United States, and establishing the parameters for Israel to acknowledge its nuclear arsenal, Israel specifically outlines to the Iranians what they would consider an act of aggression and the ramifications for those acts. In addition, the United States, would also pursue an open deterrence policy as well and would enter into a military alliance, similar to that of NATO with Israel—a strike against Israel, would essentially mean, a strike against the United States. These red lines would be drawn from the outset so the Iranians knew exactly where Israel and the United States stood on the issue. Finally, the situation in the Gaza Strip and West Bank is also forcing Israel to pursue an open deterrence policy. A military attack would create even more nightmare scenarios in a small region, so Israel can only afford to use deterrence to calm a boiling situation.

In this alternate future, America no longer supplies Egypt with the nearly $2 billion in foreign aid annually, which Cairo has greatly depended on. The United States works to continue a cordial relationship with Egypt, but recent developments in the

Middle East have caused America to lose sight of its most loyal Arab ally. Following breakdown after breakdown between the United States and Egypt, Cairo develops closer diplomatic and economic ties with Iran due to the spike in Iran's economy as a result of its nuclear program. Internationally, countries like Russia and China and Brazil and Venezuela are investing in Iran's economy and all are pursuing trade agreements for exports—mostly oil and gas. Egypt sees this as an opportunity to jumpstart its own economy which has been impeded by corruption and recession for many years. New opportunities like the mutual bank investments, oil exports, and energy investment will draw Egypt closer to Iran, even momentarily. But the long-term effects of a Cairo-Tehran alliance will be felt for many years in the West.

The consequences of these events happening would be the dismissal of Egyptian-American relations, a relationship that the U.S. has come to depend on for moderate stances in a volatile region. Any breakdown of Egyptian-American relations will come at a steep price for Washington as it tries to cohesively build a reputation as a peace builder in the region. Losing an ally like Egypt will allow radicals to rally support for a stronger, more traditional Islamic conglomerate in the Middle East. Also, depending on how Israel and the United States articulate an open deterrence policy towards Iran, it could help Iran achieve what it has been seeking—international recognition as a global superpower. This could alienate potential American allies in the region and diminish the purpose of an open deterrence policy.

LAMP Step Ten—**Deteremine the "focal events" that must occur in our present in order to bring about a given alternate future.**

Focal events are the most essential incidents that must occur in order to bring about a given alternate future. According to Lockwood & Lockwood, a focal event "is an

occurrence of sufficient magnitude that it changes the relative probability of the universe

of alternate futures" (1993, 55). In this sense, each actor has a perception of the events

unfolding and depending on that perception, there must be focal events that occur in

order to get to the goal in mind. In simplest form, in order for the goal of country A to

happen, B, C, and D need to occur.

Scenario #1- Iran changes its behavior and allows IAEA inspectors back into the country to observe its nuclear program.

Alternate Future #1-Current Strategy (IS), Current Strategy (EG), Current Strategy (U.S.) (26 Votes Received)
- FOCAL EVENT: Iran allows IAEA inspectors into the country to observe, monitor and report on its nuclear program and ambitions.
- FOCAL EVENT: The U.N. sanctions against Iran work.
- FOCAL EVENT: The United States withdraws troops from Iran's backyard (Iraq).
- FOCAL EVENT: A new Presidential election in Egypt forces Cairo to reconsider its long-term goals (domestically and internationally).

Alternate Future #4-Current Strategy (IS), Diplomatic/Economic Relations (EG), Current Strategy (U.S.) (24 Votes Received)
- FOCAL EVENT: The U.S. tells Israel any option besides sanctions (current strategy) will only embolden Iran to resort to its old ways.
- FOCAL EVENT: Iran reaches out to its regional neighbors to calm fears that Iran has expansionist and imperialist ambitions.
- FOCAL EVENT: Egyptian-Iranian relations improve due to investment and mutually beneficial trade agreements.
- FOCAL EVENT: The war in Afghanistan is taking more resources and more attention away from the Iranian threat.

Alternate Future #19-Preventive Attack (IS), Current Strategy (EG), Current Strategy (U.S.) (23 Votes Received)
- FOCAL EVENT: Anti-Jewish rhetoric escalates and Israel sees this as the only opportunity to weaken Iran and therefore launches a preventive attack against Iran's nuclear facilities
- FOCAL EVENT: Internal affairs like corruption, an ailing President Mubarak, and a weakening economy force Egypt to pursue a weak foreign policy.
- FOCAL EVENT: The United States is militarily stripped of resources to do anything other than pursue coercive measures like economic sanctions.
- FOCAL EVENT: Israeli-American relations further deteriorate and Israel does not warn Washington of an impending attack.

Alternate Future # 22-Preventive Attack (IS), Diplomatic/Economic Relations (EG), Current Strategy (U.S.). (23 Votes Received)

- FOCAL EVENT: Israel looks foolish internationally by an attack and countries rally to Iran's defense.
- FOCAL EVENT: President Hosni Mubarak dies, and the successor is more hard-line and intent on repairing Egyptian-Arab relations with its neighbors.
- FOCAL EVENT: Egypt repudiates the attack and through a series of meetings with Iran to discuss the attack, diplomatic (restoration of Egyptian Embassy in Tehran) and economic (investments and trade) relations begin.

Scenario #2- Scenario 2: Iran develops a nuclear weapons arsenal and joins the "nuclear club."

Alternate Future # 20-Preventive Attack (IS), Current Strategy (EG), Open Deterrence (U.S.) (24 Votes Received)

- FOCAL EVENT: Israeli intelligence has actionable evidence that Iran's nuclear arsenal is at a maximum, two locations, Natanz and Besheur.
- FOCAL EVENT: Israel does not forewarn America of an attack.
- FOCAL EVENT: Egypt steers clear of international security politics in time where any incident could further escalate conflict.

Alternate Future #11-Open Deterrence (IS), Current Strategy (EG), Open Deterrence (U.S.) (23 Votes Received)

- FOCAL EVENT: Israel abandons its long-held strategy of nuclear ambiguity and declares a nuclear arsenal.
- FOCAL EVENT: The United States' war in Afghanistan has become more difficult and required more resources, which limits America's options.
- FOCAL EVENT: Iran has one nuclear bomb and no second strike capability.
- FOCAL EVENT: Egypt continues to receive American aid and military assurance that allows Cairo to remain neutral in this scenario.

Alternate Future #5-Current Strategy (IS), Diplomatic/Economic Relations (EG), Open Deterrence (U.S.) (20 Votes Received)

- FOCAL EVENT: Israel's nuclear ambiguous policy has worked in the past and remains in effect to deter any Iranian aggression.
- FOCAL EVENT: The United States uses its nuclear umbrella, with the help of England and France, to protect Israel and deter Iran.
- FOCAL EVENT: A new president in Egypt reaches out to Iran and sees Iran's new status as nuclear power as an economic opportunity to rebuild Egypt's economy.

Alternate Future #14-Open Deterrence (IS), Diplomatic/Economic (EG), Open Deterrence (U.S.) (20 Votes Received)

- FOCAL EVENT: A joint Israeli-American open deterrence policy is pursued
- FOCAL EVENT: A new form of "NATO" is established that gives Israel further protection.

- FOCAL EVENT: Egyptian-American relations deteriorate due to Barack Obama's diminishing 'star power' around the globe.
- FOCAL EVENT: Iran offers economic assistance that America was once giving, further alienating the two countries.

LAMP Step Eleven—**Develop Indicators for the focal events.**

In this step, the researcher must develop indicators for the focal events, which will then be used to judge "if an event either has occurred or is about to occur" (Lockwood & Lockwood, 1993, 56). The following listing outlines the eight most likely focal events and the key indicators.

FOCAL EVENT: Iran allows IAEA inspectors into the country to observe, monitor and report on its nuclear program and ambitions.
- Key Indicator: IAEA Inspectors are allowed to monitor every nuclear facility in Iran and report to the United Nations its findings.
- Key Indicator: Continues peaceful nuclear energy under the guidance and observation of the IAEA.
- Key Indicator: Iran reaffirms its commitment to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

FOCAL EVENT: The U.N. sanctions against Iran are deemed successful.
- Key Indictator: Sanctions weaken Iran's regime and is forced to abandon its nuclear weapons program or face potential internal unrest and uprising.
- Key Indicator: China and Russia sign on to new levels of economic sanctions, which they were previously reluctant to do.

FOCAL EVENT: The United States withdraws troops from Iran's backyard (Iraq).
- Key Indicator: Diminished role in Iran's regional vicinity calms Iranian fears of American imperialism.
- Key Indicator: Iraq is a modern democracy that is seen by Iran's youth as a hopeful future.
- Key Indicator: The United States' efforts in Afghanistan are more complicated and more difficult than ever before, with less criticism being directed at Iran.

FOCAL EVENT: A new Presidential election in Egypt forces Cairo to reconsider its long-term goals (domestically and internationally).
- Key Indicator: President Hosni Mubarak resigns due to health complications or dies.
- Key Indicator: New President focuses on jump-starting Egypt's economy rather than foreign policy affairs.

FOCAL EVENT: Israeli intelligence has actionable evidence that Iran's nuclear arsenal is at a maximum, two locations, Natanz and Besheur.
- Key Indicator: Mossad, with the assistance of the CIA, is able to penetrate Iran's inner circle of nuclear expertise.
- Key Indicator: Dissident reports shed light on Iran's nuclear intentions and overall program.

FOCAL EVENT: Israel does not forewarn America of an attack.
- Key Indicator: Deterioration of Israeli-American relations
- Key Indicator: Increased anxiety and fear that Israel is alone in the fight.
- Key Indicator: America's diminishing role in securing peace and ending conflict in the Middle East

FOCAL EVENT: Egypt steers clear of international security politics in time where any incident could further escalate conflict.
- Key Indicator: Internal conflict and corruption in Egypt leaves little time to focus on foreign policy
- Key Indicator: New president is more radical and more authoritarian than Mubarak.
- Key Indicator: Iran threatens any nation with diplomatic relations with the West with "all out war."

FOCAL EVENT: Israel abandons its long-held strategy of nuclear ambiguity and declares a nuclear arsenal.
- Key Indicator: Logistical and military limitations force Israel to rethink its foreign policy strategy in regards to Iran.
- Key Indicator: Second strike capability by Israel allows Israel to have the upper hand in deterrence against Iran.
- Key Indicator: Israel receives reassurances from its closest allies (U.S., England, and France) that any Iranian aggression will be met with mutual, cooperative punishment.

LAMP Step Twelve—**State the potential of a given alternate future to "transpose" into another alternate future.**

Given the fact that many alternate futures are only one or two focal events away from developing into other alternate futures, Step twelve of LAMP allows the researcher to clarify the futures that have the potential to "transpose" into another future. According to Lockwood & Lockwood, "Transposition does not have to occur in every alternate future" but if it can, then it "may affect the relative probability of these futures as events unfold" (1993, 55).

In Scenario 1, which had Iran allowing IAEA inspectors into the country to monitor its nuclear program, there is the possibility for Alternate Future #4 to transpose into Alternate Future #1, which was deemed the "most likely" future. Alternate Future #4 (CS-Israel, DE-Egypt, and CS-U.S.) could transpose into (CS-Israel, CS-Egypt, and CS-U.S.) Egypt feels more enticed by American incentives of cooperation rather than mending diplomatic and economic ties with Iran.

Another possible transposition is Alternate Future # 22, which could potentially transpose into Alternate Future # 1. In this case, Alternate Future #22 (PA-Israel, CS-Egypt, and CS-U.S.) could transpose into (CS-Israel, CS-Egypt, and CS-U.S.) due to a variety of events. If Iran the IAEA inspectors concede that Iran is in full compliance with its nuclear program, then Israel could back off a preventive attack and instead stick to its current strategy. In addition, depending on how Israeli-American relations are during this time, the United States could argue against an attack on Iran. If Israeli-American relations are fair, then communication between the two nations should facilitate this transposition to a more diplomatic approach.

In Scenario 2, in which Iran becomes a member of the nuclear club, there is the possibility for Alternate Future #20 to transpose into Alternate Future #21. Alternate Future #20 (PA-Israel, CS-Egypt, and OD-U.S.) could transpose into Alternate Future #21 (PA-Israel, CS-Egypt, PA-U.S.) if the United States feels an imminent attack is on the horizon. In this case, both the United States and Israel would launch successive and joint attacks against Iran in a bid to destroy its nuclear arsenal. The potential for this happening is strengthened due to the fact that hundreds of thousands of American forces

are in the Gulf area. Any possibility of Iran attacking those forces would be dealt with the utmost punishment by the United States.

Another possibility in Scenario 2 is the potential for Alternate Future # 11 (OD-Israel, CS-Egypt, OD-U.S.) to transpose into Alternate Future #17 (OD-Israel, NP-Egypt, OD-U.S.). In this case, Egypt feels that its immediate security is at risk by the ascension of Iran to nuclear power status. Therefore, Egypt covertly begins its own nuclear program to counter balance the recent developments in the region. This has the potential to develop because Egypt has had nuclear ambitions in the past, but were quelled but a variety of factors—like technology and resources. A nuclear-armed Iran could make Egypt rethink its own national security doctrine and covertly begin a nuclear program.

CONCLUSION

While none of the policy options in this paper are meant to forecast the future precisely, the LAMP Method does allow the analyst to rethink possible policy ramifications by looking at each alternate future separately. The method is not fool proof and nor does it try to predict the future. But the evidence outlined in this paper shows the potential reactions of Israel, Egypt and the United States, should Iran join the league of nuclear states. Furthermore, it was the intention of this paper to add to the debate surrounding this difficult and controversial subject in a thoughtful and analytical way.

The policy options outlined are intricately tied to one another and any development or deterioration in the international arena is likely to change these options. It is therefore the hope of this paper that future students will expand, add, delete, and update any sections of this paper that are deemed essential to the latest developments in the world. By combining ideas and expertise, we, as students of history will be able to refine our thoughts to the most recent developments and provide a more cohesive and definitive product for the decision-maker.

Finally, in regards to the issue of Iran specifically, it is very likely that in the next 36-48 months, the world will be confronted with a nuclear-armed Iran. While time is not on the side of those who don't want a nuclear Iran, there is time to develop a more complete and internationally tailored response plan for that day. It is therefore the recommendation of the researcher that the Iranian nuclear issue remains at the forefront of American foreign policy and at the forefront of the agenda among the G-20 states. Any disagreement among the world community as to how a nuclear Iran would affect international security will only be intensified the day after Iran gets the bomb. Act now.

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