HOW WILL MIDDLE EASTERN STABILITY AMONG IRAQ AND TURKEY BE AFFECTED BY THE ACTIVITY AND INTENTIONS OF THE KURDISTAN WORKERS PARTY (PKK) IN THIS REGION?

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I. Introduction

Recent events in northern Iraq and southeast Turkey have called the international community's attention to Turkey's Kurdish problems, specifically to its fight against the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party)—a problem that has been dragging for three decades. While the Kurdish question/unrest emerged as an opposition to the reforms implemented by the Ottoman modernizers, aiming to dissolve the autonomous socio-political space inhabited by the Kurds, it progressed into an opposition to the transformation of an a-national political community to a national one in the first quarter of the twentieth century (Yegen 2007). The PKK has since been the quasi-political entity governing Kurdish political association, with elements operating mainly in Turkey, but also in northern Iraq. The current international trend in the age of global terrorism is to label the Kurdish Workers' Party as a terrorist group, due to certain terrorism-esque tactics that the group has adopted over the past thirty years.

Since 2001, American efforts in the Middle Eastern region have included a large amount concern geared toward political stability among nations involved. Significant US presence in both Iraq and Turkey has been committed to effective anti-terrorist postures in these nations, and the PKK, operating as a hindrance to such efforts, has thus been regarded and criticized as the enemy. The governments of Turkey, Iraq, and the U.S. all include the PKK on their national lists of 'terrorist organizations' as do NATO, the European Union, and the U.N. Security Counsel. As such, the PKK influence over the Kurdish populations in Iraq and Turkey is a significant determinist in the overall coalition attempts at geopolitical stability.

(1) Predictive Issue: How will Middle Eastern stability among Iraq and Turkey be affected by the activity and intentions of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in this region, within the term of the next decade?

The importance of studying this case rests in the fundamental question of whether or not cultural and ethnic integration into a nationalist identity can be accomplished at all, and if so, whether it may be done so forcefully or diplomatically. The same question historically has applied to the conflicts between China and Taiwan or Russia and Chechnya. Where it has been argued that the motive for such conflicts is singularly tied to an economic interest, counterterrorism strategy, or human rights campaign, there are typically more prominent political concerns. In regards to the Turk-Kurd relationship, there is no *a priori* deterministic reality therefore "the construction of an enemy and the choice of how to face it are eminently political" (Barrinha 2008).

Discussions of the strong Turkish nationalism approach to the country's security, various issues of economic interests, political dissention, and counterterrorism strategy have all played roles in developing perspectives on what has been academically termed, "the Kurdish Question." A multitude of literature has been published on these topics and their interrelatedness, most of which originated from Middle Eastern scholars over concern for their native regional stability. Primary sources used in the course of this research are described on the following section. Herein these sources are researched for the purpose of this predictive analysis in determining how Turkey and Iraq, through United States support will overcome PKK activity and intentions, either diplomatically or forcefully within the next decade, or how the status quo will be sustained.

While the United States policy in the region might have indirectly influenced the Kurdish outlook, there has been no real decisive action against the PKK by military forces in Iraq and Turkey. One Ankara Associated Press report to US service members in Turkey reported in February 2010 that to date, zero PKK "terrorists" have been detained or apprehended by U.S.

troops (*Turkish Weekly, 18 Feb 2010).* All terrorist activity and counterterrorism action taken against PKK members and affiliates has been directly conducted by joint Turkish and Iraqi military forces. For these reasons, and for the purpose of this analysis, the United States will not be considered as a key actor in the PKK dispute over regional stability between Turkey and Iraq. The U.S. will be assumed to maintain its role as mediator and third-party force for all PKK-related issues.

II. Literature Review

Emrullah Uslu, a specialist in international relations at the University of Utah's Middle East Center, published a 2007 article in the *Studies of Conflict and Terrorism* journal titled, "Turkey's Kurdish Problem: Steps Toward a Solution" presents several suggested measures to diplomatically address reformation of the Kurdish problem in Turkey. Uslu describes how, in order for diplomacy to be successful in neutralizing PKK terrorist concerns and fully integrating Kurdish ethnicity into Turkish society, a paradigm shift away from traditional Turkish authoritarian nationalism is required (Uslu 2007).

Prime Minister Erdogan in 2007 was applauded by the international community for his political emphasis on the Kurdish problem, but has since been criticized for failure to take any conclusive action in what he labeled as his "most pressing domestic issue" (Uslu 2007). In this context the article describes the current impasse established between the Kurds and the Turkish government, the divisions among the Kurdish community itself (and therefore their objectives, including PKK terrorism), the U.S. involvement or lack thereof to date, and inadequacies in current Turkish policies. It also included discussion of the influence posed by Iraqi Kurds. Each of these factors results in Uslu's hypotheses as to how a diplomatic solution can be obtained, and the steps that must be followed in order for the solution to be successful.

The article does not however include any discussion of the potential likelihood that the proposed solutions come to past. The only supporting evidence of a reform effort whatsoever in the article are the reports of P.M. Erdogan's concern over the matter—even though significant action had not yet been recorded as of the publishing to the article. A hypothetical outlook on the likelihood, potential, and probability of a successful diplomatic reconciliation with the Kurds would have added value to Uslu's perspective.

The intentions of the PKK, particularly whether or not the organization will become a political representation of the Kurdish populace or remain an international terrorist nuisance, are a vital factor in the overall stability efforts in the Middle Eastern region. At the 2008 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association Panel on Ethnicity, Identity, Militancy, Two individuals presented a paper that includes a thorough case study of PKK ambitions and strategy. Lyubov Mincheva and Ted Gurr present their paper, *Unholy Alliances III: Communal Militants and Criminal Networks in the Middle East* in which they illuminate the interactions between political and economic activities by transnational terrorist organizations, citing the PKK as the prime example.

Mincheva and Gurr's paper represent an argument for the highest probability of sustaining the status quo in terms of the PKK's role in the Kurdish Question. It argues that, if the PKK makes any agenda shift away from political terrorism—which it does not necessarily advocate—then it would be one toward alliances with international criminal networks, not national diplomacy or political representation (Mincheva and Gurr 2008). Reasons given for this theoretical model are in three parts:

> ***"First***, the group is ultimately ideologically driven. It was established as a Marxist-Leninist organization and has sought the revolutionary overthrow of the Turkish government and the establishment of an independent Kurdistan in southeastern Turkey. ***Second***, the group is also pragmatically driven. It has forged alliances with narco-traffickers. Evidence suggests that the group has financed its separatist activities "by taxing narcotic traffickers..." ***Third,*** the group is a hybrid terrorist and criminal organization because its members are directly involved in illegal business. Turkish authorities claim that the PKK is involved in all phases

of drug trafficking, including production and storage, transportation and marketing." (M. and G. 2008).

This paper goes on to document the history of (attempted) non-violent political activism efforts by the PKK through the 1990's and 2000's to the present, and describes their varying levels of success. It includes the organizations background and motives sustaining its ideology and operational strategy. Specific focus is added to the criminal activity sector of the PKK international structure, particularly funding opportunism and alliance with other criminal and/or terrorist networks. The authors conclude that their analysis contains some assumptive and speculative information in the absence of definitive evidence (M. and G. 2008), yet they state there is enough historical progression and insular Kurdish development to prevent any formation of a Kurdish identity on the national and international scale, except that which already exists. Therefore the PKK, in the spirit of self-preservation and under the guise of political dissent, will continue to operate as it has with the exception of possible leaning toward more criminal endeavors and less separatist ideology.

Bill Park's chapter in the *Adelphi Papers* on "Turkey's Kurdish Complex" extrapolates the status of the Kurds in Turkey within the context of their historical role in the development of the Republic of Turkey's national identity. The history of the Turkish Kurds since the disbanding of Ottomanism is instrumental in illustrating the nature of their current role in regional stability. Park describes the rising of the PKK within this historical socio-political framework.

Kurdish rebellion and uprising against the Turkish state had been present ever since Kemal Ataturk's campaign to create a nationalist Turkish identity in 1923 was

successful. But whereas prior to the PKK's appearance in 1978, dissent and discourse were "largely spontaneous, tribally based, and generally lacked clearly articulated objectives" (Park 2005). He describes how the following two decades resulted in the rise and fall of the PKK under Abdullah Ocalan and after his capture in 1999, the separatist war in Turkey and its effects on the Iraqi Kurdish population as many fled to Iraq for refuge, and the lack of political oversight that eventually led to utter disdain by the Kurds for the government.

This chapter finally focuses a section on the Iraqi Kurds themselves and the strides they have made in the twenty-first century toward political integration and representation in the developing Iraqi government, post-Saddam. It includes a breakdown of U.S. involvement and serves a potential model for Turkey to emulate. While Park does not suggest that such a model would be successful in Turkey, he does indicate that significant U.S. efforts have been lent toward maintaining the peace in this region while the socio-cultural elements sort out their differences.

Understanding the Kurdish historical perspective, its role in the PKK's current status, and the U.S. influence on the subject is vital in understanding the future actions available to all actors. Park's brief history provides that perspective in a largely objective context.

Aliza Marcus's 2007 book, Blood and Belief is a much more detailed comprehensive history of the development of the Kurdish Question and the PKK since 1950 and pays particular attention to the role of Abdullah Ocalan as the leader. Her book is very thorough in describing the dynamics of the relationship between a relatively new Turkish republic and the matured Kurdish ethnicity and the PKK influence. Marcus's

story-telling approach to relating Kurdish history is indicative of a certain sympathetic element leaning toward the side of the Kurdish ethnicity. While her writing is not clearly supportive, nor reproachful of the PKK and Ocalan, it does tend to support the idea of an independent Kurdish state, despite the preponderance of practical evidence she illustrates against the notion. The theme throughout the book is that, essential to understanding modern-day Kurds and their continuing demands for an independent state is understanding the PKK as the premier leading force behind all serious PKK objectives (Marcus 2007).

Marcus served as a freelance international correspondent and invested over eight years of coverage and research into the PKK. She was among the first writers to be granted interviews with imprisoned PKK rebels and leadership, and thus includes many direct quotes in her writing. As such, much of the factual basis and supporting evidence for her book can be deemed highly credible.

III. Actors and Perceptions (LAMP Steps 2 and 3)

(2) Actors: For the purpose of this analysis, the major concern is how the current situation and dynamic among Iraq, Turkey, the PKK and the United States have an impact on the overall stability in this Middle Eastern region. With the U.S. presence in Iraq looking like it will not wind down any time soon, and the allied status of Turkey under NATO providing coalition support, the Kurdish phenomenon and the actions, objectives, and intentions of the PKK pose a critical piece of political stabilization effort. Clearly the United States, the government of Iraq, the government of Turkey, and the PKK organization are the key players.

(3) Perceptions

Turkish perceptions: "The idea of decentralization in administration (one of the major political components of traditional Ottomanism), was uniformly opposed by the Turkish nationalism…In other words, what Turkish nationalism would see in the unrest of Kurds was a set of obstacles delaying the dissemination of a modern political and administrative power into the Kurdish regions." (Yegen 2007). This statement best summarizes the Turkish national perspective on the Kurdish question. The history of the Turkish people since World War I to the present has created one of the strongest cases of national identity in the region. As such, the Turks are diametrically opposed to any divisive action or compromise that may weaken the geopolitical integrity of their country.

The strong nationalist sentiment within Turkey can best be attributed to the republican formation of the country's current governmental structure, brought about by Kemal Ataturk in 1923. "Kemalists," as the far right nationalists came to be called, fought vigorously for the solidarity of geographical borders, international recognition, and national sovereignty for the Turkish people. Under Ataturk's campaign for these objectives was the false promise to Kurds residing in the region that they "would enjoy full cultural and political rights in Turkey" (Park 2005). However, shortly after Ankara, the Turkish capitol was established and international identity was granted by the

Lausanne Treaty of 1923, the Kemalist regime embarked upon a brutal repression of tribal Kurdish

rebellions within the newly-established borders (Park 2005).

The "iron-fist" approach that the Turkish government took to quell any resistance to its

newfound independence would result in decade's worth of Kurdish oppression. In its attempt to unite

and strengthen its country, the government proscribed the Kurdish language in state sponsored

institutions and schools, eliminated all references to a recognized "Kurdistan" in official documents,

and tribal religious practices were outlawed due to the potential for secularism against Ankara (Park

2005). At the time, the majority the Turkish population supported those nationalization efforts of the

Kemalists, even referring to the Kurdish-dominated southwestern population as "mountain-Turks."

Kurdish resistance to Ankara was slight and easily overcome due to the decentralized and

unorganized dispersal of the Kurdish population among Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria (Caha 2010). It

would not be until their unification under Ocalan and the PKK that Turkish Kurds presented a

legitimate political threat to the Ankara agenda.

Clearly, the Turkish standpoint on official recognition of the Kurdish culture within its

borders deviated very little up to the present day, although the government's motives for

illegitimizing an autonomous Kurdish culture did evolve away from a strict nationalist agenda. In the

1950's as the government became preoccupied with the task of the dissemination of market relations

into the regions inhabited by Kurds, it began to perceive the Kurdish question around the

requirements for economic integration—sort of a means for more effective nation building. It was

during this time that a change in political power in Ankara brought with it a "new aim to bring all

regions of Turkey to contemporary levels of civilization" and "development was construed as a

means to remove the lack of integration between the [Kurdish] region and the national economy"

(Yegen 2007).

From the 1970's through the 1990's, globalization brought a drastic social and economic

transition for Turkish policy. By this time the PKK had assumed the bulk of control and coordination

of Kurdish dissention in Turkey, and Ankara did little decrease its efforts of forced assimilation. Under Ocalan's largely-propagandist campaign for Kurdish nationalism and his promotion of a potential armed conflict in the name of ideological reform, the PKK became the image of the Turkish Kurds, at least in the eyes of the government (Marcus 2007). The PKK delivered with armed opposition against the Turkish military for fifteen years starting in the 1980's that resulted in some thirty thousand casualties (Yegen 2007). It was also during this time period where the globalization of Turkey brought about internationalization of the Kurdish question, and the international community became more involved.

Turkish Kurds opposed to Ocalan's "Kurdistan Revolutionaries," as they came to be called, fled to Iraq for safe haven from the conflict, which was created largely due to American efforts in the Gulf War. Kurdish transnational nationalism in the 1990's had to do with such international and domestic developments as the Gulf War and the growing strength of ideas concerning identity, difference, cultural, and human rights (Yegen 2007). It is safe to say that at this time, alienation between the Kurds and the state increased significantly as the entire Kurdish region became more aware. Still, the Turkish perspective maintained its stance of staunch resistance to the "Kurdish insurgency" and no significant efforts for diplomatic reform were made (Marcus 2007).

It is important to note that not all Kurds in Turkey either fought or fled. Many Kurds in Turkey have, perforce or voluntarily, assimilated into Turkishness since the Republic's founding to the present day, and have not faced any massive discrimination in citizenship practices (Yegen 2007). As of 2005, there were approximately 15 million ethnic Kurds in Turkey, composing nearly 20% of the entire population and accounting for about half of all Kurds (Park 2005). It is currently the practice of the Turkish nationalists and the government to regard Kurds as "future-Turks" as long as they were compliant with Turkish law. The disparity against Turkish Kurds exists now against those involved with or openly supportive of the PKK or other dissention groups.

In the current age of global terrorism, the Turkish perception of the PKK evolved from one of political dissenters and separatists to an outright labeling of the organization as a terrorist group, as was previously stated. Perhaps this has to do with the increasingly agile means of operating an insurgency, which is the approach the PKK currently takes against Ankara. Also contributing could be the fact that, while discussion of diplomatic reform for the Kurdish Question has been approached by Turkish politicians, little actionable evidences has supported such an endeavor (Uslu 2007). Furthermore, with the growing acceptance of religious tolerance, cultural freedoms, and societal confluence that has been promoted more and more in Iraq and Turkey (in large part due to the US influence in the region post-9/11), and democratic solutions are giving way to die-hard nationalism (Caha 2010). Should the PKK undertake a mutual campaign of democratic reform with the Turkish government and cease terrorist tactics and affiliations, they may lose their international labeling as a "terrorist organization" although as of yet there is no indication of action in this direction.

Iraqi perceptions: Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq by U.S. forces, the perception of Iraqis on the Kurdish question has become one of acknowledgment and tolerance, and less one of open discourse, differing drastically from the Turkish perspective. Like Turkey, Iraq emerged from the Ottoman Empire in its quest for national identity. And, like Turkey, strategic considerations and political powers were the deciding factors in border assignments and political demarcation, rather than ethnographic logic or geographical circumstances, resulting in a share of ethnic Kurds residing in northern Iraq. Because the Iraqi government has been dramatically reformatted in the wake of Saddam's ousting, it is fair to take up their perception of the Kurdish Question around this timeframe.

While the PKK was essentially causing civil war in Turkey, they typically used the porous Turkey-Iraq border as a staging area for conducting operations in Turkey. As a result up until the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, Ankara and Baghdad had an agreement under which Turkish forces could exercise the right of pursuit into Iraq (Park 2005). Even after the 1988 up through 1997,

Turkey was allowed the capability of military excursion into Iraq for purposes of Ankara's PKK resistance efforts, albeit with slight consternation from Iraq. Major invasions by Turkish forces occurred in 1992, 1995, 1996, and 1997 despite some degree of protest from the Turks' neighbors (mainly Iran), and as of 2005, the Turkish military maintained a presence of anywhere from 1,500 to 10,000 troops in Iraq since 1997 in support of anti-PKK operations (Park 2005).

Following Iraq's defeat in 1991 after the Gulf War, the Kurds in Iraq seized the opportunity to present some small political representation in the form of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), which was formally recognized by the Iraqi government. The U.S. played a minor role in the aftermath of the Kurdish clash with the Saddam regime. Park best describes the Iraqi Kurd situation around this time and the subsequent formation of the KRG:

"Developments in Iraqi Kurdistan subsequent to the 1990–91 Gulf War substantially reinforced Turkish sensitivity regarding Kurdish aspirations for self-determination. The failure of the 1991 Kurdish uprising against Saddam was followed by a flood of approximately half a million terrified Iraqi Kurds to a zone near the Turkish border. The resulting humanitarian crisis brought the involvement of a US-led coalition, which created safe havens for the refugees and a 'no-fly-zone' policed from Incirlik air base in Turkey. With the unilateral withdrawal of Baghdad's forces southwards in October 1991, the self-governing KRG zone was established and dominated by the two leading Iraqi Kurdish political parties, the KDP and the PUK… Despite troubled relations between the KDP and PUK, this experiment in Kurdish self-government has given the inhabitants of the KRG a tangible sense of well-being and freedom. The KRG zone has thrived economically, relative both to the rest of Iraq and to the period preceding its establishment." (Park 2005).

The relative autonomy that the KRG enjoys in Iraq has given Turkey great cause for concern, mainly from the ideological standpoint. If the Iraqi Kurds are capable of and allowed to practice self-governance, what is to preclude the PKK from feeling justified in doing the same in Turkey? The KRG illustrates serious progression toward the establishment of an independent Kurdish state, which could create greater tension within, and among, the states with Kurdish minorities, and could threaten major regional instability. However, "Ankara's fears have survived tension and conflict between the PKK and Iraq's Kurds, and have not been assuaged by Iraqi Kurdish cooperation in Turkey's war with the PKK" (Park 2005).

It is in this light that the Iraq perception of Kurdish stability has held, as long as the KRG operates as a federation of Iraq and not an internationally recognized sovereignty. Furthermore, since the majority of armed conflict with the PKK is conducted by Turkish military—on either side of the border—Iraqi involvement with PKK affairs has been largely null. However since 2003 and U.S. occupation the Turks freedom of movement across the border has been an increasing source of political tension. It remains to be seen whether or not Iraq will assume PKK counterterrorism responsibilities along the Turkish border and within the Kurdish zone.

PKK perceptions: "The denial of the Kurds as a separate ethnic group and the suppression of their language gave rise to the development of an ethnic movement in Turkey…The debates and developments, around which Kurdish demands for independence and cultural rights grew, were the originators of uprisings and acts of terrorism." (Caha 2010). As has become evident thus far, the Kurds possessed more than sufficient motive for resistance to forced assimilation early on. Neither the establishment of the Turkish Republic as a nation-state nor the acceleration of reforms targeting the termination of the loose relations between the Kurds of the periphery (referring to Iraqi Kurds) and the political centre was welcomed by the Kurds (Yegen 2007).

Thus the PKK found its roots. Throughout the organization's development, it became the political scapegoat for many of the global crises. In the 1960's and 1970's it was attributed with spreading the prospect of Communism through Iraq and Turkey. In the Iraq-Iran War in 1988, the internal Kurdish factional conflicts, the largest of which emerged as the PKK, became the nexus of economic instability in the region (Ozcan 2006). It was not unheard of for regional militant units to contract Kurdish insurrectionists for their own small scale objectives (Marcus 2007), which undoubtedly resulted in further internal and external Kurdish conflict. All the while the quest for independence raged on a simple ideological foundation.

In 1999 Ocalan was captured and imprisoned by Turkish authorities, after which a rather unsteady cease fire agreement was enacted between the Turks and the PKK. Ocalan put out a unilateral appeal for leading PKK members to turn themselves in to Turkish authorities (Barrinha 2008). However, Ankara would not be too quick to forgive over fifty years of conflict, and maintained strict repression of the PKK. Additionally, Ocalan and his lieutenants proved through multiple ideological and political movements during imprisonment that the Kurdish nationalist following backed by the PKK could and would still be able to operate (Marcus 2007). Additionally, to combat the organizations lethargy that began to creep in due to indirectly de-centralized leadership and direction, "to restore their cadre's sense of purpose and maintain morale, as well as to attract new members, the leadership that was left active (during the period of decreased activity from 1999 to 2003) determined to return to a campaign of violence." (Uslu 2007). Thus the cease-fire essentially failed along with hopes national hopes for democratic reform.

Since then the PKK has delivered again a resurgence of what the international community has now considered terrorist activities. With the ghosted cease-fire agreement brought on by Ocalan's capture failing, any trust between PKK political legitimacy and Ankara has rapidly degraded. The Turkish military does not even consider the PKK as a legitimized organization (hence the "terrorist group" title awarded) and therefore treats its cease-fire agreements as meaningless

(Uslu 2007). While Ankara's intent for a united and fully integrated "Kurdish-Turkification" has still held true from the policy-makers perspective, the PKK's "war of ideas" has been unsuccessful in delivering anything but violent aggression against the government in Turkey. The reformist-nationalists that perceive the Kurdish question in terms of the prerequisites of transforming a heterogeneous social space *ruled* by force to a homogeneous social space *governed* by a modern nation-state has not taken root after seven decades of conflict (Yegen 2007).

IV. Research Design

      The Lockwood Analytic Method for Prediction is the research design model used in this

predictive analysis. The following explanation and step-by-step procedures (the first three of which

have already been accomplished up to this point as indicated by the standard numerals preceding

each heading) of this technique are borrowed from the INTL 504 Course Materials Lesson Handout

entitled *Using the LAMP*, and is not my own work.

The Lockwood Analytic Method for Prediction (LAMP) technique is a systematic method for predicting short-term, unique behaviors (vice continuous or recurring, cyclical behaviors) (see Lockwood and O'Brien Lockwood 1993). Using primarily qualitative empirical data, LAMP allows the analyst to predict the most likely outcomes for specific research questions. LAMP analyses are anchored in rational choice theory, synthesizing tenets of rational choice with tenets of other predictive analytic techniques such as Alternative Futures and the Delphi Method. The steps of the LAMP process are presented below along with an example of using LAMP to predict the future of the Colombian Peace Process after the 2002 Colombian Presidential Elections.

Step 1. Determine the issue (behavior) for which you are trying to predict the most likely future. What is your specific research question? (Note: Keep your questions precise and limited. Questions that include too many actors, too many courses of action, or too many major scenarios will make the number of permutations that must be analyzed too large for the LAMP technique to be easily used.)

Step 2. Specify the "actors" involved in the issue. (Note: This tips you that LAMP is principally an agency or "free will" approach using rational choice. Step 3 ensures that not only the agency factors, but also structural factors are included in the analysis.)

Step 3. Perform an in-depth study of how each actor perceives the issue in question. (Note: This is the most difficult and time-consuming part of the analysis. It usually requires both a literature review and fieldwork. The analyst must study all the historical, structural (social, political, and economic), and psychological/ motivational issues affecting the actors involved. Here is also where you must avoid "mirror-imaging," taking measures to reduce the effects of your own biased "lens" about the issues or actors involved.)

Step 4. Specify all possible courses of action for each actor. List your assumptions. (Note: It is not necessary for the actors to have the same courses of action. It is also permissible here to assume that one actor will always move (act) before the other(s).)

Step 5. Determine the major scenarios (changing environments/conditions) within which you will compare the alternate futures. List your assumptions.

Step 6. Calculate the total number of permutations of possible "alternate futures" for each scenario.

Step 7. Perform a "pair wise comparison" of all alternate futures to determine their relative possibility. (Note: The winner of each comparison gets one vote. An individual analyst, group of analysts, or the Delphi technique can be used to complete this step. It should be obvious that any change in the previous assumptions will result in different results for the pair wise comparisons.)

Step 8. Rank order the alternate futures for each scenario from highest relative probability to the lowest based on the number of "votes" received.

Step 9. Assuming that each scenario occurs, analyze the possible futures with the highest relative probabilities (i.e., most votes) in terms of its/their consequences for the issue in question.

At this point in the LAMP process you have enough information to predict the most likely futures (behaviors) and their consequences. The points that follow call for the construction of an "indications and warning" problem that allows the recognition of when a particular alternate future is about to occur.

Step 10. State the potential of a given alternate future to "transpose" into another alternate future.

Note: This also highlights the role of deterring how sequential moves (i.e., who moves first) play in these analyses.

Step 11. Determine the "focal events" that must occur in our present in order to bring about a given alternate future.

Step 12. Develop indicators (measures) for the focal events.

Reference:
Lockwood, Jonathan S. and O'Brien Lockwood, Kathleen, "The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP)" monograph prepared for the Joint Military Intelligence College, Washington, D.C., December 1993.

V. Analysis (LAMP Steps 4-12)

(4) Courses of Action (CoA) for each actor and Assumptions

Turkey, Iraq, and the PKK have the following two courses of action:

CoA-1 (FITE): Actors will continue along the rejectionist paths of an internationally recognized independent Kurdish state. Conflict will continue and democratic resolution will not be achieved.

CoA-2 (TALK): Actors will agree to terms of bilateral Kurdish political representation within the Iraqi and the Turkish governments, thereby eliminating the open conflict among them.

Assumptions: Under these two courses of action, the following assumptions are applicable.

Both CoA's assume that U.S. involvement will not sway any actor more or less toward any one action. To this point, the United States has taken a minimalist role in all affairs regarding Kurdish "terrorists" and the governments of Iraq and Turkey, therefore despite U.S. recognition of the PKK as a terrorist organization, no significant counterterrorist action will be taken against the PKK.

Furthermore, it is assumed that the current Iraqi arrangement with the KRG will not be altered from its current state and that the PKK's resistance efforts against the Turkish government will not directly involve the KRG. Kurds in Iraq have apparently stabilized any outright conflict with the Iraqi government and PKK influence in the Iraqi Kurdish autonomous region is minimal.

It is also assumed that Kurdish political representation in Turkey would be headed by a legitimized PKK. This assumption indicates that once the PKK and the Turkish government reached a democratic representational agreement, all hostile acts by the PKK against Ankara will unanimously come to a halt.

Finally it can be assumed that due to the historical pattern, there will never be an internationally recognized "Kurdistan." The socio-cultural and geopolitical relations have not indicated in over 70 years any acceptance of this notion among the actors.

(5) Major Scenarios

Scenario 1: Regional stability is not achieved due to a failure to reach a diplomatic agreement among Turkey, Iraq, and the PKK. Terrorist organization status remains associated with PKK.

Scenario 2: Regional stability is achieved among Iraq, Turkey, and the PKK as the PKK ceases to operate in a terrorist capacity and becomes legitimized as a political representative entity.

Assumptions: Here it is assumed that the coalition environment in the region in support of the global anti-terrorism strategy will not change. Therefore there will remain in the area a significant number of coalition military and Status of Forces agreements with each actor.

(6) Number of Alternative Futures

$x^y = z$, where X is the number of courses of action for each player and Y is the number of players

Each actor has 2 possible courses of action (x = 2)
There are 3 actors involved (y = 3)
Number of possible alternative futures (2^3) is equal to 8.

(Table 1)

FUTURE #	TKY	IRQ	PKK	
1	FITE	FITE	FITE	*Historical trend
2	FITE	FITE	TALK	
3	FITE	TALK	FITE	*Current situation (2010)
4	FITE	TALK	TALK	
5	TALK	FITE	FITE	
6	TALK	FITE	TALK	
7	TALK	TALK	FITE	
8	TALK	TALK	TALK	

FITE – Continue in state of conflict
TALK – Achieve political democratic representation

There are eight alternative futures associated with this analysis and under the given assumptions. Combined with two scenarios, there exists the possibility of sixteen potential outcomes

(7) Pair-wise Comparison of Alternate Futures

SCENARIO 1: Regional stability is not achieved due to a failure to reach a diplomatic agreement among Turkey, Iraq, and the PKK. Terrorist organization status remains associated with PKK.

(Table 2a)

FUTURE #	TKY	IRQ	PKK	Votes
1	FITE	FITE	FITE	5
2	FITE	FITE	TALK	4
3	FITE	TALK	FITE	6
4	FITE	TALK	TALK	7
5	TALK	FITE	FITE	3
6	TALK	FITE	TALK	1
7	TALK	TALK	FITE	2
8	TALK	TALK	TALK	0

SCENARIO 2: Regional stability is achieved among Iraq, Turkey, and the PKK as the PKK ceases to operate in a terrorist capacity and becomes legitimized as a political representative entity.

(Table 2b)

FUTURE #	TKY	IRQ	PKK	Votes
1	FITE	FITE	FITE	0
2	FITE	FITE	TALK	3
3	FITE	TALK	FITE	3
4	FITE	TALK	TALK	4
5	TALK	FITE	FITE	1
6	TALK	FITE	TALK	5
7	TALK	TALK	FITE	6
8	TALK	TALK	TALK	7

(8) Rank Order Alternative Futures

SCENARIO 1: Regional stability is not achieved due to a failure to reach a diplomatic agreement among Turkey, Iraq, and the PKK. Terrorist organization status remains associated with PKK.

(Table 3a)

FUTURE #	TKY	IRQ	PKK	Votes
4	FITE	TALK	TALK	7
3	FITE	TALK	FITE	6
1	FITE	FITE	FITE	5
2	FITE	FITE	TALK	4
5	TALK	FITE	FITE	3
7	TALK	TALK	FITE	2
6	TALK	FITE	TALK	1
8	TALK	TALK	TALK	0

SCENARIO 2: Regional stability is achieved among Iraq, Turkey, and the PKK as the PKK ceases to operate in a terrorist capacity and becomes legitimized as a political representative entity.

(Table 3B)

FUTURE #	TKY	IRQ	PKK	Votes
8	TALK	TALK	TALK	7
7	TALK	TALK	FITE	6
6	TALK	FITE	TALK	5
4	FITE	TALK	TALK	4
2	FITE	FITE	TALK	3
3	FITE	TALK	FITE	2
5	TALK	FITE	FITE	1
1	FITE	FITE	FITE	0

(9) Analyze Consequences of Alternate Futures

SCENARIO 1: Regional stability is not achieved due to a failure to reach a diplomatic agreement among Turkey, Iraq, and the PKK. Terrorist organization status remains associated with PKK.

(Reference Table 3a) Assuming that Scenario 1 occurs and stability among the actors does not

occur, the most likely alternative future involves Iraq and PKK reaching an agreement between

themselves, but conflict remaining where Turkey is involved. This conflict would mostly be with

the PKK seeing as how Iraq and Turkey have withheld a non-aggressive posture toward one

another. PKK terrorist activity would likely continue.

The second most likely future under this scenario involves Iraq willing to include Kurds in the

democratic process, but the other two actors maintaining conflict. This is most in line with the

current situation as Iraq and PKK have no direct interaction.

SCENARIO 2: Regional stability is achieved among Iraq, Turkey, and the PKK as the PKK ceases to operate in a terrorist capacity and becomes legitimized as a political representative entity.

(Reference Table 3b) If Scenario 2 were to occur and regional stability is achieved, then

obviously the most likely future would be Iraq, Turkey, and the PKK all agreeing to a firm cease

fire and rejecting further hostile action and conflict. Implications here would be that the Kurdish

ethnic group would gain equal footing in the governments' representation, while still being

subjected to that government. Thus PKK would no longer utilize terrorist tactics.

The second most likely future involves Turkey and Iraq achieving stability, which would

essentially require giving into the PKK demands. If the PKK were the only group willing to fight

over the issue of Kurdish autonomy, then Turkey would be forced to acquiesce and PKK

demands would be met.

(10 and 11) Focal Events for Alternate Futures and Indicators

SCENARIO 1: Regional stability is not achieved due to a failure to reach a diplomatic agreement among Turkey, Iraq, and the PKK. Terrorist organization status remains associated with PKK.

Future # 4 (7 votes): Under this possible future, Turkey does not give in to Kurdish autonomy under an circumstances, despite what interactions the PKK and Iraqi government may have with one another. The case for Turkish nationalism is among the strongest and does not remotely lend any sway to Kurdish representation. The only event allowing stability to be achieved between the Turks and the PKK would be for Turkish Kurds to acquiesce to complete forced assimilation— something that the PKK ideology is utterly poised against.

FOCAL EVENT/INDCATORS – PKK ideology crumbles and/or the party disbands or is militarily defeated by the Turks. If this were to occur, Turkish Kurds would be forced into accepting Turkish nationalist policies.

Future #3 (6 votes): In this possible future, Iraqi Kurds maintain their autonomous region under Iraqi government federal authority, but Turkey and the PKK both remain in a state of conflict, thereby preventing regional stability from being attained.

FOCAL EVENT/INDICATORS – PKK, who will maintain conflict with the Turkish government, resents and rejects stability in Iraq and the relative peace between the Iraqi government and Iraqi Kurds. The focal event here would be to observe if PKK terrorist operations begin targeting Iraqis—their government and/or their Kurdish populace. If either were to occur, what little bit of stability was achieved by the Iraqi political process would be significantly disrupted. Strong indicators would a rise in internal Kurdish conflict among Kurdish factions.

SCENARIO 2: Regional stability is achieved among Iraq, Turkey, and the PKK as the PKK ceases to operate in a terrorist capacity and becomes legitimized as a political representative entity.

Future #8 (7 votes): Under this scenario and possible future, Iraq, Turkey, and the PKK can peaceably resolve their ethnic and socio-cultural ideals. For this to occur the PKK would have to renounce their terrorist ties, form a cooperative arrangement with the Turkish authorities and the Iraqi government and potentially establish their own representation with both governments.

FOCAL EVENT/INDICATORS – All terrorist ties that the PKK has employed and associated with must be severed completely for this stability to be attained. The research indicates that the PKK is imbedded too deeply with other organized terrorist and/or criminal networks, making such an event unlikely to occur. If the PKK were to openly oppose terrorism and support the regional counterterrorist efforts, they themselves could potentially become targets of other terrorist organizations. Indicators of Turkish and Iraqi Kurds becoming terrorist targets would be brought on by either the PKK no longer holding dominance over the Kurdish resistance effort, or another actor becoming involved in the regional stability efforts.

Future #7 (6 votes): For this possible future the Turks and the Iraqis must either completely eliminate the fighting capability of the Kurdish resistance movement for stability to be attained within the region. This might occur through a joint Kurdish suppression effort by Turkey and Iraq.

FOCAL EVENT/INDICATORS - PKK network is effectively neutralized, either by forceful suppression or assimilation. Since the PKK is the only actor instigating conflict, the organization must exhaust all fighting capability on their own, lose their backing by the Kurdish population, or otherwise lose their ability to wage an effective resistance campaign against the Turks.

(12) Assessment of Potential for Transposition Between Alternate Futures

SCENARIO 1: Regional stability is not achieved due to a failure to reach a diplomatic agreement among Turkey, Iraq, and the PKK. Terrorist organization status remains associated with PKK.

The potential exists for alternate futures to overlap due to the intra-national relationships among the actors. The Turkish standpoint against the PKK has changed very little over 70 years of conflict, therefore it is reasonable to assume that any transposition will be reactive on the part of the PKK. If Turkey were to continue its efforts at forced assimilation of Turkish Kurds, the PKK must increase its resistance efforts via terrorist activity. Such an escalation of conflict would indicate that regional stability would not be attained, especially if the conflict were to bleed over into Iraq where the relatively peaceful arrangement between the Iraqi government and the Iraqi Kurds has held for approximately seven years.

Additionally, if the PKK were to expand its campaign against Iraqi Kurds or the government of Iraq, the only potential for stability would be total neutralization of the PKK and its terrorist affiliates and acceptance of Turkish nationalism by the Turkish Kurd population.

SCENARIO 2: Regional stability is achieved among Iraq, Turkey, and the PKK as the PKK ceases to operate in a terrorist capacity and becomes legitimized as a political representative entity.

In order for regional stability to hold the PKK must voluntarily renounce terrorism and embrace the political process. Such action is against the prime PKK ideology as it has stood

since the beginning of the ethnic conflict. A cessation of conflict initiated by Turkey similarly contradicts the ingrained and staunch Turkish nationalist sentiment. Since Turkey has maintained military and operational superiority over all Kurdish resistance to date, this is unlikely to occur. Nevertheless, if the Kurdish factions in Iraq and Turkey were to present a unity of effort as yet unseen, they could potentially threaten the Turkish and Iraqi stabilization efforts to an extent similar to that see in the 15-year rebellion in the 1980's and 1990's. Obviously if that were to occur any stability theretofore achieved would be undermined.

VI. Conclusion

The historical trend of Turkish nationalist sentiment and its clash with PKK ideology indicates that neither side will be able to diplomatically resolve the issues causing conflict, especially while the PKK is currently developing greater terrorist and criminal organizational ties. It is the most likely predication that conflict will continue along the current course between these two actors until something disrupts the status quo. The Iraqi Kurds and the government of Iraq have thus far held a mutually beneficial arrangement that seems to function well enough internally. Providing that the Turkish government and the Turkish Kurd extremist do nothing to disrupt the Iraqi balance, and Iraq does nothing to significantly interfere with the Turkish-Kurd conflict, then regional stability among the three will not be obtained in the near future.

A decisive factor in this issue would be if the United States implemented a course of action or campaign against the PKK terrorist organization. While such efforts have not been made in this direction to date, as U.S. counterterrorism efforts have targeted mainly al-Qaeda organizations, the possibility of U.S. intervention on the side of the Turks, as a NATO ally, should not be completely discounted at this time.

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